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The End of Revolution?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Robert S. Snyder
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Extract

Revolution ushered in the modern world, but modernity has killed it. Scholars who examine the causes or contributing conditions of revolutions focus either on structure, agency, or ideas, yet an analysis of each perspective reveals that the alleged causes or conditions have declined or been eliminated. In spite of capitalism's global crisis in the late 1990s, the spread of liberalism and other factors should make revolutions unlikely to occur.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 61 , Issue 1 , Winter 1999 , pp. 5 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1999

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