No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
One of the most annoying things to many a student of St Anselm's Proslogion is the way in which many philosophers assume that they can make Anselm's argument disappear simply by uttering the incantation, ‘Existence is not a predicate’. Some recent studies of the argument1 have tried to rescue it from Kant's dictum by showing that this criticism does not apply to Anselm's so-called ‘second’ ontological argument. This argument appears in chapter III of Proslogion and depends on a distinction between ‘necessary existence’ and ‘contingent existence’. Both Malcolm and Hartshorne are content, however, to let the better known ‘first’ argument (Proslogion, chapter II) rest in the oblivion to which Kant assigned it.
page 121 note 1 Malcolm, Norman, ‘Anselm's Ontological Arguments’ in Philosophical Review, vol. lxix (1960), pp. 41–62.CrossRefGoogle ScholarHartshorne, Charles, The Logic of Perfection (Lasalle. Open Court, 1961).Google Scholar
page 121 note 2 Charlesworth, M. J., St Anselm's Proslogion (Oxford, 1965).Google Scholar
page 121 note 3 Ibid. p. 58.
page 122 note 1 It is also relevant to the objection that existence cannot be a perfection in things like cancer or slums. Cf. ibid. p. 64.
page 122 note 2 Ibid. pp. 69–70.
page 122 note 3 Grant, C. K., ‘The Ontological Disproof of the Devil’ in Analysis, vol. 17 (1956–1957), pp. 71–72.Google Scholar
page 122 note 4 Cock, Albert A., ‘The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol. xviu (1917–1918), pp. 363–384.Google Scholar
page 123 note 1 Cock, Albert A., ‘The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol. xviu (1917–1918), pp. 365.Google Scholar
page 123 note 2 Ibid.
page 123 note 3 Ibid. p. 381.
page 125 note 1 Charlesworth, op. cit. pp. 93–94.
page 126 note 1 Cf. Anselm, , Reply to Gaunilo, 1, iii, v.Google Scholar