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Religious exclusivism unlimited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2010

JEROEN DE RIDDER
JEROEN DE RIDDER*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
*
email: g.de_ridder@ph.vu.nl
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Abstract

Like David Silver before them, Erik Baldwin and Michael Thune argue that the facts of religious pluralism present an insurmountable challenge to the rationality of basic exclusive religious belief as construed by Reformed Epistemology. I will show that their argument is unsuccessful. First, their claim that the facts of religious pluralism make it necessary for the religious exclusivist to support her exclusive beliefs with significant reasons is one that the reformed epistemologist has the resources to reject. Secondly, they fail to demonstrate that it is impossible for basic religious beliefs to return to their properly basic state after defeaters against them have been defeated. Finally, I consider whether there is perhaps a similar but better argument in the neighbourhood and conclude in the negative. Reformed Epistemology's defence of exclusivism thus remains undefeated.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , December 2011 , pp. 449 - 463
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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