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Is Moral Enhancement a Right, or a Threat to Rights?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 October 2018
Abstract
Enhancements for morality could become technologically practical at the expense of becoming unethical and uncivil. A mode of moral enhancement intensifying a person's imposition of conformity upon others, labeled here as “moral righteousness”, is particularly problematic. Moral energies contrary to expansions of civil rights and liberties can drown out reasoned justifications for equality and freedom, delaying social progress. The technological capacity of moral righteousness in the hands of a majority could impose puritanical conformities and override some rights and liberties. Fortunately, there cannot be a human right or a civil right to access righteous moral enhancement, and governments would be prudent to forbid such technology for moral righteousness. From an enlarged perspective, less righteousness could lead to a more just society. Going further, if a neurological intervention for moral righteousness could be invented, so too could moral de-enhancement, here labeled as “moral toleration”. Perhaps moral toleration deserves as much commendation as so-called moral enhancement. Justice with less delay can be justice enhanced.
- Type
- Papers
- Information
- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 83: Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives , October 2018 , pp. 209 - 231
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2018
References
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16 This essay is premised on rejecting liberalism's ideal of public debate proceeding without appeals to devoutly-held values. This essay's concerns about righteousness within politics presume an essential role for all citizens and their values.