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Locke's Thoughts on Reputation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 August 2013

Michelle E. Brady
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Abstract

Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning Education is designed to provide the education necessary to produce citizens guided by the obligations of natural law. A careful examination of his recommendations, however, reveals that his education does not in fact teach children to obey the law of nature directly. Instead, it teaches them to obey the law of opinion or reputation. At the same time, he encourages children to see themselves as rational and therefore free. The law of reputation provides the necessary restraint to balance the desire for liberty, and the desire for liberty ensures that citizens must respect others in order to win their esteem. Respect for others' rights, an essential element of Lockean natural law, emerges from this specific combination of the law of reputation and the love of liberty.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 75 , Issue 3 , Summer 2013 , pp. 335 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2013 

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References

1 Locke, John, Second Treatise of Government, in Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. Shapiro, Ian (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003)Google Scholar, § 6; see also §§ 7, 8, 11, 16, 134, 135, 159, 182, 183. Hereafter this work will be cited in text as ST, by section number.

2 Nathan Tarcov's extensive treatment of Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in Locke's Education for Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984)Google Scholar, is the most notable exception. See also Button, Mark, Contract, Culture, and Citizenship: Transformative Liberalism from Hobbes to Rawls (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009)Google Scholar, chaps. 2–3; Forde, Steven, “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke,” American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (2001): 403–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” Review of Politics 68, no. 2 (2006): 232–58Google Scholar; Mehta, Uday Singh, The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke's Political Thought (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992)Google Scholar, esp. chap. 4. Peter Myers approaches the question from a different angle, arguing that Locke's political order is itself designed to serve a pedagogical role (Our Only Star and Compass: Locke and the Struggle for Political Rationality [New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998]Google Scholar, esp. chap. 6).

3 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, in Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Grant, Ruth W. and Tarcov, Nathan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996)Google Scholar, sec. 134. Hereafter this work will be cited in text as STCE, by section number.

4 Forde develops this connection in depth in “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke,” see esp. 403–4. See also Forde, “What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” 254; Ashcraft, Richard, Locke's Two Treatises of Government (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 43Google Scholar.

5 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Nidditch, Peter H. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)Google Scholar, II.xxi.35, 31, 37. Hereafter this work will be cited in text as ECHU, by book, chapter, and section number.

6 Some scholars read Locke's claims about self-determination as evidence he sees human beings as atomistic individuals, wholly independent of others. See, e.g., Charles Taylor's description of the “punctual self” (Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989], 49, 160, 171–73, 192–94)Google Scholar. Such readings require ignoring Locke's clear interest in the many ways we are shaped by our society. A less extreme interpretation of the capacity to act according to one's judgments is fully compatible with the recognition that others have enormous influence over that judgment (see, e.g., Button, Contract, Culture, and Citizenship, esp. 95–6, 102–4, 116, 132).

7 Locke explicitly states that his education is intended for young men, and that it “will not so perfectly suit the education of daughters” (STCE 6). Although I would argue his pedagogy can easily be extended to include all human beings, I will follow his lead in referring to the child being educated as male.

8 For an extensive discussion of the relation between the love of liberty found in self-mastery and the desire for dominion, see Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, esp. 8, 90, 131–36. Cf. Pangle, Thomas, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988)Google Scholar, 218, which treats the desire for dominion as a form of the desire for liberty.

9 See also ECHU III.xi.16, IV.iii.18, IV.iv.7, IV.xii.8.

10 Traditional readings of Locke base natural law on our relation to God as Creator. See Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises, 35, 240; Coleman, John, John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 187Google Scholar; Tuckness, Alex, “The Coherence of a Mind: John Locke and the Law of Nature,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37, no. 1 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: 82, 87; Tully, James, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 34–36, 44–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar. John Dunn argues that Lockean natural law requires a natural theology, but also that Locke fails to provide a rational defense of that theology (The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the “Two Treatises of Government” [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969Google Scholar], esp. 94–95, 98–100, 187, 188). Others argue that equality provides the necessary basis, or at least that it does so when coupled with natural right. See Forde, “What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” 235, 244, 252; Myers, Our Only Star and Compass, 49–51, 144; Zuckert, Michael, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar, 212, 214, 266; Ward, Lee, “Locke on Punishment, Property, and Moral Knowledge,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, no. 2 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: 234, 240. Cf. Jeremy Waldron's argument that Locke's idea of equality is inseparable from his Christianity (God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], esp. 71–81Google Scholar). For arguments that natural law lacks any true foundation for Locke, see Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 202–51, esp. 220, 226–29Google Scholar; Kennington, Richard, “Nature and Natural Right in Locke,” in On Modern Origins: Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Kraus, Pamela and Hunt, Frank (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), 251–70Google Scholar.

11 See Carrig, Joseph, “Liberal Impediments to Liberal Education: The Assent to Locke,” Review of Politics 63, no. 1 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: 75; Ward, “Locke on Punishment, Property, and Moral Knowledge,” 244. Forde claims that “Locke's moral education bends every effort to instill the belief—or knowledge, rather – that human beings are equal,” but he does not defend his move from belief to knowledge (“What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” 252; see also 254). He subsequently concludes that, for most, Lockean morality rests on “implicit belief rather than rational knowledge” (255–56).

12 Forde, “What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” 256–57; Reiman, Jeffrey, “Towards a Secular Lockean Liberalism,” Review of Politics 67, no. 3 (2005): 481–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Myers, Our Only Star and Compass, 145; Zuckert, Michael, Launching Liberalism: On Lockean Political Philosophy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 196Google Scholar; and Zuckert, Michael, “Locke—Religion—Equality,” Review of Politics 67, no. 3 (2005): 430CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Some scholars have argued that Locke does not even expect all those who receive his preferred education to achieve full self-mastery. See Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, 92–94; Carrig, “Liberal Impediments,” esp. 48, 63. For discussion of the relation of education and equality see Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, 72–73; Bradizza, Luigi, “Elite Education and the Viability of a Lockean Society,” Review of Politics 70, no. 4 (2008): 565CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 For the argument that equality is based on potential rationality see Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, esp. 71, and Waldron, “Response to Critics,” Review of Politics 67, no. 3 (2005): 503Google Scholar. For the argument that the capacity for abstraction provides a threshold level of rationality see Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, 79. Others find an alternative threshold in self-ownership (Zuckert, “Locke—Religion—Equality,” 431) or a minimal capacity to understand what natural law requires, even if one does not follow that law (Reiman, “Towards a Secular Lockean Liberalism,” 481–82; Forde, “What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” 257). Other scholars have argued that Locke's claims about equality are not intended to include all people. The most influential of these is Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962)Google Scholar. For an extensive treatment of this debate, see Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, esp. chaps. 2, 4.

15 James Tully argues that the motive provides the theoretical basis, serving as a ground from which the practical principle of one's actions can be deduced (“Governing conduct: Locke on the reform of thought and behavior,” in An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 214Google Scholar).

16 Cf. scholars who claim that children will eventually make the transition from a love of esteem to a love of virtue for its own sake (Forde, “What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” 404, 408; Coleman, John Locke's Moral Philosophy, 233).

17 For a discussion of Locke's transformation of traditional humanism into a “juridical apparatus,” see Tully, “Governing conduct,” 210, 224–25.

18 Forde, “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke,” 398–400; Forster, Greg, John Locke's Politics of Moral Consensus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 5, 216, 260; Myers, Our Only Star and Compass, 49, 50, 137; Zuckert, Launching Liberalism, 14. A few scholars recognize that Locke offers esteem as an alternative to the otherworldly motive of an afterlife (Pangle, Spirit of Modern Republicanism, 201–3; Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, 104). Kennington goes further, arguing that Locke questions not only the theoretical truth of Christianity but even its effectiveness (“Nature and Natural Law in Locke,” 262).

19 Even in his more theoretical works, it is unclear whether Locke considers evidence of divine sanctions possible. A number of scholars point to the absence of a defense of Locke's theological claims, many arguing that this absence is due to Locke's own recognition of the impossibility of such a defense: see Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality, 99, 102; Forde, “What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” 235; Dunn, Political Thought of John Locke, 188; Zuckert, “Locke—Religion—Equality,” 423, and Natural Rights and the New Republic, 211.

20 As Locke reminds us, even heinous violence against innocents meets with praise in some societies and, conversely, the actions we praise as virtuous are condemned by others (ECHU I.iii.9–10). Parents can dictate which actions earn esteem only in the carefully controlled environment of the home, and, even here, this preferred standard is continually under threat from competing opinions held by other members of the household (STCE 59, 68–69).

21 See Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom, esp. 153–54, 158, 164–65, 173; Hindess, Barry, Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996), 74–75, 77–79, 84Google Scholar. For the argument that this tension exists but is not irresolvable, see Button, Contract, Culture, and Citizenship, esp. 165–68; Ivison, Duncan, The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997)Google Scholar, chaps. 4–5, esp. p. 119.

22 See Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, 98, 101. See also Myers's description of self-government as a middle ground between dominion and submission (Our Only Star and Compass, 192–94).

23 Carrig, “Liberal Impediments,” 52, 54; Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom, 137–38, 142.

24 See Hindess, Discourses of Power, 74–75, 84; Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom, 31, 146, 153–54.

25 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this point.

26 Letter to Tom, 20 October 1659, in Locke, John, Political Writings, ed. Wootton, David (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 140Google Scholar.

27 See Zuckert's discussion of the basis of natural law, and the practical limits of these obligations, at Launching Liberalism, 196.

28 Tarcov makes a similar argument, claiming that the desire for esteem replaces the desire for mastery (Locke's Education for Liberty, 137, 139). On his interpretation a child retains the desire to control others, simply finding a more effective means to that end. While this is clearly part of Locke's goal, I am arguing that he intends to go further, providing a limit to that desire for control.

29 See Bradizza, “Elite Education,” 548, 560; Mehta, Uday Singh, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 62–63Google Scholar; Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, 170–71. Cf. Forde, “What Does Locke Expect Us to Know?,” 252, and “Natural Law, Theology, and Morality in Locke,” 403.

30 Cf. Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of Government, 104, who reads Locke's statements as a claim that children are entitled to such treatment, rather than as a pedagogical suggestion.

31 For a discussion of the reciprocal nature of esteem, see Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, 137–39.

32 Some scholars have rejected the idea that even this degree of independence is available in Locke's account, given the difficulty of questioning the opinions we acquire when young. See Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom, 115–18, 153–54, 158, 160, 162, 164–65; Hindess, Discourses of Power, esp. 18, 74–75, 84–85.

33 For a discussion of the extent to which Locke's reliance on custom undermines autonomy, see Button, Contract, Culture, and Citizenship, esp. 116, 132, 149, 165–68; Carrig, “Liberal Impediments,” 58–59, 70; Hindess, Discourses of Power, esp. chap. 3; Mehta, Anxiety of Freedom, esp. chap. 4. Cf. Neill, Alex, “Locke on Habituation, Autonomy, and Education,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27, no. 2 (1989): 225–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which argues that habit has a valuable role in making even epistemic autonomy possible.

34 Whether this law encourages citizens to treat all members of society as equally entitled to full rights under natural law also depends on whether that society encourages the desire for liberty and the consequent demand for respect in all its members. In a society that simply assumes women, or the working class, are not entitled to such respect, treating those groups as subordinate may not harm one's reputation. Regardless of Locke's own position on universal human equality (see footnote 14 above), his education leaves the motive for treating others as equal vulnerable to these changes in custom.

35 John Locke, “Credit, disgrace,” in Political Writings, 237. See also John Dunn's argument that Locke's transformative education is guided by a rational goal instead of irrational custom (“‘Bright Enough for All Our Purposes’: John Locke's Conception of a Civilized Society,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 43, no. 2 [1989]: 142Google Scholar).

36 Carrig, “Liberal Impediments,” 53–55; Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty, 94, 119.

37 Tarcov claims that, for Locke, “what is practically decisive is not rationality itself but the common passion or desire to be thought rational and to have one's freedom” (Locke's Education for Liberty, 94). The argument of this section can be read in part as a gloss on that claim.