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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Aristotle'S attitude and procedure in dealing with moral standards suggest that he assumed the following points: a) That he was speaking of something real and given; b) to be discovered and formulated and, if possible, applied; c) that in fact, standards satisfactory for human life — at least satisfactory and perhaps unsurpassable — had already been embodied in Grecian life and art and thought; and if this is the case, then in regard to moral standards, as in regard to many problems, Aristotle is a preserver and savior rather than an innovator and is like “prudence” as he delineates it; d) that if there is a divine source of these Grecian known and lived standards, these are just and true; if there is not, or if we do not know whether there is, they remain just and true; in any case, at least some of them are “by nature.”
1 Lenski, GerhardThe Religious Factor (New York, 1963), pp. 319–320. “…from our evidence it is clear that religion in various ways is constantly influencing the daily lives of the masses of men and women in the modern American metropolis.”Google Scholar
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4 The best philosophical statement on the subject by an anthropologist is Bidney's, David “The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism,” in Ethics and the Social Sciences, ed. by Ward, Leo R. (Notre Dame, 1959).Google Scholar
5 Friedrich, Carl J., Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective (hicago, 1963).Google Scholar Chapter XIX is “The Revival of Natural Law in Europe and America.”.
6 The Tradition of Natural Law (New York, 1965).Google Scholar
7 Oates, Whitney, Aristotle and the Problem of Value (Princeton, 1963).Google Scholar
8 Nicomachean Ethics, 1168 a 5–9. This work will be cited henceforth as Ethics.
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10 De Anima, 434 a 7–10.
11 Robin, LeonAristotle (Paris, 1944), pp. 250.Google Scholar
12 Aristotle's De Anima in the version of William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas. Tr. byFoster, Kenelm and Humphries, Silvester (New Haven, 1959), p. 480.Google Scholar
13 Ethics, 1109 b 20–25. Cf. 1179 a 17–20. In each of these passages, the context shows that Aristotle's word is “intuition” or “insight” and is badly translated by “perception,” the word used by even so distinguished a scholar as Ross.
14 Notably in The New Laokoon (Boston, 1910),Google Scholar Chapter VII, and Democracy and Leadership (Boston, 1924), Chapters VI and VII. Other American humanists have studied the mean, but Babbitt's studies of it remain the most remarkable.
15 Belloc, Hilaire contributing to Why I Am and Why I Am Nat a Catholic (New York, 1930).Google Scholar
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18 See Maritain, Jacques, The Range of Reason, part III, “On Knowledge through Connaturality” (New York, 1952).Google Scholar Also Dougherty, John Martin, Connatural Knowledge in Practical Knowledge According to Aristotle (M. A. Thesis, University of Notre Dame, 1956);Google Scholar and Tsanoff, R. A. on Aristotle's teaching: The Great Philosophers (Revised edition; New York, 1964), p. 90: “… repeated practice in reasonable conduct makes reasonableness more congenial to us.”Google Scholar
19 Ethics, 1140 b 1020. Ross's translation to the effect that such a man “forthwith fails to see any such originating cause,” does not get the sense of this famous passage. Tricot is much better: to such a man “the principle is not immediately evident, and he is incapable of seeing.…”
20 Ethics, 1113, a 32–35.
21 Jaeger, Werner, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, translated by Highet, Gilbert (Oxford, 1939), I, xix–xxi.Google Scholar
22 Ethics, Book I, and particularly at 1097 b 22–35.Google Scholar
23 Ethics, 1138 b 15–34.
24 Ibid.. 1144 b 21–28.
25 Cf. Ethics, 1168 b 34. “On the assumption” is the excellent translation by Oates, op. cit., p. 311.
26 Ethics, 1169 a 17–18.
27 Ibid.., 1178 a 4–7.
28 Maritain, Jacques, Moral Philosophy (New York, 1964), p. 37.Google Scholar
29 Notably at the outset of the Ethics, Book I, cc. 1–2.
30 Sir Ernest Barker, Traditions of Civility (London, 1948), Chapter VIII.Google Scholar
31 See Wild, John, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (Chicago, 1953), pp. 134–156.Google Scholar
32 Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, cc. 13 and 15.
33 Politics, 1337 a 20–34.
34 Ibid., Book II, c. 2.
35 Ethics, I, cc. 3 and 5.
36 Jaeger, op. cit.
37 Cf. Ward, Leo R., God and World Order (St. Louis, 1961), p. 91.Google Scholar