Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gxg78 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T05:52:34.508Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Disposed to Seek Their True Interests: Representation and Responsibility in Anti-Federalist Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Joel A. Johnson
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that the Anti-Federalists wanted representative bodies to mirror the electorate, and that the Federalists envisioned representation as a device for refining and enlarging popular views. This characterization is accurate in a broad sense, but it overlooks an important element in Anti-Federalist thought. I argue that certain key Anti-Federalists, in particular the Federal Farmer and Melancton Smith, synthesized the “mirroring” ideal and the “refining” ideal into a theory of representation that incorporated the best features of each system. This hybrid theory, though overwhelmed in the ratification debates of 1787–88, nevertheless provides a creative alternative model for effective national union.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 66 , Issue 4 , Fall 2004 , pp. 649 - 674
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. Kenyon, Cecelia, “Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government,” William and Mary Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1955): pp. 3–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2. See, for example, Pocock, J. G. A., The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 531;Google ScholarRahe, Paul, Inventions of Prudence: Constituting the American Regime, Vol. 3 of Republics Ancient and Modem (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 40–41, 75–76;Google Scholar and Peterson, Paul, “Antifederalist Thought in Contemporary American Politics,” in Antifederalism: The Legacy of George Mason, ed. Pacheco, Josephine E. (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1992), pp. 112–14Google Scholar. For a description of how the Anti-Federalists undermined their own argument for organic social homogeneity, see Gordon S.Wood, Gordon, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 492Google Scholar. For an interpretation that emphasizes the legitimate tensions within Anti-Federalist thought regarding commerce, civic virtue, and the republic's size, read Storing, Herbert J., What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar with Dry, Murray, “The Antifederalists and the Constitution,” in Pacheco, AntifederalismGoogle Scholar.

3. See Cornell, Saul, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in American, 1788–1828 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999)Google Scholar; and Hemberger, Suzette, “Dead Stepfathers,” Northwestern University Law Review 85 (1990): 220–31Google Scholar. For more skeptical accounts of the Anti-Federalists′ influence, see Finkelman, Paul, “Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, If Anything, From the Antifederalists?” Texas Law Review 79 (2001): 849–94Google Scholar; and Wood, , Creation, pp. 486–87Google Scholar. For reviews of how the Anti-Federalists′ image has fared over time, see Cornell, Saul, “The Changing Historical Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists,” Northwestern University Law Review 85 (1990): 39–73Google Scholar; and Hutson, James H., “Country, Court, and Constitution: Antifederalism and the Historians,” William and Mary Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1981): 337–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4. Finkleman, , “Losers,” p. 854Google Scholar.

5. Brutus, , Essay I, in The Complete Anti-Federalist, ed. Storing, Herbert (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981)Google Scholar, 2.9.14 (hereafter Storing).

6. Cato, Letter V, in Storing, 2.6.38.

7. The Federal Farmer, Letter VIL in Storing, 2.8.97. Storing reads “most,” not “must.”

8. Some agents were quite competent. Edmund Burke, for example, served for a number of years as New York's agent in Parliament. The real problem lay in the lack of direct accountability and agents′ unrepresentative characteristics.

9. Brutus, Essay III, in Storing, 2.9.42.

10. John DeWitt, Essay III, in Storing, 4.13.14.

11. Smith, Melancton, Speech of June 21, 1788, in The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, ed. Elliot, Jonathan (Washington, D.C., 1836), 2:245 (hereafter Debates)Google Scholar. See also Mason, George, Speech of 06 4, 1788, in Debates, 3: 31–32Google Scholar.

12. Brutus, Essay I, in Storing, 2.9.14.

13. Henry, Patrick, Speech of 06 12, 1788, in Debates, 3: 326–27Google Scholar.

14. Ratifying, Virginia Convention, “A Proposed Bill of Rights,” in Debates, 3: 658Google Scholar.

15. Madison, James, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (New York, Norton, 1966), p. 403Google Scholar.

16. Brutus, Essay I, in Storing, 2.9.16.

17. Cato, Letter V, in Storing, 2.6.38.

18. Brutus, Essay IV, in Storing, 2.9.46; The Federal Farmer, Letter III, in Storing 2.8.25; John DeWitt, Essay III, in Storing, 4.3.14.

19. The Federal Farmer, Letters III and XII, in Storing, 2.8.27, 2.8.158; Mason, George, Speech of 06 4, 1788, in Debates, 3: 31Google Scholar; and Smith, Melancton, Speech of 06 27, 1788, in Debates, 2: 332–337Google Scholar.

20. Cato, Letter VII, in Storing, 2.6.48.

21. Caesar, , Letters I and II, Daily Advertiser (New York), 10 1 and 17, 1787Google Scholar. Some scholars have attributed Caesar to Hamilton, but the evidence is scanty.

22. See, for example, Madison, Jefferson to James, December 20, 1787, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed. Peterson, Merrill D. (New York: Penguin, 1975), pp. 428–33Google Scholar.

23. Young, Alfred F., The Democratic Republicans of New York: The Origins, 1763–1797 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), pp. 113–14Google Scholar. Young argues that Jay, not Hamilton, was most effective at swaying votes in the New York convention, thanks in part to a popular public address Jay had composed earlier that spring.

24. For the Federalists′ semi-secret nationalism, see Main, Jackson Turner, The Anti-Federalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781–1788 (New York: Norton, 1961), chap. 6Google Scholar.

25. The Federalist, Nos. 1, 9, and 10Google Scholar. Secondat, Charles Louis de, Montesquieu, Baron de, The Spirit of Laws (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)Google Scholar, Book IX. For Montesquieu's influence on the Anti-Federalists, see Kupersmith, Abraham, “Montesquieu and the Ideological Strand in Antifederalist Thought,” in The Federalists, the Antifederalists, and the American Political Tradition, ed. McWilliams, Wilson Carey and Gibbons, Michael T. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992)Google Scholar; and Beer, Samuel, To Make A Nation: The Rediscovery of American Federalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 231–43Google Scholar.

26. See Hamilton, Alexander, Speech of 06 20, 1788, in Debates, 2: 254–55Google Scholar.

27. The Federalist, No. 56.

28. Hamilton, Alexander, Speech of 06 20, 1788, in Debates, 2: 265–66Google Scholar.

29. The Federalist, Nos. 56 and 59 (emphasis in the original).

30. The Federalist, No. 35. On the combination of interests across classes, see Epstein, David F., The Political Theory of The Federalist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 157–58Google Scholar; and Eubanks, Cecil, “New York: Federalism and the Political Economy of Union,” in Ratifying the Constitution, ed. Gillespie, Michael Allen and Lienesch, Michael (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1989), p. 315Google Scholar.

31. The Federalist, No. 10. On the wise representative's patriotism and love of justice, see Epstein, , The Federalist, pp. 93–99Google Scholar.

32. The Federalist, Nos. 3, 10, 57, and 71.

33. Burke, Edmund, “Speech to the Electors of Bristol,” in Select Works of Edmund Burke, vol. 4 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), pp. 10–13Google Scholar. See also The Federalist, No. 53.

34. The Federalist, No. 57.

35. The Federalist, Nos. 55, 57.

36. For helpful discussions of this question, see Rossiter, Clinton, 1787: The Grand Convention (New York: New American Library, 1966), chap. 14Google Scholar; Spaulding, E. Wilder, New York in the Critical Period: 1783–1789 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 253Google Scholar; Rutland, Robert Allen, The Ordeal of the Constitution (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983), p. 66Google Scholar; and Siemers, David J., Ratifying the Republic: Antifederalists and Federalists in Constitutional Time (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002)Google Scholar.

37. For examples of this dichotomous interpretation of the ratification controversy, see Eubanks, , “New York,” pp. 311, 330–32Google Scholar; Storing, chap. 2; Wood, , Creation, pp. 499–506Google Scholar; Kenyon, , “Men of Little Faith”Google Scholar; and Kramnick, Isaac, “The ‘Great National Discussion’: The Discourse of Politics in 1787,” William and Mary Quarterly 45, no. 1 (1988): 3–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38. On the lot, see Aristotle, , The Politics, ed. Everson, Stephen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), VI, ii, 1317b20Google Scholar; and Manin, Bernard, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 1.CrossRefGoogle Scholar On the Anti-Federalists as advocates of representative democracy, see Young, James P., Reconsidering American Liberalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 60.Google Scholar

39. Storing (Anti-Federalists, pp. 17–18)Google Scholar and Dry (The Antifederalists, 32–34) hint at this tension, but investigate it no further.

40. Brooks, Robin, “Alexander Hamilton, Melancton Smith, and the Ratification of the Constitution in New York,” William and Mary Quarterly 24, no. 3 (1967): 346–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

41. For views skeptical of Lee's authorship, see Wood, Gordon S., “The Authorship of the Letters from the Federal Farmer,” William and Mary Quarterly 31, no. 2 (1974): 299–308CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Storing, 2: 215–16Google Scholar; and Bennett, Walter Hartwell, ed., Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1978), pp. xiv–xxGoogle Scholar.

42. The best case for Smith's authorship is Robert Webking, H., “Melancton Smith and the Letters from the Federal Farmer,” William and Mary Quarterly 44, no. 3 (1987): 510–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43. See Boyd, Steven R., “The Impact of the Constitution on State Politics: New York as a Test Case,” in The Human Dimensions of Nation Making: Essays on Colonial and Revolutionary America, ed. Martin, James Kirby (Madison, WI: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976), p. 276 n. 14.Google Scholar Jean Yarbrough contrasts the political philosophies of Smith and the Federal Farmer in “Representation and Republicanism: Two Views,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 9 (1979): 85–88,Google Scholar but Robert Webking provides an effective rebuttal (“Melancton Smith,” p. 516 n. 34)Google Scholar.

44. The Federal Farmer, Letters II and V, in Storing, 2.8.15, 2.8.60 (italics added). The Pennsylvania Minority likely borrowed Federal Farmer's language in its dissent, published in December 1787: “[F]armers, traders, and mechanics, who all ought to have a competent number of their best-informed men in the legislature, will be totally unrepresented [in Congress]” (Storing, 3.11.35). Lansing, Robert used the term “best-informed men” in referring to Senators in his convention speech of 06 24, 1788 (Debates, 2:293)Google Scholar. Smith had used the term several days earlier; perhaps Lansing had found it apt.

45. Smith, Melancton, Speech of 06 21, 1788, in Debates, 2: 244–48.Google Scholar Webking noted the presence of the “best-informed man” idea in Smith's speeches and the Federal Farmer's letters, but failed to explore the concept's wider significance (Webking, , “Melancton Smith,” p. 516).Google Scholar

46. I see no reason why the hybrid theory could not be extended to include well-qualified women in the category of “best-informed” people. However, for reasons of clarity and historical accuracy, I retain the masculine usage here.

47. Smith, Melancton, Speech of 06 21, 1788, in Debates, 2: 245Google Scholar. See also The Federal Farmer, Letter XII, in Storing, 2.8.158.

48. Livingston, Chancellor, Speech of 06 23, 1788, in Debates, 2: 277.Google Scholar

49. Smith, Melancton, Speech of 06 23, 1788, in Debates, 2:281Google Scholar. Earlier, Smith had argued that, despite their characteristic vices, even the wealthiest and greatest citizens should have representatives of their own class in Congress (Speech of 06 21, 1788, in Debates, 2: 248)Google Scholar.

50. Wood, Gordon, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), pp. 258–59.Google Scholar

51. Kramnick, , “Great Debate,” p. 14.Google Scholar

52. See Lynd, Staughton, Anti-Federalism in Dutchess County, New York (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962), p. 85Google Scholar.

53. Wood, Gordon describes this choice in the same terms (Creation, p. 522).Google Scholar

54. It is difficult to pick out a stellar example of a hybrid representative among modern politicians, but several figures have approached the ideal. One might argue that what preserved Bill Clinton throughout his marred presidency was the widespread perception that he was both extraordinarily competent and genuinely disposed to address the concerns of ordinary Americans. Ronald Reagan also seemed to fit comfortably within the role of a hybrid representative, unlike George H. W. and George W. Bush who, in order to divert attention from their patrician background, have been careful to emphasize their ties to rural Texas. In the most recent race for the White House, Democratic vice-presidential candidate John Edwards seemed much more at home within the hybrid model—as the articulate, successful son of a mill worker—than did his running mate, John Kerry.

55. Sinopoli, Richard C., “Liberalism and Political Allegiance in Anti-Federalist Political Thought,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 22 (1992): 135.Google Scholar

56. Acts of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 1812, quoted in de Grazia, Alfred, Public and Republic (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 126.Google Scholar A similar insight motivates Rousseau's conception of sovereignty and the general will: “[S]ince the sovereign is formed entirely from the private individuals who make it up, it neither has nor could have an interest contrary to theirs.” The Anti-Federalists do not, however, endorse Rousseau's conclusion that “the sovereign power has no need to offer a guarantee to its subjects,” and that “whoever refuses to obey the general will … will be forced to be free” (Rousseau, Jean Jacques, On the Social Contract, in The Basic Political Writings, trans, and ed. Cress, Donald A. [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987], p. 150).Google Scholar

57. Smith, Melancton, Speech of 06 25, 1788, in Debates, 2:314Google Scholar; and Hamilton, Alexander, Speeches of 06 24 and 25, 1788, in Debates, pp. 303, 319.Google Scholar For a position similar to Smith's, see Lansing, Robert, Speech of 06 24, in Debates, p. 294Google Scholar.

58. Lincoln, Abraham, “First Inaugural Address,” in Selected Speeches and Writings, ed. Fehrenbacher, Don E. (New York: First Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 284–93.Google Scholar

59. Compare the respective self-presentations of Congressmen A and D in Fenno, Richard, Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1978), chap. 3.Google Scholar

60. Wills, Garry, Explaining America: The Federalist (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), pp. 224, 234Google Scholar.