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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
The problem of evil may be characterized as the problem of how precisely to specify a property, P, about which it is possible for a morally sensitive man to believe that (I) a person who possesses it would be morally justified on that account in not preventing instances of intense innocent suffering and (2) it is neither impossible nor unlikely that if there is an omnipotent and omniscient being, he possesses it. Atheists have typically claimed that P cannot be precisely specified. Moreover, they have maintained that in view of our inability to give a precise specification of P, it is irrational to believe that there is an omnipotent and omniscient being who is perfectly good and, hence, irrational to believe that God exists. In the remainder of this paper, I want to discuss the question whether there is any good reason for believing that this latter thesis is true.1 If there is no such reason, then no matter how much he may busy himself with an attempt at formulating a precise specification of P, the theist can be justifiably contented with the thought that it doesn't much matter whether he succeeds.
page 383 note 1 Some philosophers who have recently disagreed with the thesis are: (I) Pike, Nelson, ‘Hume on Evil’ in God and Evil, ed. by Pike, Nelson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), p. 102Google Scholar; (2) Plantinga, Alvin, God and Other Minds (Ithaca, New York, 1967), pp. 115–30Google Scholar; (3) Mavrodes, George I., Belief in God (New York, 1970), pp. 92–3Google Scholar; (4) Ahern, M. B., The Problem of Evil (London, 1971)Google Scholar; (5) Yandell, Keith E., ‘A Premature Farewell to Theism’, Religious Studies, 5 (1969), 251–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Recent advocates of the thesis are: (I) Puccetti, Roland, ‘The Loving God-Some Observations on John Hicks' Evil and the God of Love’, Religious Studies, 2 (1966–1967), 266–7Google Scholar; and (2) Richman, Robert J., ‘The Argument from Evil’, Religious Studies, 4, (1968–1969), 203–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 384 note 1 Those philosophers to whom this appears too strong a component of the above necessary condition of being justified in failing to prevent an s may substitute the following, weaker component: X has a justified belief that (a) the innocent sufferer is a person to whom X does not have the envisaged special obligations and (b) X would have to inconvenience himself (at least) in order to prevent the s; and X is not directly confronted with the innocent sufferer's plea for help. It is clear that this weakened component is not applicable to God, since an omnipotent and omniscient being would know that he could prevent s's without inconveniencing himself.
page 387 note 1 On this definition, it is possible for there to be mistaken B-beliefs, and hence X may have a B-belief that something is the case without knowing that it is the case.
page 387 note 2 Since God is omnipotent, this could be so only if God's abolishing s's were (not just causally but) logically sufficient for those states of affairs.
page 387 note 3 The theist might claim instead that he has a B-belief that God's abolishing s's which he does not in fact abolish would bring about the envisaged states of affairs but that he does not have a B-belief that the abolishing of s's by human beings would have this consequence. However, in the absence of a more precise specification of the undesirable states of affairs under discussion, it is surely highly unplausible that the theist should have the former B-belief even though he does not have the latter one. Or, at any rate, this is so unless the theist knows a cogent demonstration of God's existence. Such a demonstration, coupled with the knowledge that J1..J4 are all the justifications for not preventing s's which are applicable to human beings, would lend strong support to the claim that the theist has a B-belief that God's abolishing s's would have the consequence under discussion but does not have a similar B-belief about himself. But (as many theists admit) it is highly doubtful that anyone has constructed a cogent demonstration of God's existence.
page 388 note 1 See p. 387, n. 3.
page 389 note 1 Ivan, in The Brothers Karamazov, may be making such a commitment when he says ‘I understand, of course, what an upheaval of the universe it will be, when everthing in heaven and earth blends in one hymn of praise and everything that lives and has lived cries aloud “Thou art just, O Lord, for Thy ways are revealed’…it really may happen that if I live to that moment, or rise again to see it, I, too, perhaps, may cry aloud with the rest…“Thou art just, O Lord!” but I don't want to cry aloud then. While there is still time, I hasten to protect myself and so I renounce the higher harmony altogether. It's not worth the tears of that one tortured child…’ Dostoyevsky, , The Brothers Karamazov, translated by Garnett, Constance (Random House, New York, 1950), p. 290.Google Scholar
page 389 note 2 Nelson Pike (op. cit.) is correct in maintaining that an a priori proof of God's existence would render the problem of evil ‘a noncrucial perplexity of relatively minor importance’. But it is much less clear that he is right in claiming that holding God's existence as an item of faith also takes the sting out of the problem. For holding God's existence as an item of faith is hardly a demonstration that it is false that J1..J4 are the only justifications for not preventing s's which are applicable to any persons.