ON CHOOSING HELL

Abstract

The doctrine of hell has always been troublesome for philosophical theology and has particularly captured the attention of philosophers in the past decade. Those contemporary philosophers who defend the doctrine of hell inevitably argue that it is the result of free choice on the part of the damned. Richard Swinburne in his ‘Theodicy of Heaven and Hell’ says that ‘It is good that God should not let a man damn himself without much urging and giving him many opportunities to change his mind, but it is bad that someone should not in the all-important matter of the destiny of his soul be allowed finally to destroy it.’ William Lane Craig believes that hell is consistent with God's justice and love since ‘Those who make a well-informed and free decision to reject Christ are self-condemned ... By spurning God's prevenient grace and the solicitation of His Spirit, they shut out God's mercy and seal their own destiny.’ Similar passages could be culled from the recent books of Jerry Walls and Jonathan Kvanvig.

Disregarding variations in approach, the strategy common to these philosophers is to argue that hell is neither unjust nor unloving if it is freely chosen by the damned. Such a strategy is moot if it turns out that no one can choose hell. In a much discussed passage, Thomas Talbott denies that the notion of freely choosing hell is coherent. I will first examine Talbott's argument in an attempt to understand it. Then I will show how the published responses to Talbott fail to strike at the heart of the argument. Finally I will present my own defence of hell, based on two strands in early church theodicy.