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The CSCE: a reassessment of its role in the 1980s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Karl E. Birnbaum  and
Ingo Peters
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Extract

At the beginning of the 1990s the European political scene is in a state of rapid transformation. While the East–West conflict may not be over, it is clearly undergoing a fundamental change from an ideologically charged contest to a ‘normal’ competition between major actors in the anarchical international system. This change may well entail the elimination of some of the most dangerous threats to peace, whilst at the same time generating requirements for a new framework of European and East–West security. As the ideological conflict fades, so the bipolar alliance system which, in spite of all its shortcomings, burdens and injustices, provided some measure of stability to Europe, is also about to vanish.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 16 , Issue 4 , October 1990 , pp. 305 - 319
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1990

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References

1 See below p. 000.

2 Maresca, Cf. John J., To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1973—1975. (Durham, N.C., 1985), pp. 43–47, 94Google Scholar. See also: Kalevi, J.Holsti, ‘Who Got What and How’, in Spencer, Robert (ed.), Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Toronto, 1984), pp. 137 ffGoogle Scholar; and Bimbaum, Karl E., ‘East–West diplomacy in the Era of Multilateral Negotiations: The Case of the CSCE’, in Andren, Nils and Birabaum, Karl E. (eds.), Beyond Detente: Prospects for East–West Co-operation and Security in Europe (Leyden, 1976), pp. 142 ffGoogle Scholar.

3 At an early stage of the Geneva phase of the CSCE negotiations the USSR came out in favour of deepening and extending political consultations within the CSCE framework and supported the idea of a permanent CSCE-body for that purpose. But the Soviet enthusiasm for this project diminished markedly, as it became clear in the course of the negotiations that such an institution could also be used to supervise the implementation of provisions on human rights and human contacts. See Maresca, , To Helsinki, p. 201Google Scholar; Birnbaum, , ‘East–West Diplomacy’, pp. 144 ffGoogle Scholar.

4 See Kissinger, H. A., The White House Years (Boston–Toronto, 1979), p. 415Google Scholar; see also Maresca, , To Helsinki, p. 45Google Scholar.

5 On US goals and preoccupations at the Belgrade Follow-up Meeting, see Richard Davy’s contribution to Andren, Nils and Birnbaum, Karl E., (eds.), Belgrade and Beyond: The CSCE Process in Perspective. (Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980), pp. 4–6Google Scholar.

6 See Birnbaum, Karl E., The Politics of East–West Communication in Europe, (Farnborough, Hants, 1979), pp. 79–81Google Scholar.

7 It was the difficult task of the head of the American delegation in Madrid to reconcile the positions of his masters in Washington with those of the main European partners of the United States. See Kampelmann, Max, ‘Can We Negotiate with the Russians. And if so, How?’, Encounter (03 1985)Google Scholar; also Maresca, , To Helsinki, p. 208Google Scholar.

8 See Peters, Ingo, Translantischer Konsens und Vetrauensbildung in Europa. Die KVAE-Politik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1978–1986 (Baden-Baden, 1987), pp. 144 ffGoogle Scholar.

9 See Birnbaum, Karl E., ‘After Stockholm: The CSCE as a Framework for East–West Cooperation in Europe’; in CSCE; N + N Perspectives. The Laxenburg Papers, no. 8 (12 1987), pp. 63–66Google Scholar.

10 See Rotfeld, Adam D., ‘The CSCE Process: European Security System in statu nascendi?’ Occasional Papers, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw (PISM), 1988, pp. 5 ffGoogle Scholar.

11 Authors’ interviews with French and neutral delegates to the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna. See also Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgeway’s statement of 14 July 1988, at a joint hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Congressional Helsinki Commission. MS.

12 See Concluding document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 (Vienna, 1989), pp. 84 and 108Google Scholar.

13 Kristof, Erich, ‘Das Wiener’KSZE-Folgetreffen aus deutschlandpolitischer Sicht’; in Deutschland Archiv 4 (1989), p. 396Google Scholar. See also Bimbaum, Karl E. and Peters, Ingo, ‘Die beiden deutschen Staaten auf dem Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffen’, in Birnbaum, Karl E. and Peters, Ingo (eds.), Zwischen Abgrenzung und Verantwortungs-gemeinschqft: Zur KSZE-Politik der beiden deutschen Staaten, 1984–1989, ForthcomingGoogle Scholar.

14 See, e.g. ‘Genscher will KAE-Beratungen auf hoher politischer Ebene ansiedeln’, in General Anzeiger, Bonn, 22 Jan. 1983; and interview with Erich Honecker, in Neues Deutschland, 6 Jan. 1984.

15 See Peters, , Translantischer Konsens, pp. 81 and 201Google Scholar.

16 Peters, , Translantischer Konsens, pp. 121 and 179Google Scholar.

17 See Erich Honecker’s declaration at the 7th plenary session of the Central Committee of the SED, in Neues Deutschland, 26/27 Nov. 1983; and Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s speech held in Bremen in mid-April 1984, in Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, Bonn, no. 42, (13 April 1984).

18 Jonathan Dean has referred to an instance of this concern on the Western side. He notes that, when during the Stockholm Conference … ‘West German Foreign Minister Genscher raised the idea of advancing the Western position by discussing a possible commitment on non-use of force with his East German colleagues, he was informed that the United States and other alliance partners considered it far preferable to focus all aspects of the Stockholm negotiations at the negotiating site’. Dean, Jonathan, ‘Changing Security Dimensions in the Inter-German Relationship’ (Larrabee, F. Stephen (ed.), in: The Two German States and European Security (London 1989), p. 167Google Scholar.

19 Peters, , Translantischer Konsens, p. 242Google Scholar.

20 See ‘Positionswechsel Frankreichs bei Abrüstung’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 11. 1988Google Scholar; and ‘Slawisches im Blut’, Der Spiegel, no. 40 (3 10. 1988)Google Scholar.

21 See Birnbaum, Karl E. and Peters, Ingo, ‘Die beiden deutschen Staaten auf dem Wiener KSZE-Folgetreffen’, passimGoogle Scholar; Binnendijk, Hans, ‘NATO’s Nuclear Modernization Dilemma’, Survival (03/04 1989), pp. 137–155Google Scholar.

22 See Bergoll, Udo, ‘Kein Streit mit Paris über Abrüstung’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (10 03 1989)Google Scholar. Regarding West German reservations of long standing on this issue, see also Dean, Jonathan, ‘From Apathy to Accord’, International Security 7, no. 4 (1983), pp . 131 and 134fCrossRefGoogle Scholar.