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Requiem for associated statehood?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

William C. Gilmore
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Extract

With the demise of the Federation of the West Indies in 1962 and the failure of the parties to agree to a ‘truncated’ federation in the smaller Eastern Caribbean islands, the British Government was confronted, for the first time, with the issue of how best to treat the decolonization of island micro-states.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 8 , Issue 1 , January 1982 , pp. 9 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1982

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References

1. See, Mordecai, J., The West Indies: Federal Negotiations (London, 1968)Google Scholar. See also, Springer, , ‘Federation in the Caribbean: An Attempt that Failed’, in Lowenthal, D. and Comitas, L. (eds.), The Aftermath of Sovereignty (New York, 1973), pp. 189–213.Google Scholar

2. See, Lewis, , ‘The Agony of the Eight’, in Lowenthal and Comitas, Ibid, pp. 215–235Google Scholar. See also, Marshall, , ‘Attempts at Windward/Leeward Federation’, Caribbean Quarterly, xviii (1972), pp. 9–15.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3. See, Lewis, , ‘The Commonwealth Caribbean and Self-Determination in the International System’, in Lewis, V. (ed.), Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean (henceforth International Relations) (Kingston, 1976), p. 229Google Scholar

4. See, Payne, A., The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961–79 (Manchester, 1980), p. 13Google Scholar. See also, Coard, , ‘The Meaning of Political Independence in the Commonwealth Caribbean’, in Institute of International Relations, Independence for Grenada-Myth or Reality? (St. Augustine, 1974), pp. 69–70.Google Scholar

5. See, Coard, Ibid, p. 70. On Jamaican economic developments which gave rise to this change see generally, Jefferson, O., The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica (Kingston, 1972).Google Scholar

6. By the end of 1966 Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados had obtained independence from the UK.

7. Emmanuel, ‘Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis’, in International Relations, op. cit., p. 3. See also, Ramphal, ‘West Indian Nationhood - Myth, Mirage, or Mandate?’, in Lowenthal and Comitas (eds.), op. cit., pp. 245–246.

8. See generally, IBRD, , The Economic and Social Development of the Leeward and Windward Islands (Unpublished Report No. 566a) (Washington, D.C., 1975).Google Scholar

9. See generally, ‘Constitutional Proposals for Antigua, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada’, Cmnd. 2865 (1965).

10. See generally, ‘Report of the Antigua Constitutional Conference’, Cmnd. 2963 (1966); ‘Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference’, Cmnd. 3021 (1966); ‘Report of the St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla Constitutional Conference’, Cmnd. 3031 (1966).

11. See, the statements of Lord Brockway, 280 Pad. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 162 (1967), and Mrs. Hart, 740 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 337 (1967). For a review of that scheme see, Leibowitz, A., Colonial Emancipation in the Pacific and the Caribbean (New York, 1976) pp. 132–46.Google Scholar This was no mere carbon copy of that scheme. See, 279 Pad. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1487 (1967).

12. As the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs made clear. See, 279 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 1487 (1967). The view that the status was intended to be temporary is now much in evidence but is contradicted by the debates. For the recent British view see, ‘Report of the St. Lucia Constitutional Conference’, Cmnd. 7328 (1978), p. 9. For a similar West Indian approach see, Independence for St. Lucia (Public Relations Office of the Premier, Govt. of St. Lucia, 1977), p. 7.

13. 740 Pad. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 345 (1967).

14. Grenada, St. Lucia, Dominica and St. Vincent. See generally Laing, ‘Independence and Islands: The Decolonization of the British Caribbean’ International Law and Politics xii (1979), p. 281 et seq. See also, Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs iv (1978) No. 2 being a special issue on the independence question.

15. See generally, ‘Repor t of the Antigua Constitutional Conference’, Cmnd. 8142 (1980). See also, Smith, ‘The Antigua General Elections, 1980’ Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, vi (1980), No. 1, p. 11 et seq.

16. See generally, Smith, ‘Secession: The Problem of the Eighties’ Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, v (1979) No. 5, p. 29 et seq.

17. The demand to seek the reunification of Anguilla as a precondition for independence has been dropped by the territorial Government which has recently acquiesced in the formal separation of Anguilla from the Associated State. On the Anguilla problem see text and reference, infra.

18. West Indies Act, 1967, c. 4 (UK) (hereafter W.I.A.).

19. Which retained Crown Colony status.

20. On the local constitutions which were established see generally Forbes, ‘The West Indies Associated States: Some Aspects of the Constitutional Arrangements’, Social and Economic Studies, xix (1970), p. 59 et seq. See also Gilmore, ‘The Associated States of the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Constitutions and the Individual’, Lawyer of the Americas, xi (1979), pp. 1–41.

21. 1931, c. 4 (UK). This measure gave statutory recognition to the advances made by the Dominions as recorded by the 1926 Imperial Conference.

22. See,W.I.A.,s.3(l).

23. See,W.I.A.,s.5(4),s.7(l),s.9(2)ands.l5(4)(a).

24. For the required procedure see, W.LA. S.19(5).

25. 1865, c. 63 (UK). See, W.LA. s.4 and Sched. 1, s.l.

26. 1894, c. 60 (UK) at s.735 and s.736. See W.I.A., Sched. 1, s.3(a).

27. 1890, c. 67 (UK) at s.4 and s.7. See W.LA., Sched. 1, s.3(b).

28. W.LA. Sched. 1, s.2. For an analysis of the doctrine see Phillips, O., Constitutional and Administrative Law (London 1967, 4th ed.), pp. 741–745.Google Scholar

29. See, supra, note 9, p. 6.

30. See, Gilmore, ‘Legal Perspectives on Associated Statehood in the Eastern Caribbean’, Virginia Journal of International Law, xix (1979), p. 489, at pp. 501–504.

31. See W.LA., s.3(2)—(4). Consequently the ‘request and consent’ of the Associated State to proposed enactments is not required.

32. See, W.LA., s.7(2). See also, S.18(3). These powers are restricted to external affairs and defence concerns.

33. See, Broderick, ‘Associated Statehood —A new Form of Decolonization’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, xvii (1968), p. 368, at p. 371.

34. 279 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1488 (1967).

35. 35. See, W.LA., s.7(2) and s.l8(3).

36. There was also some concern that the terms of s.7(2) went beyond those agreed at the time of the 1966 Constitutional Conferences. See Gilmore, ‘Legal Perspectives’, op. cit., pp. 515–518.

37. See generally, supra, note 10.

38. For the draft ‘Heads of Agreement’ agreed to in 1966 see, Antigua Constitutional Conference at pp. 18–21; Windward Islands Constitutional Conference at pp. 18–20; St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla Constitutional Conference at pp. 23–25. All cited supra, note 10.

39. See e.g., Antigua Constitutional Conference,Ibid., p. 6 and pp. 21–22.

40. W.I.A.,Sched.l,s.5(3H4).

41. W.I.A., s. 10(1) to be read in conjunction with Sched. 2. A less complex formula is provided to facilitate a new federal initiative or an initiative to unite or associate any territory with a Commonwealth Caribbean state or states.

42. Forbes, op. cit., p. 86.

43. W.I.A., s.l 7(2) The UK gave oral assurances to the effect that termination on their part would be subject to 6 months notice and prior constitutional talks. See, 280 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 166–67 (1967) and 740 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 340 (1967).

44. For a detailed examination of events surrounding this issue see, ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry to Examine the Anguilla Problem’, Cmnd. 4510 (1970) (hereinafter Wooding Commission). See also, Brisk, W., The Dilemma of a Ministate: Anguilla (Columbia, 1969)Google Scholar.

45. See, Wooding Commission, Ibid, pp. 40–41.

46. Anguilla (Temporary Provision) Order, 18 March 1969, Stat. Inst. 1969 No. 371.

47. See W.I.A., s. 19(5).

48. See, supra, note 46 and Parliamentary statements at 780 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 497 (1969) and 300 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 716 (1971).

49. The possibility of UK military assistance to the civil power was directly contemplated by the terms of s.5 of the 1967 Agreement with the Associated State and indirectly by the ‘request and consent’ formula used in W.I.A. s.7(l).

50. See e.g., 300 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 497 (1971) and Carnegie, Constitutional Law, in Annual Survey of Commonwealth Law (1969), pp. 86–87. The effect was to reduce the status of Anguilla de facto to that of a Crown Colony while retaining its formal links to St.Kitts/Nevis.

51. See, 821 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 895–96 (1971). See also, Simmonds, ‘Anguilla-A n Interim Settlement’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly xxi (1972), p. 151.

52. 1971 c. 63 (UK). See also, Anguilla (Administration) Order, Stat. Inst. 1971, No. 1235.

53. See, 821 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 898 (1971).

54. W.I.A. s.9(l)(b) directly contemplates possible territorial division but this is subject to the ‘request and consent’ formula; the 1971 measure contemplated unilateral UK, action.

55. Wooding Commission, op. cit., at p. 95 (Annex 8).

56. See, Smith, S.A. de, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Harmondsworth, 1971), p. 635Google Scholar, and Simmonds. ‘Associated Statehood: A Caribbean Dilemma,’ in Miscellanea W. J. Ganshof Van der Meersch: Studia Ad Discipulis Amieisque in Honorem Egregii Professoris Edita, II (Brussels, 1972), p. 438.

57. Report of the Caribbean Task Force 1974, Part II, (Port-of-Spain, 1975), p. 97.

58. ‘Report of the Constitution Commission on the West Indies Associated States and Monserrat’ (unpublished, 1976), p. 29.

59. Anguilla Act, 1980, c. 67 (UK), brought into effect on 19 December 1980 by The Anguilla (Appointed Day) Order, Stat Inst. 1980, No. 1953. See, Gilmore, ‘Th e Anguilla Act, 1980: A Question of Constitutional Propriety’ (Forthcoming) in 1981 West Indian Law Journal.

60. These individual agreements were entered into on 16 February 1967 with Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, and St. Lucia. Although unpublished they were made available for inspection by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Agreement with St.Vincent was concluded on 23 October 1969.

61. See, supra, note 38.

62. See, Gilmore, ‘Legal Perspectives’, op. cit., pp. 530–534 for a more detailed analysis.

63. See, supra, Report of the Caribbean Task Force, op. cit., Part II, p. 78.

64. Forbes, op. cit., p. 86.

65. See, ‘St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla Constitutional Conference Report’, op. cit., pp. 26–27.

66. See e.g., Commonwealth Office Despatch No. 56, 16 February 1967 (Bowden to Administrator of Dominica) (unpublished).

67. See, Gilmore, ‘Legal Perspectives’, op. cit., pp. 535–537 for details.

68. As envisaged in 1966. See e.g., ‘Antigua Constitutional Conference Report’, op. cit., p. 3.

69. See, e.g., Commonwealth Office Despatch No. WA 2/39, 16 August 1968 (Shannon to Governor of Antigua) (unpublished).

70. This is not to say that similar participation would not have been legally permissible under the traditional forms of internal self-government.

71. Other treaties and agreements between the Associated States and third States include: (A) Bilateral Agreements: St. Lucia/USA, Investment Guarantee Agreement, 19.8.68; Antigua/USA, Investment Guarantee Agreement, 9.10.68; Dominica/USA, Investment Guarantee Agreement, 11.10.68; St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla/USA, Investment Guarantee Agreement, 21.11.68; Grenada/USA, Investment Guarantee Agreement; St. Vincent/USA, Investment Guarantee Agreement, 15.5/14.6.72; Antigua/Venezuela, Instrument of Friendship and Cooperation, 14.12.79; St. Kitts, Nevis, Anguilla/Venezuela, Instrument of Friendship and Cooperation, 18.3.80; (B) Multilateral Agreements: All Associated States, Agreement establishing the Caribbean Development Bank, 18.10.69

72. See, e.g., despatch 6/10, 11 April, 1974 (Mortlock to Premier of St. Lucia) (unpublished).

73. See, Dundas, ‘The Law of the Caribbean Community – A Statement’, West Indian Law Journal (1980), p. 13, at pp. 14—15. See also, Geiser, H., Alleyne, P. and Gajraj, C., Legal Problems of Caribbean Integration: A Study on the Legal Aspects of CARICOM (Leyden, 1976), p. 25.Google Scholar It has been observed that ‘these two conditions, if strictly applied would have given the United Kingdom a role in the decision making of the Community that is otherwise only conferred by membership’. Emmanuel, P., Lewis, V. and Mclntyre, A., The Political Economy of Independence for the Leeward and Windward Islands (unpublished, 1975), p. 20.Google Scholar

74. 74. See, Franck and Hoffman, ‘Th e Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, viii (1976), p. 331, at p. 364.

75. See generally, Geiser, ‘The Lome Convention and Caribbean Integration: A First Assessment’ Revista Interamericana, vi (1978), p. 31. See also, Emmanuel, Lewis and Mclntyre, op. cit., p. 20.

76. See, Geiser, Ibid., p. 32.

77. See, Council Decision 76/568/EEC, 19 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L176) 8–20 (1976).

78. See, A. E. Thorndike, ‘Associated Statehood in the Eastern Caribbean’ (Unpublished final report to the UK Social Science Research Council on grant HR 3553/1), p. 15.

79. See, ‘Independence for St. Lucia’, op. cit., p. 8.

80. See, supra, note 9, at p. 4.

81. See, Gilmore, ‘Legal Perspectives’ op. cit., p. 555 for details of aid flows.

82. See, e.g., ‘Independence for St. Lucia’, op. cit., p. 7.

83. For recent reviews by the World Bank see, e.g., ‘Economi c Memorandum on St. Lucia’ (IBRD Report No. 1999-CRB, 1978); ‘Ecomomic Memorandum on Antigua’ (IBRD Report No. 1997-CRB, 1978); ‘Economic Memorandum on St. Vincent’ (IBRD Report No. 2000-CRB, 1978).

84. See ‘Report of the Constitution Commission,’ op. cit., p. 23 and p. 46. See also, ‘Report of the St. Vincent Constitutional Conference’, Cmnd. 7369 (1978).

85. See, Emmanuel, Lewis and Mclntyre, op. cit., p. 20.

86. See, Report of the Caribbean Task Force, op. cit., Part II, p. 116.

87. See, Geiser, op. cit., pp. 40–42.

88. See, Art. 54, of the EEC Council Decision of 29 June 1976.

89. See, ‘Independence for St. Lucia’, op. cit., p. 9.

90. See, supra, note 9, p. 9.

91. See, e.g., ‘Windward Islands Constitutional Conference’,op. cit., p. 6.

92. Primarily as a consequence of the provisions of The Immigration Act, 1971, c. 77 (UK).

93. See, e.g., Thorndike, op. cit., p. 46. That such an interpretation of events was common is evident. See, ‘British Nationality Law: Discussion of Possible Changes’, Cmnd. 6795 (1977), p. 9. Under the proposals presently before Parliament the majority of residents in the Associated States would become Citizens of the British Dependent Territories. See, ‘British Nationality Law’, Cmnd. 7987 (1980).

94. See, de Smith, S. A., Microstates and Micronesia (New York, 1970), p. 69.Google Scholar

95. See, art 73, UN Charter.

96. GA Res. 742, 8 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 17) 21, UN Doc A/2630 (1953). See Clark, ‘Self-Determination and Free Association – Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?’, Harvard International Law Journal, xxi (1980), p. 1, at pp. 42–45.

97. See, Clark, Ibid., p. 42.

98. GA Res. 748, 8 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 17) 25, U N Doc. A/2630 (1953). See also, Leibowitz, op. cit., pp. 35–66 for a detailed overview of the inner workings of this association scheme.

99. A further exception to independence recognized by GA Res. 742 was ‘integration’ with another state. The classic example of GA acceptanc e of such a status in practice came in 1955 with the integration of the Netherland Antilles and Surinam into the Netherlands. See GA Res. 945, 10 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 19) 25, UN Doc. A/3116 (1955). For an examination of this status arrangement see generally, Hoetink, , ‘The Dutch Caribbean and its Metropolis’, in de Kadt, E. (ed.) Patterns of Foreign Influence in the Caribbean (London, 1972), pp. 103–120.Google Scholar A similar arrangement between Denmark and Greenland was approved in 1954. For recent developments see, Foighel, ‘Home Rule in Greenland’, Man and Society (1980), pp. 3–18.

100. GA Res. 1514, 15 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 16) 66, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960). For a good account of the evolution of the concept of self-determination in UN practice see generally, Sureda, R., The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination (Leiden, 1973).Google Scholar

101. The writer here takes no fixed view on the contentious issue as to whether self-determination is an accepted operative norm of customary international law. For recent indications of the view of the International Court, see Namibia Case 1971, ICJ Rep. 16, at 31, and Western Sahara Case, 1975, IGJ Rep. 12 at 33.

102. GA Res. 1541, 15 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 16) 29, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960).

103. Ibid.

104. Leibowitz, op. cit., p. 202.

105. See, Crawford, J., The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, 1979), p. 372.Google Scholar

106. The Cook Islands Constitution Act, 1964, No. 69 (N.Z.) as amended by Act No. 2 of 1965 (N.Z.). See, Aikman, ‘Recent Constitutional Changes in the South-West Pacific’, New Zealand Yearbook (1968), pp. 1104–1109.

107. GA Res. 2064, 20 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 14) 56, UN Doc. A/6014 (1965).

108. de Smith, , ‘Exceeding Small’, in Fawcett, J. and Higgins, R. (eds.) International Organisation: Law in Movement, Essays in Honour of John McMahon (London, 1976), p. 64, at p. 72.Google Scholar

109. Ibid., at p. 71.

110. See, UNITAR, , Small States and Territories: Status and Problems (New York, 1971), p. 97.Google Scholar

111. See, International Conciliation (1966) No. 560, pp. 40–41.

112. Clark, op. cit., pp. 54–55.

113. See, International Conciliation, op. cit., pp. 42–43 for details of UN activity in this regard.

114. Emerson, ‘Self-Determination’, American Journal of International Law, lxv (1971), p. 459, at p. 470.

115. See, International Conciliation, op. cit., pp. 40–49. A ‘wrecking amendment’ was narrowly defeated. See, Clark, op. cit., pp. 58–59.

116. The vote was 78–0 with 29 abstentions.

117. See, Emerson, op. cit., p. 470.

118. As has been noted these paragraphs ‘were the product of a compromise between members who considered that the association arrangement was itself a definitive act of self-determination and others who regarded it as merely an interim — and not very satisfactory — accommodation’. Crawford, op. cit., p. 373.

119. See, International Conciliation, op. cit., p. 49.

120. UNITAR, op. cit., p. 96.

121. See, Ince, ‘The Decolonization of Grenada in the UN’, in Institute of International Relations, op. cit., p. 43, at pp. 49–50.

122. See, Crawford, op. cit., p. 374 for details.

123. See, Clark, op. cit., p. 63.

124. See, Crawford, op. cit., p. 374, and Laing, op. cit., p. 298.

125. See, Crawford, op. cit., p. 374.

126. See, J. Fawcett and R. Higgins (eds.), op. cit., p. 73.

127. The UK did make one subsequent effort to seek to protect the UN from the disadvantages of micro-state membership but this, as with a similar American plan, proved futile. See, Gunter, ‘What Happened to the United Nations Ministate Problem?’ American Journal of International Law, lxxi (1977), pp. 110–124. For a more general treatment of this question in a UN context see, Adam, ‘Micro-States and the United Nations’, Italian Yearbook of International Law, ii (1976), pp. 80–101. See also, Plischke, E., Microstates in World Affairs (Washington, D.C., 1977).Google Scholar

128. E.g., include the Bahamas, the Seychelles, Tuvalu and Kiribati.

129. Emerson, op. cit., p. 469.

130. British Antarctic Territory has no permanent population. Its exact status is a matter for some debate.

131. A large number of British possessions are subject to varying claims by third states: viz, Hong Kong (China); Falkland Islands (Argentina); Gibraltar (Spain); British Indian Ocean Territory (Mauritius). Such entities are thus not likely to be proper subjects for a major status change until talks with the contesting states permit or the political climate changes. Unsuccessful tripartite talks of this kind led Belize to independence in 1981. See, ‘Report of the Belize Constitutional Conference’. Cmnd. 8245 (1981).

132. Pitcairn; St. Helena and dependencies; Cayman Islands; Montserrat; Anguilla; British Virgin Islands; and, Turks and Caicos Islands. See, Commonwealth Secretariat, The Commonwealth: Its Special Responsibilities to Small States (London, 1979), pp. 29–30.

133. The Economist, 13 August 1977, p. 13.

134. Franck and Hoffman, op. cit., p. 334.

135. Niue Constitution Act, No. 42, 1974 (NZ). See, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute, The Theory and Practice of Governmental Autonomy (Unpublished Report prepared for US Department of State, Contract No. 1722–920244, 1980), I, pp. 185–193.

136. See generally, Clark, op. cit. See also, Armstrong, ‘The Negotiations for the Future Political Status of Micronesia’, American Journal of International Law, lxxiv (1980), pp. 689–693. International acceptability is problematic.

137. Quoted by Clark, op. cit., p. 56, note 313. See also, Aikman, ‘Constitutional Development in New Zealand’s Island Territories and in Western Samoa’, in A. Ross (ed.), New Zealand’s Record in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1969), pp. 336–337. General New Zealand legislation is adopted for use in these territories with some frequency. See e.g., Act No. 15 (1970), Act No. 8 (1973), and Act No. 23 (1973) of the Cook Islands.

138. See, Clark, op. cit., pp. 57–58. For a recent instance of international action see. Treaty between the USA and the Cook Islands on Friendship and Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between the USA and the Cook Islands, 11 June 1980. Both are members of the South Pacific Forum.

139. See, Clark, Ibid.

140. See, Informal Proposal of Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Samoa (FC/10, 15 August 1979) discussed in Oxman, ‘The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session, 1979’, American Journal of International Law, lxxiv (1980), p. 1, at pp. 40–41. This has been superseded by a new proposal to much the same effect. See, Informal Proposal by the Philippines and the Solomon Islands (FC/19, 20 March 1980). No final determination on FC/19 was arrived at in the 9th Session and it was expected t o be subject to discussion at the 10th Session. As of the time of writing the outcome is still uncertain. The wording of FC/19 would not appear to permit the remaining UK Associated States to participate.

141. See, Aikman, ‘Constitutional Development’, op. cit., p. 334.

142. See e.g., UNCTAD, Developing Island Countries: Report of the Panel of Experts, UN Doc. TD/B/443/Rev. 1 (1974). UNCTAD now reviews with some frequency progress on specific action taken in favour of developing island countries.

143. GA Res. 2625, 25 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 28) 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970). There is, as yet, no practice on the wide ranging third option which emphasizes a new element of flexibility. A large number of options which emphasize autonomy could now be regarded as fit for reexamination. See, Hannum and Lillich, ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International Law’, American Journal of International Law, lxxiv (1980), pp. 858–889.

144. See, GA Res. 3285, 29 UN GAOR, Supp (No. 31) 98, UN Do c A/1631 (1974).

145. Clark, op. cit., pp. 59–60.

146. ’Fifteen years of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, Decolonization, ii (1975), No. 6, p. 19.

147. 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, p. 33.

148. Ibid., p. SI.

149. See 11 UN GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 39) 5, U N Doc. A/3173/ Add. 1 (1956).

150. See Franck and Hoffman, op. cit., p. 373.

151. Ibid., at p. 337. Tuvalu subsequently acquired independence as did the Gilbert Islands now known as Kiribati.

152. See, Crawford, op. cit., p. 376.

153. The procedures established for use by the UK in W.I.A. s,10(2) have provided the mechanism i n each case. The Grenada request that this path be followed was successful and provided a precedent for use elsewhere. For the background see, Jacobs, ‘The Movement Towards Grenadian Independence’, Institute of International Relations, op. cit., pp. 21—33

154. See e.g., ‘Report of the Dominica Constitutional Conference’, Cmnd. 6901 (1977), p. 13.