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Justice, Happiness, and the Sensible Knave: Hume's Incomplete Defense of the Just Life

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2013

Jonathan Culp
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Abstract

In his response to the fictitious “sensible knave” in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume argues that the practice of justice is always in our own interest. This article provides the first comprehensive interpretation of Hume's response, incorporating his discussion of virtue and happiness in his essay “The Sceptic.” It will be seen that this argument is a hedonistic one, resting on the superior pleasure and security of a life of modest wealth and intellectual cultivation. Hume's argument ultimately fails, and he knows it. He offers it nonetheless because it is generally true and socially beneficial.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 75 , Issue 2 , Spring 2013 , pp. 193 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2013 

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References

1 Hume's conception of justice in the broad sense has a threefold character: the invention of private property and rules for its division; the transference of property by consent rather than force or fraud; and the keeping of promises, especially contracts. See Treatise of Human Nature, 3.2.2–5; SBN 484–525; see also Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, sections 3–4 and App. 3; SBN 183–211 and 303–11.

In this essay, I cite the Treatise as follows:

T = Hume, David, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Norton, David Fate and Norton, Mary J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar. I cite the text by book, part, section, and paragraph number. Thus, “T 3.3.3.6” = Treatise, book 3, part 3, section 3, paragraph 6.

SBN = When “SBN” follows a citation to the Treatise, it refers to the corresponding page numbers in Hume, David, Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd ed., ed. Selby-Bigge, L. A., rev. Nidditch, P. H. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978)Google Scholar. When citing whole books or parts or sections, I do not include SBN numbers (e.g., “T 3.3.1” = book 3, part 3, section 1 of the Treatise; “T 3.3” = book 3, part 3 of the Treatise).

I cite the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals as follows:

EPM = Hume, David, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Beauchamp, Tom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998)Google Scholar. I cite the Enquiry by section and paragraph number.

SBN = When “SBN” follows a citation to the Enquiry, it refers to the corresponding page numbers in Hume, David, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd ed., ed. Selby-Bigge, L. A., rev. Nidditch, P. H. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. When citing whole sections, I do not include SBN numbers (e.g., EPM 6 = section 6 of the Enquiry).

Thus, whether “SBN” refers to the Treatise or the second Enquiry depends upon the citation that precedes it.

2 “'Tis … certain, that ’tis impossible for men to consult their interest in so effectual a manner, as by an universal and inflexible observance of the rules of justice” (T 3.2.7.1; SBN 534).

3 See Baier, Annette, “Artificial Virtues and the Equally Sensible Non-Knaves: A Response to Gauthier,” Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 429–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baldwin, Jason, “Hume's Knave and the Interests of Justice,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 42, no. 3 (2004): 277–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baron, Marcia, “Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of His Artificial Virtues,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12, no. 3 (1982): 539–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Costa, Michael J., “Why Be Just? Hume's Response in the Inquiry,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 22, no. 4 (1984): 469–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gauthier, David, “Three against Justice: The Foole, the Sensible Knave, and the Lydian Shepherd,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1982): 11–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gauthier, David, “Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave,” Hume Studies 18, no. 2 (1992): 401–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; King, James, “Pride and Hume's Sensible Knave,” Hume Studies 25, nos. 1–2 (1999): 123–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Krause, Sharon R., “Hume and the (False) Luster of Justice,” Political Theory 32, no. 5 (2004): 628–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Postema, Gerald, “Hume's Reply to the Sensible Knave,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1988): 23–40Google Scholar.

4 In Hume, David, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, rev. ed., ed. Miller, Eugene F. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), 159–80Google Scholar. All further references to “The Sceptic” are to this edition.

5 Gauthier (“Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave”) and Baron (“Hume's Noble Lie”) assert something similar, though neither of their arguments is identical to the one I will make because neither of them explains Hume's failure as a result of how Hume understands happiness.

6 T 2.3.9.8 (SBN 439) and especially EPM App. 2.12 (SBN 301–2) might suggest that Hume is not completely a hedonist with respect to the human good. Nonetheless, all of his discussions related to happiness revolve around pleasure and even these passages admit of a hedonistic interpretation.

7 He writes at one point, for example, that “nature has implanted in the human mind a perception of good or evil, or in other words, of pain and pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions” (T 1.3.10.2; SBN 118, italics mine; see also T 2.3.9.8; SBN 439). Likewise, he several times speaks of “good and evil” as causes of the passions (see, for example, T 2.3.4.1, 4 and 2.3.6.1; SBN 419, 421, 424), and he makes it very clear in the context that by “good and evil” he means “pleasure and pain” (See T 2.3.6.2, 2.3.9.8, and 1.3.10.2; SBN 424–25, 439, 118; see also 2.1.1.4 and 2.3.1.1; SBN 276, 399).

8 “Every quality of the mind is denominated virtuous, which gives pleasure by the mere survey; as every quality, which produces pain, is call'd vicious” (T 3.3.1.30; SBN 591); for other versions or invocations of this definition, see T 3.1.2.3–4, 3.2.2.24, and 3.3.1.3; SBN 471–72, 499, and 574–75. A discussion of the particular mechanism of the moral sentiment is beyond the scope of this essay. Although the formulation might sound paradoxical, Hume seems to consider the moral sentiment to be a kind of disinterested love or hatred made possible by sympathy and the capacity to contemplate the tendencies of kinds of actions and characters from a generalized perspective. For Hume's proof that moral judgment rests on sentiment rather than reason, see T 3.1.1.2; SBN 456. On the psychological mechanisms of the moral sense, see T 3.3.1. For a general overview of the relation between reason and sentiment in moral perception, see EPM App. 1.

9 Since “The Sceptic” is the fourth of a tetralogy of essays presenting the approach to happiness typical to four philosophical schools (Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Platonism being the other three), one cannot simply identify the speaker in “The Sceptic” with Hume himself. Indeed, Hume mildly distances himself from the eponymous speaker of the essay in a footnote (“Sceptic” 177–79n17). Immerwahr, John (“Hume's Essays on Happiness,” Hume Studies 15, no. 2 [1989]: 315–17)CrossRefGoogle Scholar makes the case that Hume disagrees with the Sceptic on one fundamental matter. Despite the fact that Hume and the Sceptic may not be in complete agreement, it is clear (and no one has denied) that Hume and the Sceptic have the same understanding of the nature of value, which is all that matters for the present point I am making.

10 Even more bluntly, he asserts that “the value of every object can be determined only by the sentiment or passion of every individual” and, hence, “good or ill, both natural and moral, are entirely relative to human sentiment and affection” (“Sceptic,” 172, 168). Hume's reasoning in support of this claim (“Sceptic,” 162–66) is comparable to the line of reasoning used in the First Appendix of the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals to prove that moral judgment depends ultimately on sentiment rather than reason. It is beyond the scope of this essay to enter into it here.

11 As he observes, the object of one man's affections will leave other animals, but also other men indifferent (see “Sceptic,” 162). Both nature and individuality determine the objects of our passions. Because different people have different temperaments or different “predominant inclination[s], to which [their] other desires and affections submit,” it follows, for example, that there are a great variety of different ways to pursue and attain happiness (“Sceptic,” 160). What makes a person happy depends, ultimately, on that person's temperament. This claim obviously poses some difficulties for anyone such as Hume who claims that the pursuit of virtue is in everyone's “true interest.” We will return to this difficulty later in the essay.

12 In the Treatise, for example, he says that “men often act knowingly against their interest,” and that this fact demonstrates that “the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them” (T 2.3.3.10; SBN 418). For a similar discussion, see EPM 6.15 (SBN 239), where Hume notes that “All men … are equally desirous of happiness; but few are successful in the pursuit,” and that this is largely because so many people lack the strength of mind to keep them fixed on the greater good when tested by present temptation. As he says, “however poets may employ their wit and eloquence, in celebrating present pleasure, and rejecting all distant views to fame, health, or fortune; it is obvious, that this practice is the source of all dissoluteness and disorder, repentance and misery.”

13 When one considers both of Hume's major discussions of virtue (book 3 of the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals), two different definitions of virtue emerge (assuming, as I think it justified, that the two discussions are fundamentally compatible). On the one hand, in the Treatise Hume often defines virtue as any quality of mind or character whose expression causes the pleasant sensation of approval in a disinterested spectator. (See T 3.3.1.30, 3.1.2.3–4, 3.2.2.24, and 3.3.1.3; SBN 591, 471–72, 499, and 574–75.) We could call this his formal definition of virtue. This definition fails, however, to lay out precisely what qualities are fit to elicit the sentiment of approval. That is the function of Hume's second definition of virtue, according to which a virtue is any quality of mind or character that is useful or pleasing to its possessor or to others. (See EPM 9.12; SBN 277; see also 9.1; SBN 268, and T 3.3.1.30; SBN 591. For Hume's proof that these classes of qualities are the ones fit to elicit moral approval, see T 3.3.1; see also EPM 5.) We could call this his material definition of virtue.

14 Hume never formally defines “justice,” but this is, I believe, the definition implicit in his discussion, and is most explicit in T 3.2.2.11; SBN 490, and EPM App. 3.3; SBN 304.

15 See T 3.2.1 (SBN 477–84) for proof of this.

16 This story is told at T 3.2.2.2–22; SBN 484–98. As Hume styles it, an “artificial virtue” is a habit of acting according to some convention that is deemed socially useful (such as the maintenance of private property). Not every act of compliance with that convention will be beneficial, but the convention as a whole is (see EPM App. 3.2–9; SBN 303–7). Thus, artificial virtues are accounted virtues (are approved of) because they are seen as means to maintaining institutions that people approve of.

17 This story is told at T 3.2.2.23–28; SBN 498–501. The extent to which truly impartial justice is internalized is questionable. That is, it is not clear to what extent it is “natural” for people to arrive at a point where they believe that they are morally required to treat everyone equally with respect to justice. I will return to this below.

18 For a very interesting discussion of how justice becomes incorporated into a sense of personal integrity, see Sharon R. Krause, “Hume and the (False) Luster of Justice,” 643–47; see also Marcia Baron, “Hume's Noble Lie,” 549–50.

19 One sees a parallel here with his second argument for the superiority of benevolence—that it brings with it a “pleasing consciousness” (EPM 9.21; SBN 282). The argument for benevolence is no more conclusive than this argument for justice. The question is whether to have a conscience, not how to avoid what pains an already-formed conscience.

20 Consider, in this regard, Glaucon's account of the origin of justice (Republic 358e–359b).

21 Gauthier (“Three against Justice”), Baron (“Hume's Noble Lie”), Costa (“Why Be Just?”), and Postema (“Hume's Reply to the Sensible Knave”) basically treat the first and third responses as equivalent.

22 It is, properly speaking, a quasi-Epicurean response because, although Hume's argument resembles Epicurus's in that they both apply similar criteria for sorting between pleasures to be sought and pleasures to be avoided, and both endorse the practice of justice while acknowledging its artificiality, Hume does not share Epicurus's metaphysical presuppositions, nor does he have precisely the same understanding of pleasure. See Epicurus, The Epicurus Reader, ed. and trans. Inwood, Brad and Gerson, L. P. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994)Google Scholar, esp. the Letter to Herodotus and the Letter to Menoeceus).

23 Baron, “Hume's Noble Lie”; Gauthier, “Artificial Virtues and the Sensible Knave.”

24 Gauthier (“Artificial Virtues,” 403) goes so far as to call it an “error” to believe that we have a moral obligation to be just even in situations where we do not have a self-interested reason. Thus, Gauthier maintains that Hume holds an “error theory” of motivation with respect to the artificial virtues. Baron (“Hume's Noble Lie,” 541–42) holds only that we over-rate the value of just actions.

25 Baier, “Artificial Virtues,” 432–34.

26 Baldwin, “Hume's Knave,” 292–94.

27 Baier, “Artificial Virtues,” 430–31.

28 “For Hume … there is no Archimedean ‘rational point of view’ from which a judgment could be made between the knave's version and the non-knave's version of self-interest. So Hume's reply to the knave is exactly what it should be. … True interest, in the Enquiry's sense, [is] relative to the values of the person whose interest it is” (Baier, “Artificial Virtues,” 431–32).

29 Baldwin is primarily concerned with refuting the notion that we lack motives to be just in certain circumstances; he does not evaluate the force or universal validity of those motives. Indeed, he admits (“Hume's Knave,” 295) that the motives he discusses all presuppose “publicity.” That is to say, they are reasons to choose being just over committing a public act of injustice. Hence, Baldwin does not provide a defense of Hume's Epicurean response, which grants the knave “secrecy” and “success.”

30 I do not discuss Postema's highly original interpretation because I do not find it plausible. He argues that, according to Hume, a stable sense of self requires honest self-exposure to others so that they can confirm that we are what we think we are. Because the knave cannot honestly expose himself, he cannot receive outside confirmation of his selfhood, and he therefore becomes psychologically unstable (he lacks a “character”). Postema bases his argument on several quotations from Hume about human sociability, but none of these quotations, when read in context, support his conclusion that we are psychologically dependent on others for confirmation of our sense of self. Systematic and successful hypocrites do not thereby become schizophrenics—which is what Postema's argument would seem to imply.

31 As Costa notes (“Why Be Just?,” 474, 476).

32 I add these qualifications because not every “honest man” in Hume's sense will necessarily set his happiness upon all the goods that Hume refers to in this passage. Hume's implication is that the person who pursues these goods will necessarily be an honest man; but the latter proposition does not, of course, imply the former.

33 Hume readily admits (see EPM 3.15–16; SBN 189–90) that there are circumstances in which respect for property must go by the wayside; but he also asserts that, under those circumstances, seizing the possessions of others is not truly vicious. More broadly, under those conditions where the convention of property is not generally useful, justice and injustice properly speaking do not exist and do not constitute virtues and vices; and there would be no convention for the knave to free ride on. Therefore, a life of knavery cannot be justified through recourse to necessity: under normal circumstances, systematic secret injustice is not necessary; under desperate circumstances, force and fraud are not vices.

34 It is important to note that Hume considers greatest overall pleasure here. He does not argue that knaves enjoy no happiness—only that they necessarily enjoy less than the moderate, comfortable honest man. In other words, Hume does not attempt to prove that an unjust disposition disqualifies a person from happiness. Just as justice and virtue are not sufficient for happiness, vice and injustice are not sufficient for unhappiness. All of this follows, of course, from Hume's hedonistic conception of happiness.

35 Philosophy can, however, have an indirect effect on taste and sentiment; for Hume's discussion of this, see “Sceptic,” 171–79.

36 As one can tell in “The Sceptic” and in the response to the knave in the Enquiry, Hume is addressing the question, “What general course of life, what general maxims, are most likely to lead to the greatest happiness overall?” He is comparing the life of the knave with the life of the honest man. He is not considering each particular calculation of benefit.

37 See the first chapter of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1.6; SBN 8–9).

38 And, perhaps, the thrill and pride of success—though this thrill and pride presupposes some value in the activity itself, and that value must come from the value of the objects. Otherwise, why not seek those thrills in some lawful pursuit?

39 See T 3.2.1.9–17; SBN 479–83; for Baron's account, see “Hume's Noble Lie,” 542–51, 554.

40 As Hume says, “A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest. … Nor is every single act of justice, consider'd apart, more conducive to private interest, than to public. … But however single acts of justice may be contrary, either to public or private interest, 'tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or indeed absolutely requisite, both to the support of society, and the well-being of every individual. 'Tis impossible to separate the good from the ill. Property must be stable, and must be fix'd by general rules” (T 3.2.2.22; SBN 497). See Baron, “Hume's Noble Lie,” 548–51.

41 See, again, Baron, “Hume's Noble Lie,” 554.

42 See David Hume, “My Own Life,” in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, xl (on love of literary fame), xxxiv–xxxv (on recasting his philosophy in popular form), xxxvi (on the EPM).

43 He writes, “though the philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of society; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must confess, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into those corners of nature, which spread a nuisance all around? Why dig up the pestilence from the pit, in which it is buried? The ingenuity of your researches may be admired; but your systems will be detested: And mankind will agree, if they cannot refute them, to sink them, at least, in eternal silence and oblivion. Truths, which are pernicious to society, if any such there be, will yield to errors, which are salutary and advantageous” (EPM 9.14; SBN 279).

44 An additional reason for doing so might have been to counteract the scandal that the Treatise had caused in some circles. The Treatise's account of justice as an artificial virtue had formed one of the bases for the opposition to his unsuccessful attempt to secure an academic position; on this, see David Hume, Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh, in A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition, ed. Norton, David Fate and Norton, Mary J. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007), 1:424, 429–30Google Scholar. For a discussion of this whole episode, see Mossner, Ernest C., The Life of David Hume, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), xxxGoogle Scholar.