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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Like so many of the concepts in our everyday language the concept of meaning is one which has a multitude of different applications. In the continuing debate within social anthropology and philosophy about how we are to understand ritual behaviour and religious customs in general among people in pre-literate cultures, advocates of different views have sought to explain the meaning of the beliefs in such cultures. In speaking of the meaning of beliefs these scholars use the concept in ways that vary to some extent depending on how, in a wider perspective, they look upon religion and magic in primitive societies. One example of a particular way of looking at the beliefs and practices of alien peoples is the standpoint of John Skorupski. In his article, ‘The Meaning of Another Culture's Beliefs’, he argues for a theory of meaning, or principle of interpretation, which he calls classical and realist in its semantic aspects, and which relies on an intellectualist sociology of thought.
page 205 note 1 In Action and Interpretation, ed. by Hookway, C. and Pettit, P. (1978), pp. 83–106.Google Scholar
page 205 note 2 Skorupski, , ‘The Meaning of Another Culture's Beliefs’, in Action and Interpretation, ed. by Hookway, C. and Pettit, P.. Cf. p. 106.Google Scholar
page 206 note 1 Cf. ibid. p. 88.
page 206 note 2 Cf. ibid. pp. 83 f.
page 206 note 3 Cf. ibid. p. 84.
page 206 note 4 Cf. ibid. p. 88.
page 207 note 1 Cf. ibid. pp. 89 f.
page 207 note 2 Cf. ibid. p. 90.
page 207 note 3 ibid
page 207 note 4 Cf. ibid. pp. 90 f.
page 207 note 5 Cf. ibid. p. 91. One would prefer the verb ‘utter’ in connection with the word ‘sentence’ which Skorupski uses instead of ‘proposition’.
page 208 note 1 Ibid p. 92.
page 208 note 2 Cf. ibid.
page 208 note 3 Cf. ibid. pp. 92 f.
page 208 note 4 Cf. ibid. pp. 93 f.
page 209 note 1 Cf. p. 96.
page 209 note 2 Winch, P., ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, in Ethics and Action (1972);Google Scholar‘Language, Belief and Relativism’, Contemporary British Philosophy, ed by Lewis, H. D. (1976).Google Scholar
page 209 note 3 Cf. Skorupski, , p. 97.Google Scholar
page 209 note 4 Winch, , 1972, p. 12;Google Scholar cf. Skorupski, , p. 97.Google Scholar
page 210 note 1 Skorupski, , p. 91.Google Scholar
page 211 note 1 Cf. ibid., esp. p. 87.
page 211 note 2 Ibid p. 95.
page 211 note 3 Ibid
page 212 note 1 Ibid p. 91.
page 212 note 2 Wittgenstein, , Über Gewissheit [On Certainty] (1979). Cf. § 96.Google Scholar
page 212 note 3 Cf. Winch, , 1976, pp. 334 f.Google Scholar
page 213 note 1 Cf. Wittgenstein, , § 167.Google Scholar
page 215 note 1 Phillips, D., ‘Faith, Scepticism and Religious Understanding’, in Religion and Understanding, (ed.) Phillips, D. Z. (1967), Cf p. 67.Google Scholar
page 215 note 2 Cf. ibid. p. 68.
page 215 note 3 Skorupski, , p. 87.Google Scholar
page 216 note 1 Ibid
page 216 note 2 Ibid p. 95.
page 216 note 3 Cf. ibid p. 105.
page 216 note 4 Ibid
page 217 note 1 Ibid