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A Leibnizian Account of why Belief in the Christian Mysteries is Justified

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Eric Cave
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Abstract

The Christian mysteries, which consist of such doctrines as the Incarnation and the Trinity, pose a problem for anyone who seeks to reconcile the tenets of Christianity with reason. As Leibniz puts it, the mysteries are incomprehensible, improbable, and against appearances. Why should a reasonable individual believe in such mysteries? By answering this question, one responds to the objection that Christianity requires individuals to embrace patent nonsense. Leibniz maintains that the mysteries, although incomprehensible, can be explained sufficiently to justify belief in them. But how can the mysteries be both incomprehensible and explicable? In this paper, I will develop a Leibnizian account of why belief in the mysteries is justified.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 31 , Issue 4 , December 1995 , pp. 463 - 473
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 I shall use ‘Mysteries’ to refer to just the Incarnation and the Trinity, and ‘mysteries’ to refer to the Incarnation, the Trinity, the paradoxes of Christianity, and miracles.

2 See Leibniz's, Theodicy (La Salle: Open Court Press, 1985), pp. 91–7.Google Scholar

3 See Leibniz, , op. cit. p. 76.Google Scholar

4 See Leibniz, , op. cit. p. 115.Google Scholar

5 See Leibniz, , op. cit. p. 103.Google Scholar

6 See Leibniz's, discussion of what is involved in comprehending the solution to a physics problem, in Philosophical Papers and Letters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 76.Google Scholar

7 See Leibniz, , op. cit. pp. 73–4.Google Scholar

8 Leibniz, , op. cit. p. 91.Google Scholar

9 In this game, a phrase is whispered in the first player's ear, and then passed on in a soft whisper from one player to the next until all players have participated. The resulting phrase is then compared to the original, often with surprising results.

10 Leibniz, , op. cit. p. 102.Google Scholar

11 See Leibniz, , op. cit. p. 103.Google Scholar

12 Nelson Pike suggested this objection to me.

13 I owe this account of how Leibniz uses the Incarnation to help explain some puzzling aspects of substance to Christia Mercer. See Mercer, , The Development of Leibniz's Metaphysics and the Origin of His Conception of Substance (Princeton University, 1989), pp. 155–6.Google Scholar

14 In constructing this interpretation of the hypostatic union, I draw heavily on Chistia Mercer's analysis of Leibniz's remarks on the hypostatic union in De Incarnatione Dei Seu De Unione Hypostatica. See Mercer, , op. cit. pp. 155–9.Google Scholar

15 Upon reading a draft of his paper, Greg Cavin expressed just this concern: I owe this objection to him.

16 But cannot divine providence make use of false beliefs? On Leibniz's account, the actual world is the best of all possible worlds. Other things being equal, individuals having false beliefs about the world is worse than their having true beliefs about the world Hence, believers can be assured that God's plan involves their having as few false beliefs about the world as is consistent with the actual world being the best of all possible worlds. Assured of this, and believing in God's omnipotence, it is plausible to regard the acquisition of false beliefs about the world by epistemically responsible individuals as the exception, rather than the rule, within God's plan.