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Britain and the issue of Italian membership of NATO, 1948–49

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Martin H. Folly
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Extract

NATO has been a fixed point in international politics for forty years and is part of the basic framework of relations between the West and the Soviet Union. NATO present form owes much to the milieu of the late 1940s which gave it birth and to crucial developments in its early years. Important insight into the character of the alliance can be gained by examination of the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty itself. It has emerged from recent scholarship that those who created the Treaty were at variance not only on the details of the Treaty, but also on the fundamental nature of the alliance they were creating: its purpose, and the means by which it could best achieve that purpose. Important studies have highlighted the debate upon the issue of the obligation to assist a member if attacked (Article 5 of the Treaty) and the mutual assistance clause (Article 3). The debate on membership of the Atlantic Pact, and particularly the criteria to apply when assessing potential members also raises fundamental questions but it has been less exhaustively studied. There is especially a lack of detailed study of the development of British views, which were of some importance given the pivotal initiatory role the British played in the negotiations, now widely recognized. The British official documents reveal not only the development of ideas on aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty in debate within the British government, but also provide much information on the course of the Treaty negotiations and the views of the other participants, to supplement that available in the published sources. This information results from the close contacts between the British Embassy in Washington and the State Department, and Britain's close ties with the West European participants through the Brussels Treaty organization.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , July 1987 , pp. 177 - 196
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1987

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References

1. Kaplan, L. S., The United States and NATO. The Formative Years (Kentucky, 1984), pp. 10–12Google Scholar, 84–5, 111–15; Ireland, T., Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (London, 1981), pp. 6Google Scholar, 89, 121–9; Henrikson, A., ‘The Creation of the North Atlantic Alliance 1948–52’, Naval War College Review, xxxii (1980), pp. 4–6Google Scholar, 16–18, 21–5; Petersen, N., ‘Who Pulled Whom and How Much? Britain, the United States and the Making of the North Atlantic Treaty’, Millenium, xi (1982)Google Scholar; see also Kaplan, L. S., Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program 1948–51 (Washington, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and de Staercke, A.et al., NATO's Anxious Birth. The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s (London, 1985)Google Scholar, (reprint of articles which appeared in NATO Review). For Britain's initiatory role, Young, J., Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945–51 (Leicester, 1984), p. 105Google Scholar; Attlee, C. R., As It Happened (London, 1954), p. 239Google Scholar; Bullock, A., Ernest Bevin Foreign Secretary 1945–51 (Oxford, 1983)Google Scholar, chap. 13 passim.

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3. Smith, E. T., ‘The Fear of Subversion: the United States and the Inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic Treaty’, Diplomatic History, vii (1983), p. 140Google Scholar (reprinted in Kaplan, L., Clawson, R., Luraghi, R. (eds.), NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, Del., 1985)Google Scholar); Kaplan, United States and NA TO, p. 110; Warner, G., ‘Italy and the Powers 1943–49’ in Woolf, S. J. (ed.), The Rebirth of Italy 1943–50 (London, 1972), p. 55Google Scholar. The difference in US and UK approaches was replicated for other countries, e.g. Sweden, for which see Petersen, N., ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty 1948–49’, Review of International Studies, viii (1982), pp. 260, 265Google Scholar.

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5. Yergin, D., Shattered Peace (Boston, 1977), pp. 308–26Google Scholar; Gaddis, J. L., ‘The United States and the Question of a Sphere of Influence in Europe’ in Riste, (ed.), Western Security, pp. 68–9Google Scholar. Ireland, Creating the Entangling, chap 1; Gladwyn, , Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), pp. 209–10Google Scholar; Pollard, R. A., ‘Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War: Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan and American Rearmament, 1944–50’, Diplomatic History, ix (1985), pp. 280–1Google Scholar; Hogan, M., ‘The Search for a “Creative Peace”: the United States, European Unity and the Origins of the Marshall Plan’, Diplomatic History, vi (1982)Google Scholar.

6. Foreign Office documents FO371/66433/N8407 12.7.47; FO800/514 Bevin conversation with Marshall 2.12.47; FO371/66374/N13701 23.10.47 Russia Committee mtg; CAB129/23 CP(48)7 4.1.48 Cabinet Paper. All documentary references are for material at the Public Record Office, Kew, London, unless otherwise stated. Reid, E., Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947–49 (Toronto, 1977), pp. 18–19Google Scholar; Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp. 301, 324; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp. 483–9; Cromwell, W., ‘The Marshall Plan, Britain and the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, viii (1982), pp. 238–42Google Scholar.

7. FO371/67674/Z11009, Zl 1010 17.12.47; FRUS 1947:2, pp. 815–22; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp. 496–500; Henderson, Birth of NATO, pp. 1–2; D. Dilks, ‘The British View of Security: Europe and a Wider World, 1945–48’ in Riste (ed.),Western Security, p. 45; Petersen, ‘Who Pulled Whom and How Much’, p. 94.

8. CAB128/12 CM(48)2nd 8.1.48 Cabinet mtg, CAB129/23 CP(48)6 4.1.48;. FO371/73045/Z273 13.1.48, Z561 26.1.48; Bevin speech 22.1.48,Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Commons 5th Series vol 4461947–48, pp. 383–409; Bullock,Ernest Bevin, pp. 518–20;FRUS 1948:3, pp. 4–6; Gladwyn,Memoirs, pp. 209, 211–12.

9. FO371/73045/Z554 20.1.48, Z748 27.1.48; FO371/73046/Z937 5.2.48, Z1060 7.2.48; Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) to Capetown 3.2.48; PREM8/787; Henrikson, ‘The Creation’, pp. 8–9; Reid, ‘Time of Fear and Hope, pp. 106–7. There were varying opinions in the US as to the nature of the system and the US relationship to it, notably between Kennan and Hickerson in the State Department: Kennan believed a ‘guarantee’ unnecessary, and Lovett (Under Secretary of State) and Marshall agreed the US should not be involved in a military pact with Europe. Hickerson, though believing security important, preferred a wide-ranging political pact involving the US, with the US also serving as its arsenal. FRUS 1948:3, pp. 9–12, 17–18; Kaplan, L., ‘Towards the Brussels Pact’, Prologue (1980), pp. 74Google Scholar, 82; Ireland, Creating the Entangling, pp. 63–4; Petersen, ‘Who Pulled Whom and How Much’, p. 97.

10. FO371/73045/Z354 12.1.48; Defence Papers DEFE4/4 COS(47)71st 6.6.47; DEFE4/ 9 COS(47)158th 16.12.47, VCOS to FO 24.12.47; CAB131/5 DO(48)2nd 8.1.48 Defence Committee mtg; DEFE4/10 COS(48)16th 2.2.48, COS(48)18th 4.2.48; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp. 523–4; Barker, E., The British Between the Superpowers (London, 1983), pp. 98–102Google Scholar, 113, 115–16. The British ‘Dunkirk Complex’ was a potent factor in shaping their defence strategy, quite apart from financial constraints. Even when it was agreed to ‘fight as far East as possible’, Montgomery was unable to get agreement to send a BEF to reinforce British occupation forces in Germany. Cf. Young, Britain, France, pp. 90–1. For the Brussels Treaty, see Ibid., pp. 82–4; Ireland, Creating the Entangling, p. 75; Bullock,Ernest Bevin, p. 537; Rendel, G., The Sword and the Olive (London, 1957), pp. 178–9Google Scholar. The Treaty was followed by the creation of a number of committees, including a Military Committee, a Permanent Commission of officials and a quarterly Consultative Council of foreign ministers.

11. FO371/71458/N3001 10.3.48:FRUS 1948:3, pp. 40, 48, 52; Henrikson, ‘The Creation’, pp. 10–12; Bullock,Ernest Bevin, pp. 525–9.

12. FO371/68067/AN1196 15.3.48, AN1214 19.3.48, 20.3.48, AN1276 24.3.48; PREM8/78 8 25.3.48 Attlee to Dominions PMs;FRUS 1948:3, pp. 59–72; Reid,Time of Fear and Hope, pp. 106–7; Wiebes, C. and Zeeman, B., ‘The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: the Launching of the North Atlantic Treaty’, International Affairs, lix (1983), pp. 351–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 356.

13. FO371/68067/AN1196 15.3.48, AN1276 22.3.48; FRUS 1948:3, p. 61; Wiebes and Zeeman, ‘The Pentagon Negotiations’, p. 361; Gladwyn,Memoirs, pp. 215–16; Henderson, Birth of NATO, pp. 15–16.

14. FO371/73045/Z354 12.1.48, Z809 19.1.48; FO371/71687/N765 15.1.48; CAB129/23 CP(48)6 4.1.48; Bullock,Ernest Bevin, p. 536.

15. FO371/71458/N3001, 10.3.48; CAB129/25 CP(48)72 3.3.48;FRUS 1948:3, pp. 775–7, 849; Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, p. 142; F. Catalano, ‘The Rebirth of the Party System 1944–8’, pp. 61–6 and G. Quazza, ‘The Politics of the Italian Resistance’, pp. 24–8 in Woolf (ed.), The Rebirth of Italy; Hughes,The US and Italy, p. 152; Ellwood, D., ‘From Reeducation to the Selling of the Marshall Plan in Italy’, in Pronay, N. and Wilson, K. (eds.), The Political Reeducation of Germany and Her Allies After World War II (London, 1985), pp. 225–6Google Scholar.

16. FO371/68067/AN1315 24.3.48, 25.3.48;FRUS 1948:3, p. 86; Reid,Time of Fear and Hope, p. 102; Kaplan,The United States and NATO, pp. 68–9.

17. FO371/68067/AN1276 22.3.48, AN1325 25.3.48, 29.3.48; FO371/68068A/AN1365 30.3.48, AN1400 31.3.48;FRUS 1948:3, pp. 61–4; Petersen, ‘Bargaining Power among Potential Allies’, p. 197; Kaplan, ‘An Unequal Triad’, p. 115.

18. FO371/68068A/AN1400 31.3.48; FO371/73050/Z1868 1.3.48; FO371/73069/Z3650 5.4.48; FO800/452 Bevin to Attlee 6.4.48; Wiebes and Zeeman, ‘The Pentagon Negotiations’, pp. 360–1; Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty’, p. 254.

19. FRUS 1948:3, pp. 72ff; Hudson, D. U., ‘Vandenberg Reconsidered: Senate Resolution 239 and American Foreign Policy’, Diplomatic History, i (1977)Google Scholar; Wiebes and Zeeman, ‘The Pentagon Negotiations’, pp. 361–3; Ireland,Creating, p. 89.

20. In the elections on 18.4.48, the Christian Democrats gained 307 seats in the Chamber, the People's Bloc 166 (PCI 135, Nenni Socialists 31) and the Saragat Socialists 33, leaving de Gasperi with a sizeable majority, even without Saragat's support; Hughes,The US and Italy, pp. 147–8.

21. FO371/68067/AN1325 29.3.48; FO371/73191/Z3464 24.4.48, Z4437 21.4.48, 5.5.48, Z4084 25.5.48. This attitude was still in place in 1949: see FO371/79221/Z364 14.1.49; FO371/79222/Z666 17.1.49. FO distrust of Sforza dated back to 1943, at which time he was described as a ‘clever rascal’, Woodward, L., British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. iii (London, 1971), pp. 440–2Google Scholar, 456–62; Hughes,The US and Italy, p. 140.

22. The French and Benelux from the start saw the Brussels Treaty as a ‘small and exclusive club’, according to Sir G. Rendel, British Ambassador in Brussels, who played an active part in negotiating the Treaty, FO371/73053/Z1933 6.3.48; FO371/73051/Z2003 9.3.48; FO371/73053/Z2411 5.3.48; Petersen, ‘Who Pulled Whom and How Much’, p. 100. The British arrived at a similar position subsequently: FO371/73060/Z5784 15.7.48, Z58O1 12.7.48.

23. FO371/73074/Z6217 24.7.48; FO371/73075/Z6680 18.8.48.

24. The first six Washington meetings were followed by regular meetings throughout August of the ‘working group’ of officials, and steady progress was made towards defining the need for a North Atlantic defence system, away from the speechmaking some of the ambassadors were prone to in the full meetings. Achilles, T., ‘US Role in Negotiations that led to Atlantic Alliance’, NATO Review, August (1979), p. 13Google Scholar; Henderson,Birth of NATO, pp. 56–60.

25. FO371/73191/Z3464 24.4.48, Z4437 21.4.48; FO371/73069/Z3941 14.5.48; FO371/73070/Z4467 1.6.48; FO371/73061/Z6305 13.8.48; Young,Britain, France, pp. 101, 105; Shlaim, A., ‘Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War’, International Affairs (1983/1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26. Henderson, Birth of NATO, p. 74; for Greece and Turkey, see Leffler, M. P., ‘strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War’, Journal of American History, Ixxi (1985)Google Scholar. The priority of Greece and Turkey appeared strongly in British considerations of the Italian question later in the year FO371/73078/ Z8215 13.10.48, FO371/73079/Z8713 26.10.48.

27. FO371/73075/Z6948 27.8.48.

28. ‘Record of Foreign Ministers’ meetings, The Hague, 19 and 20 July 1948 PREM8/1431, FO371/ 73060/Z5995 20.7.48; FO371/73074/Z6278 13.8.48; FO371/73075/Z6948 26.8.48, Z6924 23.8.48, Z6250 16.8.48; FO371/73076/Z7113 6.9.48; Ireland,Creating, pp. 104–5; Lundestad, G., America, Scandinavia and the Cold War 1945–49 (New York, 1980), p. 194Google Scholar; J. Fremeaux and A. Martel, ‘Trench Defence Policy 1947–49’, in Riste (ed.),Western Security, p. 98; Henderson,The Birth of NATO, pp. 55–6.

29. FO371/73075/Z6948 27.8.48.

30. Henderson,The Birth of NATO, p. 55; Ireland,Creating, p. 108;FRUS 1948:3, pp. 284–8; The British, however, preferred that all who were included should be full members, believing states would not accept less, and would not like to be treated as ‘stepping-stones’: FO371/73074/Z6278 13.8.48; FO371/71453/N10652 29.9.48; Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty’, p. 259.

31. FO371/73075/Z6948 30.8.48. The FO asked the Defence Committee on 20 September to reserve judgement, but the way their ideas were moving is shown by the fact that they advanced no arguments for Italian inclusion, whilst listing the disadvantages. CAB131/6 DO(48)64 20.9.48; CAB131/5 DG(48)20th 7.10.48; FO371/73079/Z8739 25.10.48.

32. DEFE4/10 COS(48)18th 4.2.48; DEFE4/11 COS(48)37th 15.3.48, 42nd 19.3.48; DEFE5/10 COS(48)59(0) 18.3.48; Barker,The British Between, pp. 131–40.

33. DEFE4/9 COS(47)158th 16.12.47; CAB13I/6 DO(48)2,3 5.1.48; CAB131/5 DO(48)2nd 8.1.48, 3rd 14.1.48; DEFE4/11 COS(48)42nd 19.3.48. The debate over the budget showed no signs of being resolved by the middle of the year: DEFE5/11 COS(48)136(0) 16.6.48. Britain's global strategy was laid down in a Defence Committee paper, DO(47)44, which is retained in the Ministry of Defence, but quoted in DEFE5/6 COS(47)227(0) Annex B 19.12.47.

34. PREM8/744 29.7.48; DEFE5/11 COS(48)165(0) 27.7.48; CAB131/5 DO(48)14th 30.7.48, 16th 13.8.48; DEFE4/15 COS(48)121st Confidential Annex(CA) 1.9.48; Barker, The British Between, pp. 142–3; Dilks, ‘The British View of Security’, pp. 47–9.

35. DEFE4/16 COS(48)37th and JP(48)27 15.3.48; COS(48)39th CA 17.3.48; 42nd 19.3.48; DEFE5/10 COS(48)74(0) April 1948.

36. DEFE4/16 COS(48)126th 10.9.48, 139th 29.9.48; DEFE11/19 War Office note 28.9.48, Price (sec. COS Committee) to Alexander (Minister of Defence) 4.10.48. Like the JCS, the COS wished to avoid any implication in the Treaty that forces would be automatically sent to any member that was attacked: DEFE4/16 COS(48)137th 25.9.48; Barker,The British Between, p. 141.

37. DEFE4/16 COS(48)124th 8.9.48; DEFE5/12 COS(48)200(0) 8.9.48; DEFE6/7 JP(48)91 8.9.48. The Middle East's prominence in British strategy derived from three considerations: oil; its position as the gateway for a Soviet advance into Africa; and its potential as a base from which strategic bombers could attack Soviet industrial areas out of range from the UK. DEFE5/6 COS(47)227(0) Annex B 19.12.47; Barker,The British Between, pp. 151–3; Dilks, ‘The British View of Security’, pp. 37,42–3. The COS wished to develop such a base in the former Italian colony of Cyrenaica, and this was for them an additional reason for not giving the Italians the chance to bargain membership for the return of colonies, DEFE4/18 COS(48)167th 23.11.48.

38. DEFE4/16 COS(48)131st 20.9.48; DEFE5/12 COS(48)210(0) 17.9.48. British commanders in Austria and Trieste were to be told that a campaign in Italy would be ‘a wasted effort’, DEFE4/16 COS(48)142nd, JP(48)92.

39. FO371/71458/N8874 6.8.48; DEFE5/12 COS(48)200(0) 8.9.48; FO371/71454/N11084 30.9.48; Kaplan,The United States and NATO, pp. 108–9; Petersen, ‘Britain, Scandinavia and the North Atlantic Treaty’, pp. 260–1; G. Vaerno, ‘The Fate of the Nordic Option’, in A. de Staercke et al., NATO's Anxious Birth.

40. DEFE5/13 COS(49)40 28.1.49; DEFE4/19 COS(49)22nd 10.2.49; FO371/77394/N1151 26.1.49, N1308 10.2.49; Howard, in Riste (ed.),Western Security, p. 17.

41. FO371/73079/Z8713 26.10.48, Z8739 25.10.48; Z8876 Oct. 1948.

42. FO371/73075/Z6947 23.8.48, Z6999 24.8.48; FO371/73077/Z7564 9.9.48; FO371/73081/Z9294 12.11.48; Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, pp. 146–7.

43. FRUS 1948:3, pp. 237–48; FO371/73076/Z7380 9.9.48.

44. FO371/73078/Z7978 7.10.48; FO371/73080/Z9136 7.11.48; Bonnet at 10th Washington mtg 22.12.48 FO800/454,FRUS 1948:3, p. 329; Henrikson,The Creation, p. 19. Jebb, always critical of French attitudes, described their view as ‘absurd’. To the French, especially the military, it was very real, and continued undiminished into 1949: FO371/79223/Z885 24.1.49; 12th Washington mtg 8.2.49 FO800/ 455; FO371/79231/Z1991 2.3.49. It has been suggested that a major reason for the French attitude was their desire to have North Africa included. The French, however, never openly made the linkage, and argued for both independently, and the British never had the chance to bargain North Africa for Italian exclusion. The two questions were linked at the 22.12.48 mtg, but initially by Wrong of Canada, not the French, and it was agreed that Italy could not be excluded if the ‘North Atlantic principle’ was compromised by including North Africa, rather than vice versa. FO371/73083/ Z10525 23.12.48; FO371/79219/Z7 8 4.1.49, 7.1.49; FO371/79220/Z224 11.1.49, 12.1.49; Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, p. 147; P. Melandri, ‘France and the Atlantic Alliance 1950–53’ in Riste (ed.),Western Security, pp. 267–9; Petersen, ‘Bargaining Power among Potential Allies’, p. 197; Kaplan and Clawson, ‘NATO and the Mediterranean Powers in Historical Perspective’ in Kaplan, Clawson and Luraghi (eds),NATO and the Mediterranean, pp. 4–5; cf. Henderson,The Birth of NATO, p. 73.

45. Consultative Council mtgs 25,26.10.48 FO800/454; FO371/73080/Z9136 1.11.48; FO371/73081/ Z9294 12.11.48, Z9295 25.11.48, 29.11.48; DEFE5/9 COS(48)171 FO to COS 22.11.48; cf. Kaplan, The United States and NATO, p. 108.

46. CAB129/30 CP(48)249 2.11.48; CAB128/13 CM(48)68th 4.11.48; FO371/73066/Z9623 25.11.48. By this time Jebb accepted Italian exclusion, in view of Bevin's preference, and his own desire to complete the negotiation of the Treaty. For the Council of Europe, see FO371/73082/Z9910 22.11.48; FO371/ 73083/Z10346 20.12.48; Warner, G., ‘The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe 1945–51’, in Ovendale, R. (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945–51 (Leicester, 1984), pp. 68–70Google Scholar; Young,Britain, France, chap. 12.

47. CAB128/13 CM(48)68th 4.11.48;FRUS 1948:3, pp. 310, 313; Young,Britain, France, p. 102; Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, p. 196.

48. DEFE4/18 COS(48)167th 24.11.48. Ministers present were Attlee, Alexander, Cripps (Chancellor of the Exchequer), Noel-Baker (Dominions Sec.) and Mayhew (deputizing for Bevin) together with Fraser (First Sea Lord), Slim (CIGS) and Sanders (VCAS), with Hollis (Chief of Staff to Minister of Defence) and Jebb.

49. FO371/73083/Z10182 11.12.48, Z10345 15.12.48, Z10566 24.12.48;FRUS 1948:3, pp. 333–5; Henderson,The Birth of NATO, pp. 67–73.

50. DEFE4/17 COS(48)160th, JP(48)130 10.11.48; FO371/73083/Z10182 16.12.48, 24.12.48; FO371/ 79219/Z89 COS to BJSM 29.12.48.

51. FO371/79219/Z89 BJSM to COS 31.12.48; Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, pp. 152–3. Bradley also suggested Tito might not follow Soviet orders to advance further than Venezia Giulia, which Yugoslavia claimed, if faced with Italian resistance. The Tito-Soviet rift was alluded to by the COS on 3.1.49 but with no noticeable effect on their view of the indefensibility of Italy.

52. DEFE4/19 COS(49)lst mtg 3.1.49 with JP(48)141; DEFE11/19 Price to Coleridge 4.1.49; CAB131/8 DO(49)lst 3.1.49.

53. FO371/73083/Z10568 18.12.48; FO371/79218/Z77 4.1.49; FO371/79219/Z78 4.1.49, 7.1.49, Z126 5.1.49 Z200 10.1.49, 12.1.49, 13.1.49; Vannicelli, P., Italy, NATO and the European Community (Cambridge, MA, 1974), pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

54. FO371/79221/Z352 5.1.49, Z362 13.1.49, Z364 13.1.49; FO371/79220/Z260 13.1.49; FO371/79221/ Z422 17.1.49.

55. DEFE4/19 COS(49)9th 17.1.49; FO371/79221/Z364 14.1.49; FO371/79222/Z681 20.1.49.

56. FO371/79223/Z970, Z971 Unofficial British record of Consultative Council mtgs, 27,28.1.49; Henderson,The Birth of NATO, pp. 80–1; Washington mtg 8.2.48 FO800/455, cf. Young,Britain, France, pp. 103–4: the British did not see this as a retreat—they had always been prepared to defer to a strong US insistence. The Americans received inaccurate reports of the British attitude (FRUS 1949:4, pp. 44, 53), which was itself confused by the contradictory signals received from the Americans.

57. The Permanent Commission reaffirmed the ‘seven power’ decision as late as 23 February: Jebb noted at this time that French acceptance that Italy would not be a founder member represented ‘a major victory and I can only hope that the Americans will agree also’ FO371/79228/ 23.2.49; Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp. 93–4. The British, although used to what Kirkpatrick described as the State Department's ‘characteristic wobbles and divergences’, found the Americans ‘as fitful as weather-cocks’ on the Italian question, FO371/73083/Z10264 17.12.48; FO371/79227/Z1629 24.2.49.

58. From December the Americans had been asking that the Brussels powers give a lead on the question, which would resolve their own internal differences FO371/73083/Z10525 23.12.48; Henrikson, ‘The Creation’, p. 19; Young,Britain, France, p. 104; E. Ortona, ‘Diplomacy On The Spot’, in de Staercke, NATO's Anxious Birth, p. 105;FRUS 1949:4, p. 125; Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, p. 152; FO371/77398/N1505 Acheson comments to Lange 12.2.49; FO371/79226/Z1544 Acheson comments at informal mtg 19.2.49.

59. Washington mtg 25.2.49 (not inFRUS) FO800/455; FO371/79228/Z1753 25.2.49, Z1754 25.2.49; FRUS 1949:4, pp. 108–17. For Soviet pressure on Norway, FO371/77397/N1148 5.2.49, N1274 7,2.49;FRUS 1949:4, pp. 60–2. Norwegian preference that the Pact be limited to the North Atlantic was a further argument against Italian inclusion in British eyes FO371/77397/N1148 5.2.49. For Bonnet see FO371/79226/Z1463 Brussels Pact Ambassadors mtg 16.2.49; FO371/79227/Z1629 24.2.49; FO371/77399/N1931 25.2.49, N1932 25.2.49. Acheson described Bonnet's actions at the 25.2.49 mtg as ‘an extraordinary exhibition’,FRUS 1949:4, pp. 123–4.

60. FO371/79229/Z1806 28.2.49; FO371/79231/Z1991 2.3.49; Young,Britain, France, pp. 129–30; C. Delmas, ‘A Change of Heart’, in de Staercke,NATO's Anxious Birth, pp. 61–7; Henderson,Birth of NATO, pp. 95–6; Achilles, ‘The US Role in Negotiations’, p. 14. In contrast to the approach Achilles described, the French openly brandished their bargaining power: Petersen, ‘Bargaining Power Among Potential Allies’, pp. 193, 197–200.

61. Washington mtg 1.3.49 FO800/455; FO371/79229/Z1870 1.3.49 FO371/79231/Z1968 4.3.49. In view of the course of the discussions during February 1949, it can hardly be said that the Americans were ‘preeminent’ in getting Italy included. Few Americans were sure of the wisdom of including Italy, including Truman, and it is hard to see how Hickerson could have succeeded had not the French taken the stand they did; which is not to say that Hickerson's role in the US policy-making establishment was not crucial. Petersen, ‘Bargaining Power’, p. 198; Henrikson, ‘The Creation’, p. 19; cf. Kaplan,The United States and NATO, pp. 84, 110–1; Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, pp. 154–5.

62. FO371/79229/Z1807 1.3.49; CAB128/15 CM(49)14th 22.2.49. Eventually the US and UK made separate declarations: Bevin's was made in the House of Commons on 18.3.49: Barker,The British Between, p. 149; A. Rendel, ‘The Uncertain Months’ in de Staercke (ed.), NATO's Anxious Birth, p. 60. The declaration covered the area from Greece to the Persian Gulf. For FO views on the Cabinet decision, FO371/79228/Z1716 22.2.49, Z1755 2.3.49.

63. The Italians had been making such hints since the start of the year: FO371/79219/Z78 7.1.49; FO371/ 79222/Z577 17.1.49; FO371/79229/Z187 1.3.49; FO371/79230/Z1960 3.3.49; Ortona, ‘Diplomacy’, pp. 106–7.

64. FO371/79230/Z1960 3.3.49 (2 tels.) Z1914 3.3.49, Z1959 5.3.49; FO371/77399/N2232 4.3.49; DEFE 5/13 COS(49)92 18.3.49; DEFE4/20 COS(49)38th 7.3.49, 39th 9.3.49; Barker, The British Between, pp. 155–6; Young,Britain, France, p. 104.

65. FO371/79231/Z2023 8.3.49; FO371/79234/Z2081 8.3.49, 9.3.49, Z2178 11.3.49, Z2177 12.3.49; CAB129/33 CP(49)56 8.3.49; cf. Ortona, ‘Diplomacy’, p. 107. The Americans were equally highhanded over the venue for signature; Kaplan,The United States and NATO, p. 119. Typically, Bonnet had contested the British view of the Permanent Commission decision at the 4.3.49 mtg: FO371/79230/Z1959 4.3.49. Further discussion was intended at the next meeting but was preempted by the US invitation to the Italians.

66. The FO clearly did not believe that it was the act of inclusion that would combat communism, but the fact of the alliance as a force in international politics that would raise self-confidence, aided by the specific declaration of interest. As one official wrote,

…these points of Italian internal reaction are important but must come a bad second to other considerations. Italy would hardly go communist because she was not included in the Pact.

FO371/79229/Z1893 3.3.49. cf. Hickerson's views, Smith, ‘The Fear of Subversion’, pp. 154–5. See also FO371/79229/Z1851 28.2.49 and Bevin's comments at Consultative Council 27.1.49 FO371/ 79223/Z970.

67. Gaddis, ‘The United States and the Question’, p. 75; Howard, in Riske, Western Security, p. 16; Pollard,Economic Security, pp. 280–7; Cotler, C., The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (London, 1984), pp. 3–5Google Scholar, 121–8; Young,Britain, France, p. 107.

68. The inclusion of Italy in the Treaty made the Mediterranean a decisive sector and a major concern to the West. In effect it made the Mediterranean an arm of the Atlantic, as well as crystallizing the pattern of the cold war in the region, not least in internal Italian politics, Henrikson, ‘The Creation’, pp. 19–20; R. Luraghi, ‘The Italian Role in NATO’ in Kaplan, Clawson and Luraghi (eds), ‘NATO and the Mediterranean’; Vannicelli,Italy, NATO and the European Community, pp. 6–9.