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What is Moral Enhancement?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2018

Mark Rowlands
Mark Rowlands*
Affiliation:
University of Miami
*
mrowlands@miami.edu
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Abstract

The idea of moral enhancement has no clear meaning. This is because the idea of being moral has no clear meaning. There are numerous ways in which one might go astray, morally speaking, and each of these ways, in turn, fragments on further analysis. The concept of moral enhancement is as broad, messy, and mottled as the reasons why people behave badly. This mottled character of moral failure calls into question the feasibility of (non-traditional) programmes of moral enhancement.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 83: Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives , October 2018 , pp. 5 - 18
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2018 

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