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Moral Integrity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Bernard Mayo
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Extract

‘Moral Integrity’ has struck me for some time as one of those things that is more a matter of name-dropping than of real acquaintance. But when I undertook to say something about it, I soon discovered that I had bitten off far more than I – or perhaps anyone – could chew within the hour. In this I find myself in good company: for Professor Winch also chose this title for his Inaugural Lecture – I apologise for overlooking this when I chose my own title – and in his first paragraph he explains that he will be saying nothing about Moral Integrity, though he expresses the hope that what he has said will be found to have a bearing on it. I shall not be discussing his lecture, except incidentally; but I commend his wisdom in not trying, as rashly as I am, to say something directly about the topic.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 11: Human Values , March 1977 , pp. 27 - 43
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1977

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References

NOTES

1 Reprinted in Winch, Peter, Ethics and Action, pp. 171–92.Google Scholar

2 Freedom and Reason, p. 169.Google Scholar

3 Empiricism and Ethics, p. 129.Google Scholar

4 Contemporary Moral Philosophy, p. 59.Google Scholar

5 In this, too, I found myself in good company: when the first volume of the Synoptic Index of the Aristotelian Society's Proceedings was published, I found that G. E. Moore, when duly synopsising a fifty-year-old paper, had filled his entry with disclaimers like ‘purports’.

6 ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, §§4–5, in Smart, and Williams, , Utilitarianism For and Against.Google Scholar

7 Harris, John, ‘Williams on Negative Responsibility and Integrity’, Philosophical Quarterly, 24, pp. 270–3.Google Scholar

8 ‘Critique’, p. 118.Google Scholar

9 Journal of Philosophy, 73, pp. 453–66.Google Scholar

10 Mind, 85, pp. 90–6.Google Scholar

11 Human Conduct, pp. 181–2.Google Scholar

12 Grice, Russell, in Grounds of Moral Judgment, 101ff.Google Scholar, has constructed a rather more robust character called the Master Criminal.

13 The Possibility of Altruism: see especially pp. 144–5.

14 Moral Motions, p. 119.Google Scholar

15 Ethics and Action, p. 172.Google Scholar

16 ‘The Moral Agent’, in The Human Agent (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, vol. I (1966–1967), pp. 55–8).Google Scholar