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The incarnation, soul-free: physicalism, kind membership, and the incarnation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 October 2015

KEVIN W. SHARPE
KEVIN W. SHARPE*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, St Cloud State University, 720 Fourth Avenue S., St Cloud, MN 56301, USA
*
e-mail: kwsharpe@stcloudstate.edu
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Abstract

Animalists, those who hold that human persons are identical to human animals, seem committed to holding that, in becoming incarnate, the Son of God became a human animal. Unsurprisingly, a number of philosophers have argued that this is impossible. In this article, I consider several objections to an animalist account of the incarnation based on kind membership, viz. objections drawing on kind essentialism, constitution essentialism, and the persistence conditions of animals. After developing each objection in detail, I respond by drawing on my preferred formulation of animalism. My goal in addressing these objections is to take the first steps toward demonstrating the compatibility of animalism and the incarnation.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 53 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 117 - 131
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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