Article contents
Promises to the Dead
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 November 2021
Abstract
Many people attempt to give meaning to their lives by pursuing projects that they believe will bear fruit after they have died. Knowing that their death will preclude them from protecting or promoting such projects people who draw meaning from them will often attempt to secure their continuance by securing promises from others to serve as their caretakers after they die. But those who rely on such are faced with a problem: None of the four major accounts that have been developed to explain directed promissory obligation (the Authority View, the Trust View, the Assurance View, and the Reliance View) support the view that we are obligated to keep our promises to persons who are now dead. But I will provide hope for those who wish to use such promises to protect the meaning with which they have endowed their lives. I will argue that while we cannot wrong a person who is now dead by breaking a promise made to her during her life, we could wrong the living by so doing. We thus (might) have reason to keep the promises that we made to those who are now dead.
- Type
- Papers
- Information
- Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 90: Death and Meaning , October 2021 , pp. 81 - 103
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2021
References
- 2
- Cited by