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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Romans 7: 14 if. has traditionally been one of the most frequently discussed passages in the whole of the Pauline Corpus. Nevertheless, this pericope has attracted attention more because it is consistently regarded as a crucial part of Paul's theology, than because of its intrinsic exegetical problems. The main issue is whether the ‘split personality’ and the weakness of will (to which explicit reference is made in verse 19: ‘For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do’) should be regarded as essential to the life of the believing Christian; or, rather, as characteristic for those who are not ‘in Christ’ and therefore beyond the power of his Spirit. For the systematic theologian, the question of whether the first person singular in these verses should be understood in an autobiographical sense is a subordinate one. However this particular question is answered, we are still confronted by the main issue.
page 495 note 1 For both issues, see Kümmel's, W. G. classical 1929 dissertation Römer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus (Romans 7 and the Conversion of Paul), reprinted under the heading Römer 7 und das Bild des Menschen im Neuen Testament (Romans 7 and the Image of Man in the New Testament), (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1974), especially pp. 74–138.Google Scholar In it, a valuable survey of the history of the discussion of these issues is offered as well. For more recent discussion of the issues, see Wilckens, U., Der Brief an die Römer, 2. Teilband Röm. 6–11 (Zürich/Neukirchen: Benziger/Neukirchener Verlag, 1980), pp. 75–117.Google Scholar
page 495 note 2 Kümmel's dissertation (see note 1) has certainly influenced this development, see e.g. Bultmann, R., ‘Romans 7 and the Anthropology of Paul’, Existence and Faith, Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (New York: Meridian Books, 1960), p. 147Google Scholar; Dunn, J. D. G., ‘Rom. 7, 14–25 in the Theology of Paul’, Theologische Zeitschrift XXXI (1975), p. 258Google Scholar; and Wilckens, ibid. p. 76. (Dunn is one of the very few contemporary theologians who argue for what I call ‘the first line of interpretation’.)
page 496 note 1 The exegetes adopt different opinions on the question of whether the conjunction īνα should be taken as consecutive or as optative.
page 496 note 2 So, e.g., Ridderbos, Herman. See his Paul. An Outline of his Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), pp. 117 18.Google Scholar See also, Kümmel, ibid. pp. 105–6.
page 496 note 3 I am inclined to side with the great majority of contemporary exegetes in maintaining that there are two different subjects involved: the one is a non-Christian (or a non-yet-Christian), the other a Christian. The following comment on this issue, made by Kümmel, is certainly worth considering: And if. on the one hand. insight into the text of Rom. 7 forces us to understand it as a description of the non-Christian and, on the other hand, we recognize in the text our own moral situation … then the question cannot be: does the description in Rom. 7fit the Christian also. or primarily, but it should rather be: how is it to be explained that our Christianity differs so much from Paul's that we see ourselves reflected in the image of Paul's non-Christian? Kümmel, Ibid p. 108 my own translation.
page 497 note 1 Here, I follow Miss Anscombe who takes intentional actions to be a subclass of the class of ‘things known without observation’. See. Anscombe, G. E. M., Intention Oxford: Blackwell, 1976, 1st ed. 1957, p. 14.Google Scholar For a more restricted definition of ‘intentional action’, see Kenny, A., Wi11, Freedom and Power (Oxford: Blackwell. 1975), p. 56.Google Scholar
page 498 note 1 Thus, e.g., in Rom. 1: 18–32 and 2: 1–29.
page 498 note 2 As indicated above, Augustine's later exegesis of Rom. 7 (from 418) should be distinguished from that of an earlier period (391–397). In both versions, however, Augustine maintains the interpretation of ‘ignoro’ as ‘non approbo’. In both cases, ‘non approbo’ has a meaning which is close to the ‘odi’ of the same verse. See Lekkerkerker, A. F. N., Römer? und Römer9 bei Augustin (Amsterdam: Paris, 1942), Pp. 25, 55.Google Scholar
page 498 note 3 ‘Ja eigentlich ist er's selber gar nicht, der da begehrt, weil er mit der sündlichen Begierde des Fleisches nicht übereinstimmt. (…) Also ist beides wahr: dass ere selber handelt und doch nicht selber. Gleich wie es bei einem Reiter ist: Wenn das Pferd nicht ganz nach seinem Wunsch dahintrabt, dann bewirkt er es und (wiederum) nicht er, dass es so dahintrabt. Denn pas Pferd ist nicht ohne ihn, und er nicht ohne das Pferd’, Ellwein, E., D. Martin Luthers Epistel-Auslegung, I. Band, Der Römerbrief (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1963), p. 97.Google Scholar
page 499 note 1 ‘ich bin es gar nicht, der mein persönliches Leben lenkt und bestimmt, sondern da ist ein fremder Tyrann, der für mich denkt, redet und handelt (…) der mir seine Kinder unterschiebt, die ich dann als “meine” Taten anerkennen und mit meinem Namen decken muss’, Barth, K., Der Römerbrief (Bern: Bäschlin, 1919), p. 210.Google Scholar
page 499 note 2 ‘Denn mit welchen Gründen sollte ich die Nicht-identität des Ich, das vollbringt und des Ich, das nicht will, was jenes vollbringt, behaupten? Die Wirklichkeit (…) kennt nur Einen Menschen und der bin Ich, kein anderer,’ Barth, , Der Römerbrief (München: Kaiser, 1922), p. 250.Google Scholar
page 499 note 3 Kümmel, ibid. pp. 59–61; cp. Leenhardt, F. J., The Epistle to the Romans (London: Lutterworth, 1961), p. 192.Google Scholar
page 499 note 4 ‘The argument is one of acquittal of the ego, not one of utter contrition’, Stendahl, K., ‘The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West’, Harvard Theological Review LVI (1963), p. 212.Google Scholar
page 499 note 5 Theissen, G., Psychologische Aspekte paulinischer Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1983), pp. 221–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Later on, I return to this fascinating study.
page 500 note 1 Kenny, ibid. pp. 58–9.
page 500 note 2 Protagoras 352d, 357c e; quotation is from ‘Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. II, with an English Translation by W. R. M. Lamb, M.A.’ (Cambridge/London: Harvard U.P./Heinemann, 1977; Loeb Classical Library), p. 241.Google Scholar
page 500 note 3 Nicomachean Ethics 1145b28; quotation is from ‘Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, Vol. XIX, with an English Translation by H. Rackham M.A.’ (Cambridge etc., 1968), p. 379.Google Scholar
page 501 note 1 Ibid 1147b15.
page 501 note 2 They maintain different opinions, however. See, e.g. Hardie, W. F. R., ‘Aristotle on Moral Weakness’, in Mortimore, G. W., ed., Weakness of Will (London: MacMillan, 1971), pp. 69 94.Google Scholar
page 501 note 3 Davidson, D., ‘How is Weakness of the Will Possible’, in J. Feinberg, Moral Concepts (Oxford: O.U.P, 1969), Pp. 93–113.Google Scholar
page 501 note 4 Ibid p. 94.
page 501 note 5 Ibid p. 95.
page 502 note 1 Ibid pp. 101–2.
page 503 note 1 Ibid p. 112.
page 503 note 2 ‘Now there is one objection to all kinds of prescriptivism which is so commonly made (…) This is the objection that, if moral judgements were prescriptive, then it would be impossible to accept some moral judgement and yet act contrary to it. But, it is maintained (in Hume's words), “tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it”’, Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), p. 67.Google Scholar
page 503 note 3 Hare, , Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), pp. 124–5;Google ScholarFreedom and Reason, pp. 70–4, 83.Google Scholar
page 504 note 1 Ibid. pp. 77–7.
page 504 note 2 Ibid. pp. 79–81.
page 505 note 1 Kenny, Ibid. pp. 104–6.
page 506 note 1 Ibid. 106–7.
page 506 note 2 The conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is an intention to act. So the ‘I shall’ of the conclusion is not a prediction about future behaviour, but the expression of the deliberator's intention. As such, the ‘I shall’ expresses also his will. The ‘I want’ of the first premise leads to the ‘I want’ of the conclusion via the second premise, cp. Kenny: ‘Practical reasoning, it appears to me, can very well be looked at as a process of passing from one fiat to another according to rules’ (ibid. p. 43). As soon as the intention is successfully executed, there is an intentional action which is voluntary by definition. This is the truth in Aristotle's observation that the conclusion of a practical syllogism is an action, N.E. 1124a27–31.
page 507 note 1 Thus, e.g. by Althaus, P. and Beyer, H. W. in their commentaries on Romans and Galatians, Das Neue Testament Deutsch, Vol. III (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 65, 48.Google Scholar See also, Leenhardt, , Epistle to the Romans, pp. 185–6,Google Scholar and the following note.
page 508 note 1 Bultmann, ibid. p. 147. Bultmann mentions Lietzmann, Jülicher and Zahn in a footnote.
page 508 note 2 Ibid pp. 148–50.
page 508 note 3 Ibid pp. 151–7.
page 508 note 4 Theissen, ibid. p. 222.
page 508 note 5 Ibid pp. 223, 225, 257, 259.
page 509 note 1 Ibid p. 225.
page 509 note 2 Ibid p. 244.
page 510 note 1 Phaedrus, 237d–238b. (For references to the Protagoras, see note 16.)
page 510 note 2 Ibid; quotation is from ‘Plato, with an English Translation by H. N. Fowler, Vol I’ (London/New York: Heinemann/Putman's Sons, 1923; Lceb Classical Library), p. 445.Google Scholar
page 510 note 3 Ibid 238a. I follow here the Dutch translation by Win, X. de, Plato, Verzameld Werk, vol. 4 (Antwerpen/Baarn: Nederlandsche Bcekhandel/Ambo, 1978), p. 22,Google Scholar who apparently takes ⋯ρίστου to be the genitive of the noun τòἂριστον (‘ the best’), and not of the adjective belonging to τοũ λόγου (‘ the reason’).
page 511 note 1 Kenny, ibid. p. 107.
page 512 note 1 Frankfurt, H. G., ‘Freedom of the will and the Concept of a Person’, in Watson, G., ed., Free Will (Oxford: O.U.P., 1982), pp. 81–95.Google Scholar Actually, Frankfurt's term is ‘second-order volition’.