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HOW A SEMANTICS FOR TONK SHOULD BE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2015

ANDREAS FJELLSTAD
ANDREAS FJELLSTAD*
Affiliation:
University Of Aberdeen
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN OLD BREWERY AB24 3UB ABERDEEN E-mail: a.fjellstad@abdn.ac.uk
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Abstract

This paper explores how a semantics for Prior’s infamous connective tonk should be, a connective defined by inference rules that trivialize the logic of a deductive system if that logic is supposed to be transitive. To avoid triviality, one must reject transitivity and in a relatively recent paper, Roy Cook develops a semantics for tonk with non-transitive entailment. However, I show in this paper that a cut-free sequent calculus for tonk - the arguably most natural and simplest deductive system for a non-transitive logic - can neither be complete with respect to Cook’s semantics nor with respect to a semantics with non-transitive entailment based on a semantics for vagueness and transparent truth developed by Cobreros et al. It is argued that the failure to adequately represent tonk is connected with the fact that tonk is not uniquely defined in a cut-free sequent calculus system unless the logic is in addition non-reflexive. To remedy this, the paper develops a semantics with non-transitive and non-reflexive entailment based on the idea that complex formulae are true or false relative to them being assessed as premise or as conclusion.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 488 - 505
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015 

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