Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
The question about ‘identity’ under consideration in this paper is different from the one discussed in some of the other papers—for instance by Geoffrey Madell and Lars Herzberg. That question arises from the fact that human beings change in appearance and behaviour in the course of their life. By and large we have no trouble in recognizing them but we may wonder what it is that remains the same in them or about them so that we recognize them, address them by the same name, respond to them as to someone we know. What is it for a person to be the same person through these changes? By virtue of what do we call them by the same name?
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5 See Bettleheim, Bruno, The Informed Heart (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).Google Scholar
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