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Optimism without theism? Nagasawa on atheism, evolution, and evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 August 2021

Guy Kahane Open the ORCID record for Guy Kahane [Opens in a new window]
Guy Kahane*
Affiliation:
Pembroke College, St. Aldates, OX1 1DW, Oxford, UK
*
Corresponding author: Guy Kahane, email: guy.kahane@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

Nagasawa has argued that the suffering associated with evolution presents a greater challenge to atheism than to theism because that evil is incompatible with ‘existential optimism’ about the world – with seeing the world as an overall good place, and being thankful that we exist. I argue that even if atheism was incompatible with existential optimism in this way, this presents no threat to atheism. Moreover, it is unclear how the suffering associated with evolution could on its own undermine existential optimism. Links between Nagasawa's argument and the current debate about the axiology of (a)theism are also explored.

Keywords

problem of evilevolutionsufferingatheismtheismoptimismpessimismaxiology of theismgratitude
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , December 2022 , pp. 701 - 714
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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