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Democracies and Peace: The Self-organizing Foundation for the Democratic Peace

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Gus diZerega
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Extract

Democracies do not fight one another. This is because they are self-organizing systems and therefore fundamentally distinct from other states. As systems, liberal democracies have more in common with science and the market than they do with undemocratic states. By contrast, undemocratic states are best conceived as instrumental organizations pursuing relatively well defined goals. Liberal democracies do not normally pursue particular goals, are rarely comprehensible as rational actors, have unusually open boundaries, are self-transforming, and handle greater complexity than instrumental organizations. These characteristics provide the foundation for their mutually pacific relationships. The U.S. president's partial insulation from these characteristics explains why the United States has sometimes undermined small quasi-democratic states. This analysis sheds light on how norms and institutions help maintain the democratic peace.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , Spring 1995 , pp. 279 - 308
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1995

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References

I would like to thank in particular the late Clifford Ketzel, who pointed out to me many years ago the mutually pacific relationships of democratic governments. In addition I thank the referees who have read and commented on this paper.

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55. The argument I have developed here shares some similarities with that proposed by Rummel, R. J. in his Understanding Conflict and War, vols. 2 and 4 (Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1979).Google Scholar We agree that not only are liberal democracies unique in their mutual peacefulness, but in addition that both systemic and normative features account for this pacific record. Further, both of us have profited in our analysis from the work of F. A. Hayek. However, there are important differences in our approaches. As I understand Rummel's fascinating work, he classifies societies into three basic types which have existed throughout history: exchange, authoritative, and coercive societies (II, p. 301). Modern liberal societies would basically be exchange societies. Rummel's ideal model for a pure exchange society would be one governed by the classic “night-watchman state” (II, p. 296). Such a state is very limited in its activities. Indeed, he believes it has largely disappeared as politics becomes increasingly dominated by a managerial class (II., pp. 232, 307; IV, p. 60) Whereas Rummel emphasizes the similarities between contemporary exchange societies and earlier ones, such as democratic Athens, I emphasize the distinctiveness of modern liberal democratic societies. The role of self-organizing processes in liberal societies is qualitatively different from that existing in earlier exchange societies. They have completely transformed these societies, constituting a genuine cultural mutation. Greek democracies did occasionally war with one another, fundamentally, I believe, because the role of self-organizing processes within them was much weaker. City states were far less subject to impersonal political processes. Mob rule was a common problem. Madison's argument for extended republics is important in helping distinguish between the international behavior of classical and liberal democracy. Rummel emphasizes the importance of both democratic processes and limited political action. I emphasize only the democratic process. This is not because I believe a classical democratic socialist state is possible, I do not. But no set of procedural rules can equally address all values. The procedural rules for democracy and those for the market are weighted in favor of public and privatevalues respectively. Expanding political programs need not mean that the principles of liberal society are being subverted. It may only mean one value mix is traded for another.

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