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THE AMBIGUITY OF KNOWABILITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 June 2016

BARTELD KOOI
BARTELD KOOI*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen
*
*FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN OUDE BOTERINGESTRAAT 52 9712 GL GRONINGEN THE NETHERLANDS E-mail: b.p.kooi@rug.nl
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Abstract

In this paper it is shown that the Verification Thesis (all truths are knowable) is only susceptible to Fitch’s Paradox if one conflates the de re and de dicto interpretation of knowability. A formalisation shows that if one treats knowability as a complex second-order predicate, then the paradox falls apart.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 421 - 428
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2016 

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References

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