Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T22:40:13.936Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Beyond Obligation: Reasons and Supererogation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2015

Michael Ferry
Michael Ferry*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Spring Hill College
*
mferry@shc.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Morality makes many demands on us. But few of us believe that we must do, morally speaking, the best that we can. There is a category of acts, the supererogatory, that involve going beyond our obligations. It seems perfectly plausible, for example, that the moral perfectionist would donate her fifty dollars to UNICEF though the rest of us are within our moral prerogative when we buy ourselves shoes instead. Although donating to UNICEF is considered especially good, it is usually accepted that morality permits us to buy the shoes; buying shoes is not considered a moral failing. When we consider our reactions to examples like this one, the idea that morality does not demand that we do our best is quite intuitive. On its face, however, it is rather curious. If in a given situation it would be morally better to give to UNICEF than to buy shoes, then how is it not a moral failing when one buys the shoes?

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 77: Supererogation , October 2015 , pp. 49 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Attfield, R. (1987) A Theory of Value and Obligation (London: Croon Helm).Google Scholar
Austin, J.L. (1962) How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard UP).Google Scholar
Bentham, J. (1830) An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. Neal, John (Boston: Wells and Lilly).Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. (1963) ‘Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics’, Ratio 5 1–14.Google Scholar
Clark, M. (1978) ‘The Meritorious and the Mandatory’, Meeting of the Aristotelian Society. (London).Google Scholar
Dancy, J. (1993) Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell).Google Scholar
Darwall, S. (2006) The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability (Cambridge: Harvard UP).Google Scholar
Dreier, J. (2004) ‘Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn't’, in Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason, ed. Byron, Michael (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).Google Scholar
Ferry, M. (2013) ‘Does Morality Demand Our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of Duty’, Philosophical Studies 165 573–589.Google Scholar
Gert, J. (2003) ‘Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength’, Erkenntnis 59 5–36.Google Scholar
Heyd, D. (1982) Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).Google Scholar
Macnamara, C. (2006) Beyond Praise and Blame: A Theory of Holding Others Responsible. Doctoral Dissertation. (Georgetown University).Google Scholar
Mill, J.S. (1866) ‘Auguste Comte and Positivism’, (London: N. Trübner and Co.).Google Scholar
Mill, J.S. (1863) Utilitarianism. (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn).Google Scholar
Portmore, D. (2003) ‘Position-Relative Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation’, Ethics 113.Google Scholar
Raz, J. (1999) Practical Reason and Norms. Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford UP).Google Scholar
Scheffler, S. (1994) The Rejection of Consequentialism. Revised Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press).Google Scholar
Searle, J and Vanderveken, D. (1985) Foundations of Illocutionary Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).Google Scholar
Strawson, P.F. (1993) ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, ed. Martin Fischer, John and Ravizza, Mark (Ithaca: Cornell UP).Google Scholar
Williams, B. (1995) ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame’, in Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).Google Scholar
Wolf, S. (1982) ‘Moral Saints,” Journal of Philosophy 79.Google Scholar