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The philosophy of filioque

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 May 2018

NIKK EFFINGHAM
NIKK EFFINGHAM*
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
*
e-mail: nikk.effingham@gmail.com
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Abstract

This article offers a model of the Trinity dealing with various objections to the filioque clause. I deal with three worries: the problem of double procession; the problem of the Father's omnipotence; worries about the Spirit's subordination. The model has two main commitments: (i) relations like proceeding, begetting, generation, etc. are causal relations; (ii) each Divine Person is caused by the other two Divine Persons. The model also allows for the Father's elevation over and above the Spirit and the Son. I end by discussing some problems for this revisionary scheme.1

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 54 , Special Issue 3: Metaphysics of the Trinity: New Directions , September 2018 , pp. 297 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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