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Consent, Custom, and the Common Good in Aquinas's Account of Political Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Mark C. Murphy
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Extract

According to Aquinas's view, while the mandate that political authority be instituted and exercised is an immediate consequence of the natural law precept that the common good be promoted, the question of who possesses political authority is settled by customary law. Samuel Beer's rival interpretation, one of the few attempts to discern Aquinas's view on political authority, is incompatible with Aquinas's explicit remarks on these matters. The present account provides an interpretation that both fits Aquinas's few explicit remarks about the source and form of political authority and explains the terseness of his remarks on that subject.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 59 , Issue 2 , Spring 1997 , pp. 323 - 350
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1997

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References

1 “[Lex] nihil est aliud, quam quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam communitatis habet, promulgata” {Summa Theologiae Iallae, 90, 4. Hereafter cited as ST.) All translations from Aquinas's texts are my own.Google Scholar

2 “tota communitas universi” (ST Iallae 91, 1).

3 See ST la 22,1.

4 Eschmann, I. T., “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Two Powers”, Mediaeval Studies 20 (1958): 201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Beer, Samuel H., “The Rule of the Wise and the Holy: Hierarchy in the Thomistic System”, Political Theory 14 (1986): 391.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 Beer, , “Rule of the Wise and the Holy”, p. 391.Google Scholar

7 ibid., p. 393.

8 See ST la 5, 1 and 5, 3.

9 Beer, , “Rule of the Wise and the Holy”, p. 399.Google Scholar

10 ibid., p. 400.

11 ibid.

12 ibid., p. 401.

13 ibid.

14 Aquinas, , Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 81, cited in Beer, “Rule of the Wise and the Holy”, at p. 410.Google Scholar

15 Beer, , “Rule of the Wise and the Holy”, p. 414.Google Scholar

16 ibid., p. 415.

17 Iallae, ST 102, 4, cited in Beer, “Rule of the Wise and the Holy,” at p. 417.Google Scholar

18 Beer, , “Rule of the Wise and the Holy,” p. 417.Google Scholar

19 Tierney, Brian, “Hierarchy, Consent, and the ‘Western Tradition’,” Political Theory 15 (1987): 646.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 See ST Iallae 105, 1.

21 See ST IaIIae 96, 4.

22 Tierney, , “Hierarchy, Consent, and the ‘Western Tradition,’” p. 647.Google Scholar

23 “Creaturae ignobiliores sunt propter nobiliores” (ST la 65, 2).

24 “Ea quae tantum vivunt, ut plantae, sunt communiter propter animalia; omnia autem animalia sunt propter hominum” (ST Ilallae 64, 1).

25 See ST la 96, 3. The thrust of Aquinas's argument is that since possession of virtue and knowledge depends on the exercise of free will, there would have been inequality of virtue and knowledge in the state of innocence, even if that state precludes the existence of vice.

26 See ST la 109, 2 ad 3.

27 See ST la 50, 4.

28 See ST la 47, 2.

29 “Daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam: unde in eis est naturalis praelatio: quod in hominibus non contingit, qui natura sunt pares” (ST la 109, 2 ad 3).

30 “Virtutem coactivam habet, non tantum temporaliter sed etiam spiritualiter propter conscientiam.” See Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis (Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard), Book II, Distinction 44, Question 2, Article 2. Hereafter cited as Commentary.

31 See Commentary, II 44, 1, 2.Google Scholar

32 I will consider why the mode of authority is always good in the following section.

33 See Commentary, II 44, 2, 2.Google Scholar

34 See Commentary, II 44, 2, 2.Google Scholar

35 “Non impeditur quin jus praelationis ei acquiratur; et quoniam praelatio secundum suam formam semper a Deo est (quod debitum obedientiae causat); ideo talibus praelatis, quamvis indignis, obedire tenentur subditi” (Commentary, II, 44, 2, 2Google Scholar).

36 See Aquinas's, commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans 13:1–7.Google Scholar

37 “Ideo condere legem vel pertinet ad totam multitudinem, vel pertinet ad personam publicam, quae totius multitudinis curam habet” (ST Iallae 90, 3).

38 “Est ejus, cujus est proprius ille finis” (ST Iallae 90, 3).

39 The text that Beer cites in favor of this view—ST Iallae 102, 4—provides no evidence that Aquinas thought that the ruler's having such possessions is a sign of natural authority.

40 Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Irwin, Terence (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 1099a3–5.Google Scholar

41 See Commentary, II 44, 2, 2Google Scholar. A rejoinder similar in form can be made against those who hold that for Aquinas the legitimate title to authority rests on the authority's issuing proper dictates, i.e., those that are directed at the common good. (Arthur Monahan approaches this view when he claims, “Aquinas could afford to be indifferent-seeming in this matter [of how one comes to hold legislative authority]⃛What did interest him was how a ruler exercised his authority, rather than how he came by it” (Monahan, , Consent, Coercion, and Limit: The Medieval Origins of Parliamentary Democracy [Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987], p. 172Google Scholar). If the title to authority rested wholly on substantive considerations— the quality of a king's rule—rather than partly on procedural considerations—the method by which one comes to hold the right to rule—then no sense could be made of Aquinas's references in the commentary on the Sentences to both the origin and the use of authority as determining factors of whether such authority has the power to bind in conscience.

42 “Est de jure gentium, quod est jus humanum” (ST Ilallae 12, 2).

43 For a perspicuous discussion of Ulpian's account seeCrowe, M. B., The Changing Profile of the Natural Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

44 ibid., p. 69.

45 See ST Iallae 95, 4.

46 “Ad jus gentium pertinent ea quae derivantur ex lege naturae, sicut conclusiones ex principiis; ut justae emptiones, venditiones, et alia huiusmodi, sine quibus homines ad invicem convivere non possunt: quod est de lege naturae; quia homo est naturaliter animal sociabile, ut probatur in I. Polit.: quae vero derivantur a lege naturae per modum particularis determinationis, pertinent ad jus civile, secundum quod quaelibet civitas aliquid sibi accommode determinat” (ST Iallae 95, 4).

47 “Similis est ei, quo in scientiis ex principiis conclusiones demonstrativae producuntur” (ST Iallae 95, 2).

48 “Simile est, quod in artibus formae communes determinantur ad aliquid speciale” (ST Iallae 95, 2).

49 For an interesting contemporary discussion of determination seeFinnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 284–89.Google Scholar

50 “Derivator a lege naturali per modum conclusionis, quae non est multum remota a principiis.”

51 See ST Iallae 95, 4 ad 1.

52 See ST Iallae 95, 3.

53 Aquinas's view on political authority thus contrasts with Augustine's, who had held that political authority is a product of human sinfulness. The entrance of sin into the world brought with it as punishment the institution of slavery, and it is difficult not to read Augustine as likening the condition of slavery to that of being subject to political authority. Although this condition of servitude is much worse than the freedom that would have existed had the Fall not occurred, it does have one beneficial result, and that is the fostering of humility, which is “as salutary for the servants as pride is harmful to the masters”; Augustine admonishes those in such a condition to “make their slavery, in a sense, free, by serving not with the slyness of fear, but with the fidelity of affection, until all injustice disappears and all human lordship and power is annihilated” (City of God, trans. Bettenson, Henry [New York: Penguin Books, 1984], bk. XIX, chap. 5Google Scholar). Although Augustine emphasizes the punitive aspect of political authority, he also ascribes to authority another purpose: the preservation of a kind of earthly peace, which, though perhaps unstable and uncertain, is the best that can be had in this life (City of God, XIX. 6). To secure this aim, political authority attempts to generate “a kind of compromise” among citizens concerning temporal goods (City of God, XIX. 17). This purpose of political authority would also not have existed had the Fall not occurred; the conditions that make earthly peace so precarious came into being with sin. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Weithman, Paul, “Aquinas and Augustine on Original Sin and the Function of Political Authority,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 353–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

54 “Homo naturaliter est animal sociale: unde homines in statu innocentiae socialiter vixissent: socialis autem vita multorum esse non posset, nisi aliquis praesideret, qui ad bonum commune intenderet: multi enim per se intendunt ad multa, unus vero ad unum” (ST la 96, 4).

55 “Ipse sibi unusquisque esset rex” (De Regno ad regem Cypri [On Kingship], bk. I, chap. 1).Google Scholar

56 “Oportet igitur, praeter id quod movet ad proprium bonum uniuscuiusque, esse aliquid, quod movet ad bonum commune multorum” (De Regno, I. 1).Google Scholar

57 “[A] reader of Thomas's political works will find nothing resembling a Tractatus de bono communi. When the common good is referred to we are usually being presented with an example of it and are assumed to have already a grasp of its essential features” (Froelich, Gregory, “The Equivocal Status of Bonum Commune” New Scholasticism 63 (1989): 38–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Froelich also rightly points out the stark contrast between Aquinas's detailed treatment of the individual good at the beginning of the Secunda Pars and his near silence on the issue of what the common good consists in.

58 ibid., p. 42.

59 ibid., p. 48. Froelich contrasts goods common by way of causation with goods common by way of predication and goods common by way of distribution. Suppose, for example, that both you and I each have a twenty dollar bill. There is no actually existing good possessed by both of us; money is a good common to us by way of predication in that each of us possesses a good to which a common predicate (a predicate relevant to the object's goodness) is attached. Next suppose that we have baked a pie that is sitting on the table before us: unless it is divided between us, neither of us can enjoy it. The pie is a good common by way of distribution: prior to division, its goodness is enjoyed by neither of us; it is only by distribution that its goodness is available to us. A good common by way of causation is, by contrast, “common precisely as it is individual” (ibid., p. 48): it is numerically one but good for more than one person. The victory by an army or athletic team might be an example of a good which extends to many in this way.

60 ST Iallae 96, 3. Aquinas also refers to justice as part of the common good at ST Iallae 19, 10 and llallae 33, 6; he refers to peace as “the good of the multitude” at ST la 103, 2, obj. 1 (not denied), and calls the peace of the state good in itself (and presumably a common good) at ST Ilallae 123, 5, ad 3.

61 We may also note that Aquinas mentions no other goods besides justice and peace that are common to persons by way of causation and are such that they pertain particularly to the political community.

62 “Determinatio eorum quae sunt iusta secundum institutionem humanum vel divinam” (ST Iallae 104, 3, ad 1).

63 ST Ilallae 47, 6; see also ST la 79,12 and Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, Question 16, Article 1.

64 Porter, Jean, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics (Louisville, KY: Westminster / John Knox Press, 1990), pp. 156–62.Google Scholar

65 ibid., p. 157.

66 ibid., p. 159.

67 ST Hallae 47, 10.

68 ST Ilallae 50, 1, ad 2.

69 ST IIaIIae 57, 1.

70 ST IIaIIae 57, 1

71 ST IIaIIae 57, 2.

72 “Ex ipsa natura rei; puta cum aliquis tantum dat, ut tantumdem recipiat” (ST Hallae 57, 2).

73 “Ex condicto, sive ex communi placito; quando scilicet aliquis reputat se contentum, si tantum accipiat” (ST Hallae 57, 2).

74 “Puta cum totus populus consentit, quod aliquid habeatur quasi adaequatum, et commensuratum alteri; vel cum hoc ordinat Princeps, qui curam populi habet, et ejus personam gerit” (ST Hallae 57, 2).

75 ST Hallae 57, 2, ad 2.

76 “Ad legem divinam pertinet ut ordinet homines ad invicem et ad Deum. Utrumque autem horum in communi quidem pertinet ad dictamen legis naturae, ad quod referuntur moralia praecepta; sed oportet quod determinetur utrumque per legem divinam vel humanum, quia principia naturaliter nota sunt communia tam in speculativis quam in activis. Sicut igitur determinatio communis praecepti de cultu divino fit per praecepta caeremonialia, sic et determinatio communis praecepti de iustitia observanda inter homines, determinatur per praecepta iudicialia” (ST Iallae 99, 4).

77 The importance of political authority in determining the constitution of justice explains why Aquinas held that even though some persons are more worthy to govern than others, the unworthiness of some rulers does not ipso facto preclude their possessing legitimate authority. For there must be some determination of rules of justice if the common good of justice is to be achieved; so long as the ruler's prudence is sufficient for issuing at least minimally acceptable determinations of justice, his or her rulership will be effective for the promotion of the common good. (If the ruler's prudence is radically deficient, however, it is not his or her unworthiness as such that releases the subject from being bound by their pronouncements, but his or her poor use of the legislative power.)

78 “Diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt” (ST Ilallae 29, I).

79 “Uno quidem modo secundum diversas potentias appetitivas: sicut appetitus sensitivus plerumque tendit in contrarium rationalis appetitus … alio modo, inquantum una et eadem vis appetitiva in diversa appetibilia tendit, quae simul assequi non potest; unde necesse est, esse repugnantiam motuum appetitus” (ST Ilallae 29, 1).

80 “Si enim homo concordat cum alio non spontanea voluntate, sed quasi coactus timore alicujus mali sibi imminentis, talis concordia non est vere pax: quia non servatur ordo utriusque concordantis, sed perturbatur ab aliquo timorem inferente” (ST Ilallae 29, 1, ad 1).

81 “Ex hoc ipso quod homo aliquid appetit, consequens est, ipsum appetere ejus quod appetit assecutionem, et per consequens remotionetn eorum, quae assecutionem impedire possunt” (ST Ilallae 29, 2).

82 ST Ilallae 29, 2.

83 City of God, XIX. 13.Google Scholar

84 Commentary, II 44, 1, 2.Google Scholar

85 “In quibusdam praelationibus videtur magna inordinatio esse, ut quod stultus sapienti, puer seni, peccator justo praeponatur, ut plerumque contingit” (Commentary, II 44, 1, 2, obj. 5Google Scholar).

86 See ST Iallae 97, 3.

87 “Omnis lex proficiscitur a ratione, et voluntate legislations…sicut autem ratio et voluntas humana manifestantur verbo in rebus agendis, ita etiam manifestantur facto: hoc enim unusquisque eligere videtur ut bonum, quod opere implet. Manifestum est autem, quod verbo humano potest mutari lex, et etiam exponi, inquantum manifestat interiorem mo turn, et conceptum rationis humanae: unde etiam et per actus maxime multiplicatos, qui consuetudinem efficiunt, mutari potest lex, et exponi, et etiam aliquid causari, quod legis virtutem obtineat; inquantum scilicet per exteriores actus multiplicatos interior voluntatis motus, et rationis conceptus efficacissime declaratur” (ST Iallae 97, 3).

88 “Lex naturalis, et divina procedit a voluntate divina…unde non potest mutari per consuetudinem procedentem a voluntate hominis, sed solum per auctoritatem divinam mutari posset; et inde est quod nulla consuetudo vim legis obtinere potest contra legem divinam, vel legem naturalem” (ST Iallae 97, 3 ad 1).

89 “Ferre leges pertinet ad publica personas, ad quas pertinet regere communitatem: unde privatae personae legem facere non possunt: sed consuetudo invalescit per actus privatarum personarum; ero consuetudo non potest obtinere vim legis” (ST Iallae 97, 3, obj. 3).

90 “Si enim sit libera multitudo, quae possit sibi legem facere, plus est consensus totius multitudinis ad aliquid observandum, quod consuetudo manifestat, quam auctoritas principis, qui non habet potestatem condendi legem legem, nisi inquantum gerit personam multitudinis; unde licit singulae personae non possint condere legem, tamen totus populus condere legem potest” (ST Iallae 97, 3, ad 3).

91 Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961)Google Scholar. It is important to keep in mind that while the issue of morally rightful authority is what is at issue in Aquinas's discussion of political authority, it is not at all on Hart's agenda in The Concept of Law. I employ Hart's conception of the internal aspect of rules as providing merely one piece of an account of political authority: it would not be nearly enough to establish who has rightful authority within Aquinas's view without an appeal to the common good, the law of nations and the community's original capacity to make law.

92 ibid., p. 55.

93 ibid., p. 56.

94 ibid., p. 54.

95 Finnis rejects appeal to custom to explain the status of a person or persons as authoritative within a political community: “Consent, transmission, contract, custom—none of these is needed to constitute the state of affairs which (presumptively) justifies someone in claiming and others in acknowledging his authority to settle co—ordination problems for a whole community by creating authoritative rules or issuing authoritative orders and determinations. Rather, the required state of facts is this: that in the circumstances the say—so of this person or body or configuration of persons probably will be, by and large, complied with and acted upon, to the exclusion of any rival say-so and notwithstanding any differing preferences of individuals about what should be stipulated and done in the relevant fields of co-ordination problems” (Finnis, , Natural Law and Natural Rights, pp. 248–49). While a full response to Finnis on Aquinas's behalf cannot be undertaken here, it seems to me that Finnis neglects his own reliance on a “focal meaning” method of analysis, fruitfully employed in his discussions of law and friendship, when discussing authority. The central case of political authority is not that of a power imposed from without, as in the case of military conquest, but one with which the community freely cooperates. I think that while Aquinas might agree with Finnis that one ought to adhere to the rules laid down by an unjust conqueror that has the capacity to solve coordination problems by fiat, this would not be a case of political authority in the focal sense: Aquinas would say, I believe, that such conquerors are to be obeyed only to avoid scandal or “a more grievous hurt” (ST Iallae 96, 4).Google Scholar

96 Hart, , Concept of Law, p. 78.Google Scholar

97 ibid., p. 57.

98 See ST la 103, 5; see also De Regno, I. 1.

99 See ST Iallae 103, 1 and De Regno, I. 2–5.