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Sceptical theism and a lying God: Wielenberg's argument defended and developed

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 July 2014

STEPHEN LAW
STEPHEN LAW*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Heythrop College, University of London, Kensington Square, London W5 8HX, UK e-mail: s.law@heythrop.ac.uk
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Abstract

Sceptical theists attempt to block the evidential argument from evil by arguing that a key premise of that argument – that gratuitous evil exists – cannot reasonably be maintained. They argue that, for all we know, our knowledge of reasons God may have to permit such evil is radically incomplete. Thus the fact that we cannot identify reasons for God to permit the evil we observe does not allow us reasonably to conclude that no such reasons exist. In response, Erik Wielenberg has pointed out what appears to be, for many sceptical theists, an unfortunate further consequence of their position. According to Wielenberg, if sceptical theism is correct, then, similarly, the fact that we cannot identify reasons why God would lie to us does not allow us reasonably to conclude no such reasons exist. But then, for all we know, God's word constitutes not a divine revelation but a divine lie. This article examines sceptical theist responses to Wielenberg's argument to date (from Segal, and McBrayer and Swenson) and develops two new Wielenberg-style arguments for the same conclusion.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 91 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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