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God and the Approval of Sin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Paul Helm
Paul Helm
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Liverpool
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Extract

Having clarified certain conceptual matters with regard to God's relation to sin and evil, Professor Brümmer considers the two propositions that God could be the author of any state of affairs that he does not approve of, and that God could approve of any state of affairs which is evil. Brü mmer argues that both these are logically impossible, the first because it would be a sign of weakness in God, and the second because God's will is the ultimate standard of goodness.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 1984 , pp. 215 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1984

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References

page 216 note 1 Geach, P. T., ‘Omnipotence’, Philosophy 1973 (reprinted as chapter I of Providence and Evil (Cambridge, 1977)).Google Scholar

page 216 note 2 For an attempt at overcoming them, see Swinburne, Richard, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford, 1977).Google Scholar

page 217 note 1 Plantinga, Alvin, Does God have a nature? (Milwaukee, 1980).Google Scholar

page 218 note 1 Geach, P. T., God and the Soul (London, 1969), pp. 119 ff.Google Scholar

page 220 note 1 Plantinga, Alvin, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford, 1974)Google Scholar, ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’ in Papers on Logic and Language (ed. Holdcroft, D., University of Warwick, 1977)Google Scholar, ‘The Boethian Compromise’ (American Philosophical Quarterly, 1978) and ‘De Essentia’ in Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (ed. Sosa, Ernest, Amsterdam, 1979).Google Scholar

page 220 note 2 Chisholm, R. M., Person and Object (London, 1976) p. 37.Google Scholar Chisholm expresses doubts about this in Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (ed. Sosa, Ernest, Amsterdam, 1979), pp. 317 ff.Google Scholar

page 221 note 1 Prior, A. N., ‘Identifiable individuals’ in Papers on Time and Tense (Oxford, 1968).Google Scholar Also Geach, P. T., Providence and Evil, pp. 44–6.Google Scholar

page 221 note 2 Prior op. Cit. p. 74.