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Moral Enhancement and Moral Freedom: A Critique of the Little Alex Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2018

John Danaher
John Danaher*
Affiliation:
National University of Ireland, Galway
*
john.danaher@nuigalway.ie
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Abstract

A common objection to moral enhancement is that it would undermine our moral freedom and that this is a bad thing because moral freedom is a great good. Michael Hauskeller has defended this view on a couple of occasions using an arresting thought experiment called the “Little Alex” problem. In this chapter, I reconstruct the argument Hauskeller derives from this thought experiment and subject it to critical scrutiny. I claim that the argument ultimately fails because (a) it assumes that moral freedom is an intrinsic good when, in fact, it is more likely to be an axiological catalyst; and (b) there are reasons to think that moral enhancement does not undermine moral freedom.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 83: Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives , October 2018 , pp. 233 - 250
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2018 

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