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LP+, K3+, FDE+, AND THEIR ‘CLASSICAL COLLAPSE’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2013

JC BEALL
JC BEALL*
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut and Northern Institute of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT STORRS, CT 06268
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Abstract

This paper is a sequel to Beall (2011), in which I both give and discuss the philosophical import of a ‘classical collapse’ result for the propositional (multiple-conclusion) logic LP+. Feedback on such ideas prompted a spelling out of the first-order case. My aim in this paper is to do just that: namely, explicitly record the first-order result(s), including the collapse results for K3+ and FDE+.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 6 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 742 - 754
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2013 

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