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Scientific Progress: Beyond Foundationalism and Coherentism1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 November 2007

Hasok Chang
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Extract

Scientific progress remains one of the most significant issues in the philosophy of science today. This is not only because of the intrinsic importance of the topic, but also because of its immense difficulty. In what sense exactly does science makes progress, and how is it that scientists are apparently able to achieve it better than people in other realms of human intellectual endeavour? Neither philosophers nor scientists themselves have been able to answer these questions to general satisfaction.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 61: Philosophy of Science , October 2007 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2007

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Footnotes

*University College London
1

This is an updated and expanded version of the lecture given in the Royal Institute of Philosophy seminar series in London on 28 October 2005.