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Peter van Inwagen on gratuitous evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2013

KLAAS J. KRAAY
KLAAS J. KRAAY*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, M5B 2K3, Canada e-mail: kraay@ryerson.ca
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Abstract

Defenders and critics of the evidential argument from evil typically agree that if theism is true, no gratuitous evil occurs. But Peter van Inwagen has challenged this orthodoxy by urging that for all we know, given God's goals, it is impossible for God to prevent all gratuitous evil, in which case God is not required do so. If van Inwagen is right, the evidential argument from evil fails. After setting out this striking and innovative move, I examine three responses found in the literature, and show that none of them defeats van Inwagen's argument. I then offer a novel criticism: I show that van Inwagen implicitly relies on the claim that God can sensibly be thought to satisfice, and I argue that this is seriously under-motivated. Accordingly, van Inwagen's objection to the evidential argument from evil is, at best, incomplete.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 217 - 234
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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