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Nihilism without Self-Contradiction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2008

David Liggins
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Extract

Last weekend, I made a bookcase. To begin with, I went and bought various pieces of wood and several screws. Then I screwed the pieces of wood together. In doing so, I created something new: my bookcase. And this bookcase is made up of the pieces of wood and the screws. In other words, they're parts of it.

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Papers
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 62 , July 2008 , pp. 177 - 196
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2008

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