Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Philosophers of religion divide neatly into two camps on the problem of evil: those who think it fatal to the concept of a loving God and those who do not. The latter have established a wide array of defensive positions down through the centuries, but none that has proved impregnable to sceptical attack. In his new book Mr Hick wisely abandons these older fortifications and falls back on highly mobile reserves. Not for him the ‘Fall of Man’ thesis, with its unexplained choice to give up finite perfection; nor the Plotinian principle of plenitude, evil being an inevitable petering out of God's goodness; nor the ‘aesthetic’ gambit where the horrors of life constitute mere ‘shadows’ designed to highlight the beauty of creation; nor the ‘cosmic Toryism’, as someone called it, of Leibniz's ‘best of all possible worlds’; nor even, one might say gratefully, the gaseous obscurantism of Karl Barth's ‘das Nichtige’. All of these defences, and others besides, Mr Hick lumps together under what he calls ‘the majority report’ in Christian theodicy: the Augustinian tradition or type. In place of these venerable ramparts Hick elects the more fluid defence afforded, he thinks, by Irenaeus, Eastern Christianity and, in modern times, by Schleiermacher and a few contemporary thinkers.
page 255 note 1 Hick, John, Evil and the God of Love (MacMillan, 1966).Google Scholar
page 255 note 2 Cf. Puccetti, Roland, ‘The Concept of God,’ The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 56 (07 1964).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 266 note 1 Hume on Evil, reprinted in God and Evil, ed. Nelson Pike (Prentice-Hall, N.J., 1964), pp. 85–102.Google Scholar