Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T22:18:29.314Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

On Understanding a General Name

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2010

Bernard Harrison
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

One venerable, and supposedly thoroughly discredited, way of thinking about general names is to conceive of them as names of essences. This is not as transparently foolish a conceit as is nowadays generally supposed. Locke used the term ‘essence’ in two related senses; first, as ‘the being of any thing whereby it is what it is’, and second, as a name for any principle or procedure (for example, matching against an abstract idea) which enables us to rank things under ‘sortal names’ (general names) (Locke, 1690, 3.2.15). In this latter sense, knowing the essence which corresponds to horse or lead, for example is, according to Locke, knowing ‘what are the alterations may or may not be in a horse or lead, without making either of them to be of another species’ (Locke, 1690, 3·3·13).

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 10 , March 1976 , pp. 116 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 1975

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Chomsky, N.Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1969), Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press.Google Scholar
Frege, G. ‘On sense and nominatum’ in Feigl, H. and Sellars, W. (Eds.) Readings in Philosophical Analysis (1949), N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 85–102.Google Scholar
Harrison, B.‘Translations and Taxonomies’ J. Philosophical Linguistics, 1, no. 2 (1970), pp. 9–30.Google Scholar
Harrison, B.Meaning and Structure (1972), N.Y.: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Harrison, B.Form and Content (1973), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Harrison, B. ‘Epistemological Relativism and Meaning Invariance’ Cahiers du Centre de Recherches l'Analyse et la Théorie des Savoirs, Université de Lille III (1977), Presses Universitaires de l'Université de Lille.Google Scholar
Harrison, B.Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (forthcoming), London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Kovesi, J.Moral Notions (1968), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Kripke, S. ‘Naming and Necessity’ in Davidson, D. and Harman, G. (Eds.) Semantics of Natural Language (1972), 2nd ed., Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
Locke, J.An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Montague, R. ‘English as a formal language’ in Visentini, B. et al (Eds.) Linguaggi: nella societa e nellatechnica (1970), Milan: Edizioni di communita, 189–222.Google Scholar
Moravcsik, J. M.E.Understanding Language (1975), The Hague: Mouton.Google Scholar
Nelson, K.‘Concept, Word and Sentence: Interrelations in Acquisition and Development’ Psychological Review, 81 (1974), 267–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ in Quine, , From a Logical Point of View (1953), N.Y.: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Slote, M. (1974) Metaphysics and Essence, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L.Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L.Philosophical Investigations (1953), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L.The Blue and Brown Books (1958), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wittgenstein, L.On Certainty (1969), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar