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TWO LEVEL CREDIBILITY-LIMITED REVISIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2020

MARCO GARAPA*
Affiliation:
FACULDADE DE CIÊNCIAS EXACTAS E DA ENGENHARIA UNIVERSIDADE DA MADEIRA CAMPUS UNIVERSITÁRIO DA PENTEADA 9020-105 FUNCHAL, PORTUGALE-mail: marco@uma.pt

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new kind of nonprioritized operator which we call two level credibility-limited revision. When revising through a two level credibility-limited revision there are two levels of credibility and one of incredibility. When revising by a sentence at the highest level of credibility, the operator behaves as a standard revision, if the sentence is at the second level of credibility, then the outcome of the revision process coincides with a standard contraction by the negation of that sentence. If the sentence is not credible, then the original belief set remains unchanged. In this article, we axiomatically characterize several classes of two level credibility-limited revision operators.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Association for Symbolic Logic

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References

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