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Replying to the anti-God challenge: a God without moral character acts well

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 March 2011

PETER FORREST
PETER FORREST*
Affiliation:
School of Humanities, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia
*
e-mail: pforrest@une.edu.au
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Abstract

Several authors, including Stephen Law in this journal, have argued that the case for an evil God is (about) as strong as for a good God. In this article I take up the challenge on behalf of theists who, like Richard Swinburne, argue for an agent of unrestricted power and knowledge as the ultimate explanation of all contingent truths. I shall argue that an evil God is much less probable than a good one. I do so by (1) distinguishing the analogical predication of ‘good’ or ‘evil’ of God from the literal predication, (2) interpreting ‘acting in a morally good way’ to mean ‘acting like a good consequentialist’, and (3) relying on an axiarchist thesis about agency that is congenial to theists and perhaps even presupposed by theism.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 35 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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