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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
In a divided world and one in which there is no peace, a nation's military power fixes the extent to which it can hope to influence its own destiny. Only a few years ago, Europe west of the Stettin-Trieste line encompassed four out of seven Great Powers. Today it is militarily and economically prostrate and sapped by political dissent and moral incertitude. The unexampled accumulation of power across the Atlantic and beyond the Iron Curtain turns this weakness into relative impotence. No wonder that many western Europeans have reacted against this striking change in their fortunes by demanding that their several countries recapture jointly what as individual nations they have irretrievably lost.
The problem before us is a formidable one but its elements are simple. Many years ago Alexis de Tocqueville foresaw the day when each of the European nations, caught between the mass of Americans and the mass of Russians, would feel itself tragically weak, indeed powerless.
1 Gilson, Etienne, “The Achievements of the Congress of Europe,” Ambassade de France, Service de l'Information, Series IV, No. 20 (July, 1948), p. 2.Google Scholar
2 This definition deviates from the orthodox terminology which, in ascending order as regards the concentration of authority and power, distinguishes between alliances, confederation, federation, and the unitary state. I am using the term “Union” in the sense of confederation because this usage has become general since Mr. Bevin's pronouncement in January, 1948.
3 For some intelligent discussions of the problem see: Ward, Barbara, The West at Bay (New York, 1948);Google ScholarCrowther, Geoffrey, The Economic Reconstruction of Europe (Claremont, California), 1948;Google ScholarHarrod, R. F., “European Union,” Lloyds Bank Review, New Series, July, 1948, pp. 1–20;Google Scholar“British Commonwealth and Western Union,” The Round Table, June, 1948, pp. 633–642;Google Scholar and the official Labour Party publication Feet on the Ground (London, 1948). The latter pamphlet was written by Denis Healey.Google Scholar
4 Those familiar with Professor David Mitrany's writings will recall the sharp distinction he makes between the federal and the functional approach to international government. For his most recent study see “The Functional Approach to World Organization,” International Affairs, XXIV, 07, 1948, pp. 350–363.Google Scholar
5 Quoted in Feet on the Ground, p. 21.Google Scholar
6 Ibid.
7 The New York Times, December 10, 1948, p. 17.Google Scholar
8 Much to the surprise of the British government, the old Dominions are strongly supporting British commitments on the continent along the lines laid down by the Foreign Office. The functional approach suits them, too, since it permits them to watch developments and criticize or protest when their interests appear jeopardized.
9 This argument is stressed by Mr. Healey: “…the European countries differ greatly among themselves about the way in which a state's economic life should be organized; each country would do its best to insure that the federal government had as little power as possible to interfere in its domestic policies; certainly Socialists, at present a minority in Western Europe as a whole, would insist on the right to organize socialism in countries where they were a majority, as in Britain and Scandinavia.” Feet on the Ground, p. 20.Google Scholar
10 This does not mean that rising consumption levels in Europe are impossible or that the necessary sacrifices are of prohibitive magnitude if expressed as a percentage of the national product. But consumption levels must be kept from rising too much as production expands and, given the intense preoccupation of western Europeans with material consumption, this calls for real sacrifice. The problem of consumption levels is complicated by their close relation with the system of incentives toward productivity upon which western economies rely. And it is further complicated by the political problem of so distributing the burden of austerity between different population groups that political stability and national morale are at an optimum.
11 A third group of difficulties, those arising from the reactions of other countries, especially the USSR, is excluded from the paper.
12 At present, Britain and France are the chief powers of Western Union as represented by the parties to the Brussels pact. Yet a union grouped around France and Germany is not entirely inconceivable. It is rumoured that some persons in de Gaulle's entourage are entertaining such a design and it might gain currency if Britain's reluctance to commit herself would confront an increasing willingness to unite on the Continent.
13 Few Englismmen are unperturbed by what Western Union may imply in terms of the Commonwealth; and it is not, perhaps, surprising that this lively anxiety far exceeds that displayed by the Old Dominions. If the problem is analyzed in its various political, military and economic aspects, there apears no obvious reason why the Commonwealth connection could not survive British participation in a close union with western Europe. To be sure, there are problems of compatibility; but there are none, upon first inquiry at least, that could not be solved satisfactorily as long as union does not mean federation. English doubts are dictated by stereotyped reactions rather than by cool examination of the problems. In many instances citing the Commonwealth problem is simply a handy device of concealing other reasons for opposing a strong European commitment.
14 It has been estimated, for example, that it would cost Great Britain over £ 300 million if she were to adopt American rifles.
15 See the excellent article “The Onus of the Minus,” The Economist, London, 01 1, 1949, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar