No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Expressions used in religious contexts have often seemed odd and paradoxical to philosophers. Statements have appeared in Christian discourse to the effect that God is not a person and yet is a person, that he is a servant and a king, that he is nothingness and being itself. These statements appear unintelligible either because their terms are self-contradictory or because they are mutually exclusive.
page 144 note 1 See my paper, ‘Some Aspects of Ian Ramsey's Empiricism’, International journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. iii, No. 1, Spring 1972, pp. 2–17.Google Scholar
page 144 note 2 Religious Language (London: S.C.M. Press, 1957), p. 65.Google Scholar
page 144 note 3 Quoted in Mehta, Ved, The New Theologian (New York, Harper and Row, 1965), p. 119.Google Scholar
page 145 note 1 Religious Language, pp. 53, 61, 73; Religion and Science: Conflict and Synthesis (London: S.P.C.K., 1964), p. 23Google Scholar; Models and Mystery (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 15–16, 57–9Google Scholar; ‘Letter to the Editor’, Theology, Vol. LXVIII, No. 536 (February 1965), p. 109Google Scholar; Christian Discourse: Some Logical Explorations (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 5, 66–67, 88–89Google Scholar; ‘Models and Mystery: a reply’, Theoria to Theory, vol. I (April 1967), pp. 264–5.Google Scholar
page 145 note 2 Black, Max, Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 222.Google Scholar
page 145 note 3 Christian Discourse, pp. 71, 74; ‘Talking about God: Models, Ancient and Modern’, Myth and Symbol, ed. Dillistone, F. W. (London: S.P.C.K., 1966), p. 95.Google Scholar
page 145 note 4 Religious Language, p. 62.
page 145 note 5 Models and Mystery, pp. 60–1.
page 146 note 1 Models and Mystery pp. 51–3.
page 146 note 2 Black, , op. cit., pp. 24–47.Google Scholar
page 146 note 3 Religious Language, p. 66.
page 146 note 4 ibid. p. 65.
page 147 note 1 Religious Language, pp. 57–8
page 148 note 1 Ramsey implicitly identifies wisdom with knowledge. Wisdom, however, can appear in the absence of knowledge. It involves not only reflection about things, but also sound judgment about a way of life that is not arrived at solely by argumentation. The terms have different, albeit related, meanings.
page 148 note 2 ‘Empiricism and Religion’, The Christian Scholar, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, June 1956, p. 161Google Scholar; ‘Contemporary Philosophy and the Christian Faith’, Religious Studies, vol. I (1965), p. 61.Google Scholar
page 148 note 3 Models and Mystery, p. 30.
page 149 note 1 On Being Sure in Religion (London: The Athlone Press, 1963), p. 62.Google Scholar
page 149 note 2 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, translated by Anscombe, G. E. M. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), section 40.Google Scholar
page 149 note 3 Quine, W. O., Word and Object (Cambridge: Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960), p. 109.Google Scholar
page 149 note 4 Geach, Peter, God and the Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 81.Google Scholar
page 151 note 1 ‘History and the Gospels: Some Philosophical Reflections’, Studia Evangelica, vol. VIII, Pt. II, Sect. VI (1961), pp. 212–14Google Scholar; Models and Mystery, pp. 38–40.
page 151 note 2 Religion and Science, p. 69.
page 151 note 3 ‘Talking about God’, p. 90.
page 151 note 4 ‘On the Possibility and Purpose of a Metaphysical Theology’, Prospect for Metaphysics, ed. Ramsey, I. T. (London: George and Unwin, Ltd., 1961), p. 176.Google Scholar
page 152 note 1 These groupings include some qualified models discussed in Ramsey's work that are not mentioned specifically elsewhere in this article.
page 152 note 2 Ramsey discusses the possibility of using ‘Evil’ as a model in Religious Language, pp. 80–88. He suggests that the term may be so used if it is suitably qualified, for example, by a narrative that does not function on the descriptive level. He does not explain why the model, ‘Evil’, requires the very special qualification that he gives it.
page 153 note 1 Beardsley, Monroe, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1958), p. 142.Google Scholar
page 154 note 1 Black, , op. cit., pp. 222–3.Google Scholar