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MODALITY AND AXIOMATIC THEORIES OF TRUTH II: KRIPKE-FEFERMAN

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2014

JOHANNES STERN
JOHANNES STERN*
Affiliation:
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich
*
*MCMP, FAKULTÄT FÖR PHILOSOPHIE, WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE UND RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFTEN, LMU MÜNCHEN, GESCHWISTER-SCHOLL-PLATZ 1, D-80539 MÜNCHEN, GERMANY E-mail: johannes.stern@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
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Abstract

In this second and last paper of the two part investigation on “Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth” we apply a general strategy for constructing modal theories over axiomatic theories of truth to the theory Kripke-Feferman. This general strategy was developed in the first part of our investigation. Applying the strategy to Kripke-Feferman leads to the theory Modal Kripke-Feferman which we discuss from the three perspectives that we had already considered in the first paper, where we discussed the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. That is, we first show that Modal Kripke-Feferman preserves theoremhood modulo translation with respect to modal operator logic. Second, we develop a modal semantics fitting the newly developed theory. Third, we investigate whether the modal predicate of Modal Kripke-Feferman can be understood along the lines of a proposal of Kripke, namely as a truth predicate modified by a modal operator.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 299 - 318
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2014 

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References

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