Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T07:20:38.717Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Reconceptualising world order: Chinese political thought and its challenge to International Relations theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 February 2014

FLORIAN SCHNEIDER
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

At the outset of the twenty-first century, the world is facing a range of problems, including environmental, economic, and security risks, that increasingly challenge the logic of nation-state governance. While American and European models of International Relations and global governance, such as the Westphalian system of states and the Washington Consensus, have come under attack from poststructuralist thinkers, political philosophers from China and Taiwan have tried to reconceptualise the world of the twenty-first century from their own perspectives. This article examines current streams of Chinese International Relations theorising and confronts them with the case of territorial disputes in the East China Sea. The article analyses the arguments by Chinese realists, ‘worldists’, and procedural constructivists, showing how Chinese scholars creatively revive pre-modern Chinese political theory in attempts to provide new ways in which International Relations scholars might view the world, or: ‘all-under-heaven’. I argue that these contributions will progressively challenge conventional theories of International Relations, while at the same time contending that so-called non-Western theorising, if it is to contribute to IRT, will require additional rigorous empirical grounding, a critical perspective on its entanglement with nationalist political discourses in East Asian societies, and the willingness to incorporate existing theories.

Type
Articles
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 40 , Issue 4 , October 2014 , pp. 683 - 703
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2014 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For examples drawing from French poststructuralist thinkers, see the Bourdieusian critique in Berling, Trine Villumsen, ‘Bourdieu, International Relations, and European Security’, Theory and Society, 41:5 (2012), pp. 451–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar, as well as the Deridarian arguments in Zehfuss, Maja, Constructivism in International Relations – The Politics of Reality (Cambridgeet al.: Cambridge University Press, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For feminist critiques, particularly of realist approaches to international security, see the various contributions in the Special Issue of Security Studies, 18:2 (2009). In addition, critical theorists like Robert Cox, David Campbell, or Michael Shapiro have similarly challenged mainstream IRT – for discussions see Moolakkattu, John S., ‘Robert W. Cox and Critical Theory of International Relations’, International Studies, 46:4 (2009), pp. 439–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Paipais, Vassilios, ‘Self and Other in Critical International Theory: Assimilation, Incommensurability and the Paradox of Critique’, Review of International Studies, 37:1 (2011), pp. 121–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Seth, Sanjay, ‘Postcolonial Theory and the Critique of International Relations’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, 40:1 (2011), p. 169CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See also the various contributions in Tickner, Arlene B. and Wæver, Ole (eds), International Relations Scholarship around the World (Oxon and New York: Routledge)Google Scholar as well as Acharya, Amitav and Buzan, Barry (eds), Non-Western International Relations Theory – Perspectives on and beyond Asia (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2010)Google Scholar. For a discussion of approaches from Asia, see Shih Chih-yu, ‘The Plausible Asian Schools of International Relations: Hypothesizing Non-Interventionism’, European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan Online Paper Series (EOPS No.2, Tübingen: Eberhard Karls Universität, 2009). For all Chinese names, this article follows the convention of placing the surname before the given name. Any translations are the author's, unless stated otherwise.

4 Yongjin, Zhang, ‘System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations’, Review of International Studies, 27 (2001), p. 63Google Scholar.

5 See also, respectively, Damasio, Antonio, Self Comes to Mind – Constructing the Conscious Brain (London: William Heinemann, 2010)Google Scholar and Sperber, Dan, Explaining Culture – A Naturalistic Approach (Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1996)Google Scholar.

6 For a similar argument, see in particular ch. 1 in Trachtenberg, Marc, The Craft of International History – A Guide to Method (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

7 See also Acharya and Buzan (eds), Non-Western International Relations Theory, p. 3.

8 Acharya and Buzan (eds), Non-Western International Relations Theory, p. 6.

9 The diagram is not meant as a rigid taxonomy of approaches, setting up new dichotomies and placing scholars into set categories, but as a means to think about what different authors might aim to achieve through recourse to Chinese traditions, and how their contributions might enrich IRT. The distinctions should therefore not be understood in absolute terms, and many Chinese attempts to theorise politics indeed tend to fall between the extremes, often containing both universal and discrete claims as well as normative and analytical elements.

10 This is not to suggest that theories that aim to be ‘analytical’ are free of normative considerations. Suganami, Hidemi has criticised such distinctions in ‘The English School and International Theory’, in Bellamy, Alex J. (ed.), International Society and its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 29–44Google Scholar, and in ‘Causal Explanation and Moral Judgement: Undividing a Division’, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, March (2011), pp. 1–18. Pragmatic political thinkers such as Geuss have made a similar point: see Geuss, Raymond, Philosophy and Real Politics (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 16Google Scholar. However, neither would be likely to argue that political thought should be guided by an ‘ideal theory’ that draws conclusions ‘about how people ought to act or live’ (ibid., p. 7).

11 Mittag, Achim, ‘Historiography’, Brill‘s Encyclopaedia of China (Leiden: Brill, 2009)Google Scholar.

12 On Chinese history, see Fairbank, John King and Goldman, Merle, China – A New History (2nd edn, Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press Harvard, 2006)Google Scholar.

13 The idea that there is one unified Confucian tradition is highly contested, particularly since many of the canonical ‘classics’ were heavily edited or even forged during later periods, such as the Han Dynasty, and interpreted in different ways throughout Chinese history. See Gernet, Jacques, A History of Chinese Civilization (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972/2002), pp. 86–7Google Scholar.

14 Ling L.H.M., Hwang Ching-chang, and Chen Boyu, ‘China's Confucian Turn: Implications for Humanitarian Intervention and Global Governance’, conference paper presented at ‘Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention in the International Society of East Asia – Historical Legacies and New Dynamics’, 11 June 2010 (Leiden and The Hague: Modern East Asia Research Centre). See also Agathangelou, Anna M. and L.H.M., Ling, Transforming World Politics: From Empire to Multiple Worlds (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 92Google Scholar.

15 Analects XII, 22.1. See also Mengzi (Li Lao II, 28.2): ‘The benevolent man loves others’ (ren zhe ai ren 仁者爱人). The English translations of the Mengzi and Analects used here are taken from Legge, James, The Chinese Classics (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1876)Google Scholar.

16 Xuetong, Yan and Jin, Xu (eds), Wangba tianxia sixiang ji qidi (Thoughts of World Leadership and Implications) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2009)Google Scholar.

17 Hui, Victoria Tin-bor, ‘History and Thought in China's Traditions’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 17 (2012), pp. 125–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Yan and Xu (eds), Wangba tianxia, p. 241.

19 Yan Xuetong, ‘How China Can Defeat America’, The New York Times (20 November 2011), available at: {http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/opinion/how-china-can-defeat-america.html?pagewanted=all} accessed 20 April 2012.

20 Qing, Jiang, Zhengzhi ruxue – dangdai ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu fazhan (Political Confucianism – Changes, Characteristics, and Developments in Contemporary Confucianism) (Beijing: San lian shudian, 2003)Google Scholar. For a review see Bell, Daniel A., China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008)Google Scholar. Note that the so-called ‘Confucian revival’ in Chinese politics should not be overemphasised. Confucian concepts form only part of the overall political discourse, and often in highly distorted ways, for instance when the CCP picks key terms like ‘harmony’ (he 和) and interprets them in line with New Left political thought. What is more, even such highly selective use of Confucian thought has encountered staunch opposition from Marxist scholars and cadres. For an example of such critique, see Keli, Fang, Xiandai xin ruxue yu Zhongguo xiandaihua (Modern Neo-Confucianism and China's Modernization) (Changchun: Changchun chubanshe, 2008)Google Scholar.

21 Yaqing, Qin, ‘Relationality and Processual Construction: Bringing Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory’, Social Science in China, 30:4 (2009), p. 36Google Scholar.

22 Tingyang, Zhao, Tianxia tixi – shijie zhidu zhexue daolun (The ‘All-under-Heaven’ System – An Introduction to World System Philosophy) (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005)Google Scholar.

23 Callahan, William A., ‘Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?’, International Studies Review, 10 (2008), pp. 749–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a more favourable review of Zhao's work from a Chinese scholar, see Yiwei, Wang, ‘China: Between Copying and Constructing’, in Tickner, Arlene B. and Wæver, Ole (eds), International Relations Scholarship around the World (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp.111–14Google Scholar.

24 Zhao, Tianxia tixi, p. 114. See also Tingyang, Zhao, ‘Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept “All-under-Heaven” (Tian-xia, 天下)’, Diogenes, 221:56 (2006), pp. 5–18Google Scholar.

25 Tingyang, Zhao, Huai shijie yanjiu – zuowei di yi zhexue de zhengzhixue (The Study of the Bad World – Political Philosophy as the Primary Philosophy) (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2009), pp. 51–75, 295Google Scholar, respectively.

26 Callahan, ‘Chinese Visions of World Order’, p. 758.

27 See Zhang, ‘System, Empire and State’, p. 54.

28 Qin, ‘International Society’, p. 36.

29 Ibid.

30 Callahan, ‘Chinese Visions of World Order’, p. 755, and Zhang, ‘System, Empire and State’, p. 51, respectively. For additional discussions of the tributary system, see Hsiao-Ting, Lin, ‘The Tributary System in China's Historical Imagination: China and Hunza, ca.1760–1960’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 19 (2009), pp. 489–507Google Scholar and Min, Shu, ‘Hegemon and Instability: Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia under the Tribute System’, WIAS Research Bulletin, 4 (2012), pp. 45–62Google Scholar.

31 Wang, ‘China: Between Copying and Constructing’, p. 109. The call for a ‘harmonious society’ has become a cornerstone of CCP propaganda; see also Barmé, Geremie, ‘China's Flat Earth: History and 8 August 2008’, The China Quarterly, 197 (2009), pp. 64–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

32 Callahan, ‘Chinese Visions of World Order’, p. 753.

33 Note the rhetorical question in Analects XIV, 8.0: ‘Can there be love which does not lead to strictness with its object?’ (ai zhi, neng wu lao hu 爱之、能勿劳乎).

34 Qin, ‘International Society’, pp. 148, 151.

35 Wang, ‘China: Between Copying and Constructing’, p. 117, fn. 12.

36 The idea of a public sphere is arguably an invention of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century enlightenment movements in Europe; see also Habermas, Jürgen, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society) (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1990 [orig. pub. 1962])Google Scholar.

37 Wang, ‘China: Between Copying and Constructing’, p. 115.

38 Yiwei, Wang, ‘Tanxun Zhongguo de xin shenfen: guanyu minzuzhuyi de shenhua (Seeking China's New Identity: The Myth of Chinese Nationalism)’, Shijie zhengzhi, 2 (2006), pp. 14–21, available at: {http://www.cas.fudan.edu.cn/picture/1433.pdf} accessed 20 April 2012Google Scholar.

39 Yiwei, Wang, ‘Between Science and Art: Questionable International Relations Theories’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 8:2 (2007), p. 208Google Scholar. In another context, Wang expands his political project by arguing that a ‘China School’ of IRT ‘depends on the reunification of Taiwan and the Mainland’ (Wang, ‘China: Between Copying and Constructing’, p. 115). Apparently the diversity of worldviews he advocates elsewhere (ibid., p. 116) does not apply once the territorial integrity of the Chinese nation is in question.

40 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities (3rd rev. edn, London and New York: Verso, 2006)Google Scholar.

41 For comprehensive analyses of Chinese nationalism, see Gries, Peter Hays, China's New Nationalism – Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeleyet al.: University of California Press, 2004)Google Scholar and Suisheng, Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction – Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

42 Shih, ‘The Plausible Asian Schools’, p. 8.

43 Agathangelou and Ling, Transforming World Politics, p. 93.

44 Ibid.

45 Beck, Ulrich, Power in the Global Age (Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007), p. 22Google Scholar.

46 Chih-yu, Shih, ‘Consuming Part-time Nationalism: China as an Immigrant in the Global Society’, New Political Science, 25:3 (2003), p. 367Google Scholar.

47 Yaqing, Qin and Ling, Wei, ‘Structure, Process, and the Socialization of Power – East Asian Community-Building and the Rise of China’, in Ross, Robert S. and Feng, Zhu (eds), China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 135Google Scholar. It should be noted, however, that Qin and Wei do not follow through on this argument and in fact produce an analysis that focuses almost entirely on inter-state relations.

48 Chih-yu, Shih, ‘Assigning Role Characteristics to China: the Role State versus the Ego State’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 8 (2012), pp. 71–91Google Scholar.

49 Qin and Wei, ‘Structure, Process, and the Socialization of Power’, p. 122.

50 Qin, ‘Relationality and Processual Construction’, p. 16.

51 Ibid., p. 14.

52 Ibid., pp.14–16.

53 Ibid., p. 15.

54 Shih, ‘The Plausible Asian Schools’, p. 8.

55 Shih, ‘Assigning Role Characteristics’, p. 74.

56 Qin, ‘Relationality and Processual Construction’, p. 14.

57 Ibid., p. 15.

58 Ibid.: pp. 9–10.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., p. 13.

61 For an overview of the conflict, see Koo, Min Gyo, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics?’, The Pacific Review, 22:2 (2009), p. 208CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The history of US involvement in the issue is examined in Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., ‘The U.S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, 1945-1971’, The China Quarterly, 161 (2000), pp. 95–123CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Shaw, Han-yi provides a legal assessment in The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1999)Google Scholar and Lee, Lai To analyses the diplomatic aspects in China and the South Sea Dialogues (Westport and London: Praeger, 1999)Google Scholar.

62 For journalistic accounts of the most recent developments, see in particular the issue website of the BBC {http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139} accessed 24 January 2013. Scholarly analyses of previous disputes include Koo Min Gyo, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute’, pp. 205–32; Chung, Chien-Peng, ‘Resolving China's Island Disputes: A Two-Level Game Analysis’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 12:1 (2007), pp. 49–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hagström, Linus, ‘“Power Shift” in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Incident in 2010’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5 (2012), pp. 267–97CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 See also Blanchard, ‘The US Role’, pp. 95–6.

64 Hagström, ‘“Power Shift” in East Asia?’, p. 268.

65 Koo, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute’, p. 206.

66 Ibid., p. 227 and Chung, ‘Resolving China's Island Disputes’, p. 60, respectively.

67 Koo, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute’, p. 221.

68 Ibid. Chung's liberal, rationalist arguments on territorial disputes remain equally unconvincing, particularly his predictions for developments in the South China Sea, where he expects increased trade volumes to ‘expand the domestic constituencies for greater economic interdependence, which will lead to more willingness to cooperate on other non-economic issues’ (Chung, ‘Resolving China's Island Disputes’, p. 64). Considering recent developments in that region, such arguments seem fallacious.

69 Blanchard, ‘The US Role’, p. 123.

70 Qin and Wei, ‘Structure, Process, and the Socialization of Power’, p. 123.

71 Koo, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute’, p. 209.

72 Wendt has defended this perspective, arguing that states ‘are “intentional” or purposive actors’, and that ‘since intentionality is the primary quality of persons that scholars typically attribute to states’ this ultimately justifies ‘personifying state persons’; a practice ‘in which almost all of us engage’. He goes on to warn that ‘the question of the reality of state persons goes to the heart of IR's epistemic authority as a science of world politics’ – an argument with which I agree – and claims that ‘giving up the concept of state personhood would result in a substantial loss of extant scientific knowledge about world politics’ – an argument that I find questionable. See Wendt, Alexander, ‘The State as Person in International Theory’, Review of International Studies, 30 (2004), pp. 291–2, 316CrossRefGoogle Scholar, respectively.

73 See the various reports in The Guardian, particularly ‘Japan Stokes Tensions with China over Plan to Buy Disputed Islands’, available at: {http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/05/japan-china-disputed-islands?INTCMP=SRCH}, and ‘China Warns of Consequences as Japan Announces Purchase of Disputed Islands’, available at: {www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/11/china-warns-japan-disputed-islands} both accessed 24 January 2013.

74 Sheila Smith, ‘Why Japan, South Korea, and China Are So Riled Up Over a Few Tiny Islands’, The Atlantic, available at: {www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/why-japan-south-korea-and-china-are-so-riled-up-over-a-few-tiny-islands/261224/} accessed 24 January 2013.

75 BBC News, ‘Japan Activists Land on Disputed Islands amid China Row’, available at: {www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-19303931} accessed 24 January 2013.

76 The web-service China Smack has collected online discussions, both in the original Chinese and in English translation; see ‘The Diaoyu Island Dispute’, available at: {www.chinasmack.com/tag/diaoyu-islands-dispute} accessed 24 January 2013.

77 See also Chung, ‘Resolving China's Island Disputes’, and Hagström, ‘“Power Shift” in East Asia?’, respectively.

78 Qin and Wei, ‘Structure, Process, and the Socialization of Power’, pp. 130–7.

79 See, respectively, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Position Paper: Japan-China Relations Surrounding the Situation of the Senkaku Islands’ (9 November 2012), available at: {www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/position_paper_en.html} and Gemba Koichiro, ‘Japan-China Relations at a Crossroads’, International Herald Tribune (21 November 2012), available at: {www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/gaisho/gemba/pdfs/iht_121121_en.pdf} both accessed 24 January 2013.

80 See Japan Times, ‘Xi Vows to Better Ties despite Isle Row’ (25 January 2013), available at: {www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/01/25/national/xi-vows-to-better-ties-despite-isle-row/#.UQLWuL-Yt0o} and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, ‘Xi Jinping Meets with Natsuo Yamaguchi, Leader of Japan's New Komeito Party’, available at {www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1008008.shtml} both accessed 25 January 2013.

81 See, respectively, MOFA, ‘Position Paper’, and State Council Information Office, ‘Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China’ (25 September 2012), available at: {news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-09/25/c_131872152.htm} accessed 24 January 2013.

82 See Qin and Wei, ‘Structure, Process, and the Socialization of Power’, p. 134.

83 Note Qin's example of globalisation processes, for which he argues ‘if we accept that un-owned process exists in social life, we should also accept that process is its own prime mover and maintainer …. In the globalizing process, states and other actors of the international system continuously adapt, adjust, define, and redefine their self-interest. But no individual can be found that started the process or that can stop or reverse it.’ See Qin, ‘Relationality and Processual Construction’, pp. 10–11, emphasis added. While Qin's observation that the movers behind globalisation processes are hard to identify is surely accurate, it does not follow that there are no such actors, or that their influence on such processes is trivial. It is also no justification to stop looking for the persons and interest groups that actually ‘move’ the processes in world politics. What Qin is essentially arguing, is that a process like globalisation ‘happens’. Such an argument brings him in close proximity with the dominant discourse of PRC government officials, who argue that globalisation is ‘an inevitable trend of economic development’ – an unstoppable external force that simply is, and which nation-states like the PRC then react to, much like ships sailing a stormy ocean. See Wen Jiabao, ‘World Summit for Social Development and Beyond: Achieving Social Development for All in a Globalizing World’, speech held at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly (15 October 2003), available at: {www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/socialhr/shfz/t29344.htm} accessed 20 April 2012.

84 Hagström, though arguably approaching the subject from a different poststructuralist angle, has demonstrated how such methods can be deployed in the analysis of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island conflict. See Hagström, ‘“Power Shift” in East Asia?’.

85 The term ‘structures of feeling’ is borrowed from Callahan, William A., China – The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)Google Scholar.

86 See, for example, State Council Information Office, ‘Diaoyu Dao’.

87 Qin and Wei, ‘Structures, Processes, and the Socialization of Power’, p. 126.

88 Mitchell, Melanie, Complexity – A Guided Tour (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009)Google Scholar.

89 Qin, ‘Relationality and Processual Construction’, p. 17.

90 Ibid.

91 Beck, Power in the Global Age, p. 116.

92 Ibid., p. 4.

93 Castells, Manuel, Communication Power (Oxfordet al.: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 11Google Scholar.

94 Ibid., p. 20.

95 In other words, such an approach makes it possible to reconceptualise Weberian power not as the ability to overcome opposition, or even the ability to achieve something (goal-oriented), but as the potential to act. This can also include the ability to engage others in non-confrontational ways, making it possible to reframe interactions in terms that are not zero-sum.

96 Note that this is not an endorsement of what Katzenstein has called ‘analytical eclecticism’. Katzenstein argues that IR scholarship should draw from mainstream theories as needed in order to cover the various dimensions of politics: relative gains, absolute gains, and symbolic interactions. While this move indeed helps overcome some of the limitations of mainstream IR, Katzenstein's approach nevertheless remains firmly anchored in the major research traditions it draws from, thereby arguably reinforcing rather than thoroughly challenging their premises. Also, this particular eclecticism is rooted in a specific analytical tradition that emphasises causal relations between variables and seeks to predict political outcomes. It remains unclear whether such eclecticism is versatile enough to accommodate both an Aristotelian approach to knowledge and its poststructuralist critique. This is a fundamental problem, particularly since scholars of complexity and emergent systems have shown how causal explanations and predictions of complex processes are not only impossible for practical reasons (lack of data), but also impossible in principle, due to the very nature of complex, dynamic processes (see Mitchell, Complexity). For Katzenstein's arguments and analyses, see Katzenstein, Peter J. and Nobuo, Okawara, ‘Japan, Asia-Pacific Security, and the Case of Analytical Eclecticism’, International Security, 26:3 (2001), pp. 153–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar, as well as Sil, Rudra and Katzenstein, Peter J., ‘Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions’, Perspectives on Politics, 8:2 (2010), pp. 411–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97 Suganami, ‘The English School’, p. 43, fn. 9.