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TWO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE GENERIC MULTIVERSE
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2020
Abstract
This paper critically examines two arguments against the generic multiverse, both of which are due to W. Hugh Woodin. Versions of the first argument have appeared a number of times in print, while the second argument is relatively novel. We shall investigate these arguments through the lens of two different attitudes one may take toward the methodology and metaphysics of set theory; and we shall observe that the impact of these arguments depends significantly on which of these attitudes is upheld. Our examination of the second argument involves the development of a new (inner) model for Steel’s multiverse theory, which is delivered in the Appendix.
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- Research Article
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- © Association for Symbolic Logic, 2020
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