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The Other Happy Life: The Political Dimensions to St. Augustine's Cassiciacum Dialogues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Michael P. Foley
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Extract

Though they are often overlooked or studied for different reasons, St. Augustine's Cassiciacum dialogues have a subtle yet important political dimension. Much of Augustine's conversation with his interlocutors implicitly hinges on matters concerning political philosophy, as does the very dialogue format Augustine chooses. Yet on the other hand, the focal points of the dialogues are essentially nonpolitical, and some of Augustine's statements can be construed as hostile to civic life and to any thoughtful reflection on the best political order. This essay argues that these apparent inconsistencies are not signs of a contradictory attitude but reveal a three-pronged strategy by Augustine to forge a properly Christian attitude towards political life, a strategy that involves (1) debunking patriotic fervor, (2) inflaming the love of truth, and( 3) re-engaging the civitas from a higher perspective.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 65 , Issue 2 , Spring 2003 , pp. 165 - 183
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2003

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References

1. These are, in the order they were intended to be read: the Contra Academicos (Against the Academics), the De beata vita (On the Happy Life), the De ordine (On Order), and the Soliloquia (Soliloquies). All of them were written at Cassiciacum, northern Italy, in the tradition of a philosophical dialogue some time after Augustine's conversion in the summer and autumn of 386 but before his baptism in April 387.

2. The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's ‘City of God’ (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1921).Google Scholar

3. New York: Columbia U. Press, 1963. Cf. pp. 253n35, 267n47 (on the Contra Academicos), and pp. 281n36, 296n20, 305n78 (on the De ordine). All of Deane's references to the Cassiciacum dialogues are found only in footnotes.Google Scholar

4. Saeculum: History & Society in the Theology of St. Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1970), pp. 78, 80.Google Scholar

5. The Pilgrim City: Social and Political Ideas in the Writings of St. Augustine of Hippo (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2001), p. 73.Google Scholar

6. Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reasoning (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).Google Scholar

7. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995.

8. Soliloquia 1.2.7. All translations in this essay are mine.Google Scholar

9. Romanianus, , to whom the Contra AcademicosGoogle Scholar is dedicated, was Augustine's lifelong friend and patron. At the time he was in Milan trying to protect his interests at the Emperor's court (Conf. 6.14.24), as many (unspecified) misfortunes had recently befallen him (Contra Academicos 1.1.2). Zenobius, , to whom the De ordine is dedicated, was another close friend of Augustine. He was currently in a kind of self-imposed exile “somewhere beyond the Alps”Google Scholar (Sol. 2.14.26) as a result of the Arian attempt to take over the Catholic basilicas in Milan in the spring of 386, a disturbance that had rendered Milan a “city terrified and tumultuous” (Conf. 9.7.15).

10. Contra Academicos 1.1.1–3; De ordine 1.2.4; cf. Augustine's description of his own retreat from public life, De beata vita 1.4.

11. Contra Academicos 1.1.2.

12. Cf. Brown, Peter, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000),Google Scholar where Brown construes the convert's recent deliverance “from the cares of a public career” as an intention “to live a secluded life” (pp. 108,125), and where he, after translating the phrase otium liberale as “cultured retirement,” outlines Augustine's early “intellectual programme” at Cassiciacum without any reference to the civic strains of that program or even the sections concerning character development (pp. 108,115). Cf. also Halliburton, R. J., “The Inclination to Retirement—the Retreat of Cassiciacum and the ‘;Monastery’ of Tagaste,” (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Altchristlichen Uteratur, Band 80[Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962], pp. 329–40),Google Scholar where Halliburton follows upon a line of thinking developed by Festugiére, A J., O.P., in his Personal Religion Among the Greeks (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), p. 53ff. My contention is not that Brown et al. believe that the early Augustine was anti-political or held no political opinions (in fact, some scholars like R. A. Markus argue—incorrectly, I would say—that Augustine held Eusebian views of a Christian Empire at this time), but simply that in light of their portrayal of Augustine during his catechumenate and neophyte periods as reclusive and disenchanted with the public forum, it would be understandably tempting for the reader to conclude that Augustine was not interested in engaging political life or political philosophy at this stage of his life.Google Scholar

13. Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1958.

14. St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386–391 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 4, 3,Google Scholar resp. O'Connell's judgment of Cicero, it should be noted, is in diametric opposition to Augustine's, not only with respect to Cicero's value (cf. Contra Academicos 3.16.36) but with respect to Cicero's alleged subscription to skepticism, which Augustine spends most of book 3 of the Contra Academicos boldly arguing is more apparent than real (cf. esp. 3.17.37ff, and Epistles 1 and 118, where Augustine contends that Cicero and/or the Academics only publicly professed the doctrine of skepticism, privately concealing a much different position. Augustine also alludes to this esotericism in Conf. 5.10.19, where he states that he— along with many others—thought that the Academics affirmed that no truth could be grasped because at the time he did not yet understand their real meaning (cf. 5.14.25)).

15. Augustine and the Latin Classics (Göteborg, 1967), p. 483.Google Scholar

16. Ibid., p. 481. According to Hagendahi, Augustine quotes twenty-nine passages from Cicero's speeches and two hundred three passages from Cicero's philosophical writings.

17. Ibid., p. 483.

18. Confessions 9.2.9.

19. Foley, , “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” Revue des Etudes Augnstiniennes 45/1 (1999): 63ff.Google Scholar

20. Cf. De fin. 3.1.3.

21. De div. 2.1.2.

22. It should be noted that Cicero saw these two dialogues as related, one being the foundation for the other (cf. De div. 2. 1. 2).

23. That Cicero expected these three works to be read as a trilogy can be seen from De div. 2. 1. 2.

24. Curley, , Augustine's Critique of Skepticism: A Study of Contra Academicos (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), pp. xvi ff.Google Scholar

25. Ibid., p. 12.

26. Debeata vita 1.1.

27. Deordine 1.1.1.

28. Cf. Cicero's portrayal of Socrates as the first political philosopher (Tusc.Disp. 5. 4. 5–11).

29. Dedivinatione 2.1.2.

30. Te, te consulo, Marce Tulli; de adulescentium moribus uitaque tractamus, cui educandae atque instituendae omnes Mae litterae tuae uigilauerunt) (Contra Academicos 3.16.35). Furthermore, when Cicero defends the Academics and Augustine attacks them, both are actually pursuing the same goal of fostering civic-mindedness. Cicero's promotion of skepticism was designed in part to attenuate political fanaticism by weakening its foundations in certainty. Augustine's assault on skepticism, on the other hand, is designed in part to promote moral action by expunging from the body politic the cynical inaction bred by systemic doubt (cf. Foley, , “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues,” pp. 59–61, 64).Google Scholar

31. Deordine 2.8.25.

32. Ibid., 2.9.26–2.15.42.

33. Ibid., 2.20.54. Significantly, Augustine's praise occurs after his discourse on education, wherein he shows his reader how to become “learned, perfect, wise, and happy.” Augustine, in other words, is replicating Pythagoras's pedagogical economy.

34. Contra Academicos 3.16.36.

35. De ordine 2.7.22.

36. “Augustine at Cassiciacum,” Vigiliae Christianae 42 (1988): 138,141, resp.Google Scholar

37. De beata vita 2.11.

38. Cf. Contra Academicos 3.16.36.

39. Cf. De beata vita 1.2, where Augustine twice uses patria to denote the beatific harbor of philosophy.

40. Contra Academicos 3.17.37.

41. I say “some” because like Plato, Aristotle also uses the adjective “political” to denote quasi or pseudo virtues (Nicomachean Ethics 3.1116a17).

42. Ennead 1.2.

43. Ennead 1.2.2, 3, esp. 1.2.2.15–25 and 1.2.3. 10–20.

44. Contra Julianum 4.3.4.

45. Ibid., 3.8.16. Augustine elsewhere labels this third type of vice curiositas (on this point see 1.10.16 and 10.30.41ff, as well as for more references to the three parts of the soul).

46. Ibid., 1.20.31: “I avoided pain, despair, ignorance—is this not admirable and praiseworthy in such a living being?” (fugiebam dolorem, abiectionem, ignorantiam. quid in talianimante non mirabileatque laudabile?).

47. Ibid. Cf. 13.21.30, where Augustine interprets the beasts, cattle, and serpents mentioned in the Genesis account of creation as mystical representations of the three parts of the soul.

48. Ibid., 10.30.41. The phrase is from I John 2:16.

49. N.B, : Libido principandi, ambitio saeculi, etc., are not synonymous with thymos (the spirited or irascible part of the soul) but are one of several possible results of thymos when it is in a sinful, disordered state.Google Scholar

50. Cf. Conf. 10.38.63, where Augustine describes the temptation of loving praise (amor laudis) as the most dangerous (periculosissimam).

51. Ibid., 38.71.1 say “presumably” because Augustine does not explicitly state that the lust for temporal domination is stronger than the allure of curiosity, though the passage, in my opinion, implies it.

52. Ibid., where Augustine equates the dominationis temporalis fastus with superbia, and 44.85, where Augustine describes this fastus in terms of the Fall.

53. De civitate Dei, 1.30 and proemium, resp.

54. De vera religione 45.84.

55. Debeata vita 1.2.

56. Ibid., 1.3. Cf. Contra Academicos 2.2.3.

57. O si uideretis… in quibus periculis iaceamus, cujus morbi dementiam risus iste indicet! O si uideretis! quam cito, quam statim quantoque productius eum uerteretis in fletus! Miseri, nescitis ubi simus?⃜ In philosophmm et in earn uitam, quam me tandem occupasse laetor, aemulationis tabificae atque inanis iactantiae ultimam sed nocentiorem ceteris omnibus pestem introducere ac proseminare conamini (De ordine 1. 10. 29, 30, emphasis added).

58. Ibid., 1.7.20.

59. Ibid., 1.10.29.

60. Julius Caesar II. iii. 13,14.

61. “St. Augustine's Critique of Politics,” New Scholasticism 47 (1973): 441.Google Scholar

62. De beata vita 4.35,36.

63. Ibid., 2.8.

64. Ibid., 2.11.

65. Cum autem se conposuerit et ordinarit concinnam pulchramque reddiderit, audebit iam deum uidere atcjue ipsumfontem, unde manat omne uerum, ipsumque patrem ueritatis. Deus magne, qui erunt illi oculi, quam sani, quam decori, quam ualentes, quam constantes, quam sereni, quam beati! Quid autem est illud, quod uident? Quid quaeso, quid arbitremur, quid aestimemus, quid loquamur? Cotidiana uerba occurrunt et sordidata sunt omnia uilissimis rebus. Nihil amplius dicam nisi promitti nobis aspectum pulchritudinis, cuius imitatione pulchra, cuius conparatione foeda sunt cetera (De ordine 2.19.51).

66. De liberio arbitrio 2. 14. 37: Habemus igitur qua fruamur omnes aequaliter atque communiter: nullae sunt angustiae, nullus in ea defectus. Omnes amatores suos nullo modo sibi invidos recipit, et omnibus communis est, et singulis casta est. Nemo alicui dicit: Recede, ut etiam ego accedam; remoue manus, ut etiam ego amplectar. Omnes innaerent, idipsum omnes tangunt … non enim aliquid ejus aliquando fit cujusquam unius aut quorumdam proprium, sed simul omnibus tota est communis. Truth as the highest and only truly shareable object of our longing is acknowledged in a briefer but equally eye-raising passage in the De ordine, where Augustine describes Christ avidly seeking souls worthy of his marriage-bed (1.8.24).

67. Rebpulic 462b, c; 464a, c. Augustine's judgment that a loyalty to one's own is inherently problematic is reflected in the tension between Augustine and his pupils (Trygetius and Licentius) in the Contra Academicos, De beata vita, and De ordine. He also explains the problem more explicitly in De vera religione 46.88ff.Google Scholar

68. De ordine 2.20.50.

69. Cf. De beata vita 2.8,4.30–32. Augustine portrays moderation not in terms of abstinence or suppression, but in terms of balance, “right measure,” and equanimity. He also uses the concept of moderation rather broadly, extending it beyond the perfection of the appetitive part of the soul to include the spirited, or thymotic, part as well (cf. De beata vita 4. 33, where immoderation is described as leading not only to luxuria, but dominatio and superbia).

70. Markus, , Saeculum, p. 78.Google Scholar

71. De ordine 2.9.26.

72. Cf. De beata vita 2.10; De ordine 1.11. 32, 2.1.1.

73. De ordine 2.9.27.

74. Cf. Ibid., 2.19.51, where Augustine attributes his love of truth not to his education, but to his mother's prayers.

75. Contra Academicos 3.19.42.

76. On this point see, among others, White, Michael, “Pluralism and Secularism in the Political Order: St. Augustine and Theoretical Liberalism,” University of Dayton Review 22:3 (1994): 144f;Google ScholarElshtain, , Augustine and the Limits of Politics, p. 22;Google ScholarDyson, , The Pilgrim City, p. xi.Google Scholar

77. White, , “Pluralism and Secularism in the Political Order,” p. 145.Google Scholar This topic also ties into the debate over whether Augustine's judgment of political life is pessimistic or positive (see below for examples of both sides of this argument). Though it is outside the scope of this essay to scrutinize these conclusions, I would like to suggest that broadening the examination of Augustine's political thought beyond the City of the God to the Cassiciacum dialogues may lead to a more nuanced evaluation of Augustine's thought and effect a mild reconciliation between proponents of Augustine's alleged negativity of the civitas and political life on the one hand and defendants of Augustine's affirmative political assessments on the other. For examples of the former position, see Deane, , Political and Social Ideas of Saint Augustine, chap. 4;Google ScholarLavere, George J., “The Political Realism of Saint Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 11 (1980), pp. 136,144;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWhite, , “Pluralism and Secularism in the Political Order,” p. 144;Google ScholarWeithman, Paul J., “Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function of Political Authority,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 30:3 (07 1992): 356–60;CrossRefGoogle ScholarCaton, , “St. Augustine's Critique of Politics,” p. 457;Google ScholarDyson, , The Pilgrim City.Google Scholar For the latter position, see Schall, James V., “Political Theory and Political Theology,” Laval Theologique et Philosophique 31 (1975): 27;Google ScholarBurnell, P. J., “The Status of Politics in St. Augustine's City of God,” History of Political Thought 13:1 (1992): 13–29;Google ScholarHefferman, Jeanne Marie, “The Nature and Origin of Political Authority in Augustine and Aquinas” (M.A. Thesis, Notre Dame Dept. of Government, 04 1995);Google ScholarElshtain, , Augustine and the Limits of Politics, esp. pp. 93ff.Google Scholarvon Heyking, John, Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2001).Google Scholar