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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
The past few years have seen a tremendous increase in the direct involvement of Africa's military men in political affairs. Between January, 1963, and early 1968 there were no less than nineteen successful military coups, military-led secessions, or military actions instrumental in bringing about changes of government in that continent. This total can be augmented by the numerous attempted military coups, mutinies, secessions, and plots that failed to gain power or that were foiled before launching. This increase in the political activities of the military in Africa calls for an assessment of the degree to which Africa's military men are accepted as legitimate national leadership material by Africa's masses and intellectuals.
1 These Forces Are Discussed At Some Length In My Forthcoming Monograph, Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa.
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14 Ibid.
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