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The ontological argument and the motivational centres of lives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2010

ALEXANDER R. PRUSS
ALEXANDER R. PRUSS*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX 76798-7273
*
e-mail: Alexander_Pruss@baylor.edu
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Abstract

Assuming S5, the main controversial premise in modal ontological arguments is the possibility premise, such as that possibly a maximally great being exists. I shall offer a new way of arguing that the possibility premise is probably true.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 233 - 249
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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