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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Arguments from design in Hume's day were often cast as arguments from analogy. For instance, a very simple version might read like this: ‘The universe resembles a machine; machines are the products of intelligent design; therefore, the universe is (probably) the product of intelligent design.’ Design arguments (usually of a more sophisticated sort) were put forward by some of the greatest scientists of the time, including Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton. Such arguments were generally thought to be on a par with the conclusions of physics: Hume raised a number of well-known objections to such design arguments. I am going to discuss one of these objections, the claim that the uniqueness of the universe is, in itself, a bar to our drawing any conclusion about its cause or origin. This objection is raised by Hume at the end of ‘Of a Particular Providence’ and in Part II of the Dialogues.
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18 Hume's particular target is the Newtonian design argument, but his argument here applies equally to any theory of the origin of the universe, even a purely materialistic account. Hume regards all such theories as mere conjectures, though Philo seems to concede a slight advantage to design in Part XII of the Dialogues. On Newtonian design arguments, see Hurlbutt, Robert, Hume, Newton, and the Design Argument, rev. ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), pp. 135–49.Google Scholar On Hume's opposition to other origin theories see the discussion by Heath, Peter, ‘The Incredulous Hume’, American Philosophical Quarterly, xiii (1976), 159–63.Google Scholar The controversy about Philo's apparent concession to design is discussed at length by Pike, Nelson, Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. 204–38.Google Scholar
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36 Ian Hacking points out that the oscillating universe theory, unlike the many worlds theory, makes the presence of life in this universe strictly a matter of chance. There may be infinitely many oscillations, but as far as we know this universe might be the first of them. Life did turn up here, but it was not inevitable. By contrast, the appearance of life is inevitable in the many worlds theory, since all possible universes in that theory are actualized. See ‘The Inverse Gambler's Fallacy: the Argument from Design. The Anthropic Principle Applied to Wheeler Universes’, Mind, lxxvi (1987), pp. 331–40.Google Scholar
37 The hypothesis of‘intelligent design’ considered here is usually expressed in some mental metaphor. For instance, it is said that the universe shows evidence of having been ‘carefully thought out’, it seems to have been ‘expecting us’, and so on. The point of this hypothesis is that the universe is purposely constructed so as to allow for the appearance of life, and this in turn suggests that the universe is controlled by some cosmic mind. None of this amounts to anything like a complete theology, but then no one should expect to take a complete theology from the design argument. The historic function of design arguments, from Plato and the Stoics, to Boyle, Newton, and Paley, has been to support a teleological conception of the world against a purely naturalistic or materialistic interpretation. This is also its function here. Of course, nothing prevents us from elaborating the design hypothesis into a theology that also draws from other sources. Many people (perhaps including Paul Davies) will wish to do so.