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(Ad-)ventures in faith: a critique of Bishop's doxastic-venture model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2014

AMBER L. GRIFFIOEN
AMBER L. GRIFFIOEN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, PO Box 22, 78457 Konstanz, Germany e-mail: amber.griffioen@uni-konstanz.de
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Abstract

While some philosophical models reduce religious faith to either mere belief or affect, more recent accounts have begun to look at the volitional component of faith. In this spirit, John Bishop has defended the notion of faith as a ‘doxastic venture’. In this article, I consider Bishop's view in detail and attempt to show that his account proves on the one hand too permissive and on the other too restrictive. Thus, although the doxastic-venture model offers certain advantages over other prominent views in the philosophy of religion, it still falls short of providing us with an ultimately satisfactory account of religious faith.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 51 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 513 - 529
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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