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Deception and the Trinity: a rejoinder to Tuggy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2011

WILLIAM HASKER
WILLIAM HASKER*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Huntington University, 2303 College Avenue, Huntington, IN 46750
*
e-mail: whasker@huntington.edu
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Abstract

Dale Tuggy argues that his divine-deception argument against Social Trinitarianism remains unscathed, in spite of my recent objections. I maintain that his argument is question-begging and exegetically weak, and does not succeed in refuting Social Trinitarianism.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 117 - 120
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

Notes

1. Tuggy, Dale‘Divine deception and monotheism: a reply to Hasker’, Religious Studies, 47 (2011), 109–115CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In-text references are to this paper.

2. Readers who have seen only the present exchange might suppose that Tuggy's opposition is only to Social Trinitarianism, and that he is open to other versions of Trinitarian doctrine. That would be a mistake. He is equally opposed to all the other versions of Trinitarianism on offer, and I doubt that any of them (other than explicitly modalist views) would qualify as monotheistic by his lights. Tuggy now considers himself a unitarian (private communication).

3. Among other texts, see John 1.1–3, 14, 18; 5.17–18; 20.28–29; Romans 9.5 (cf. Acts 20.28); Philippians 2.5–10; Colossians 1.15–17; Titus 2.13; Hebrews 1.1–3, 8–12. It should be stated that Tuggy would not agree with the traditional reading of these passages that I am assuming here. I believe, however, that he faces a monumental exegetical task if he is to render these passages consistent with his unitarian Christology. (I am not at this point debating with those who would see the high Christology of these texts as a questionable late elaboration; Tuggy, as we have noted, claims to be a unitarian for biblical reasons.)

4. Tuggy refers to the philosophy of religion text, Reason and Religious Belief, of which I am a co-author: Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, & David Basinger Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 4th edn (New York NY: Oxford University Press, 2009). So I would call to his attention the following note, which occurs in every edition of that volume: ‘Note that we say God is “personal,” not that God is a person. The latter assertion would be a controversial one, accepted by some theists but not by all. According to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, there are three persons in God, designated as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: these persons are capable of personal relationships between themselves as well as with created persons. Nevertheless, it is common in Christian discourse to refer to ‘God’ – that is, to the Trinity – as to a single person. Jews and Muslims, on the other hand, emphatically reject the doctrine of the Trinity'; 87, n. 13. One may hope that this is sufficient to avoid the ‘deception’ of which Tuggy complains.